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Abstract 
An Enterprise Culture, which looks to replicate improvements to quality and efficiency 
demonstrated in the private sector, has evolved from health care policy in the English 
NHS.  The aims of this research were to explore the theory underpinning the application 
of the policy and to challenge and test if the Enterprise Culture has provided a 
framework for performance improvement in a rural District General Hospital (DGH). 
The evolution and characteristics of the Enterprise Culture resulting from the 
convergence of political policy relating to health care revealed a centralised command 
and control approach to performance expectations and a decentralised means of 
achieving them through managers and competitive markets. Using a mixed 
methodology with a dominant quantitative, less dominant qualitative emphasis, this 
research examined the theory through a critical comparison of the Enterprise Culture 
present in a single case study of a rural DGH with the Purpose, Process, People (PPP) 
framework which has led to private sector success. 
Firstly, the study looked to understand the nature of the central Enterprise Culture 
target for hospital emergency care: that patients spend less than four hours in the 
Emergency Department. A quantitative analysis of service demand from patients found 
that attendance patterns offered opportunity to use PPP techniques to meet the four 
hour target, but that greater data availability would be necessary to make detailed 
calculations.  A quantitative analysis of the resources provided revealed that capacity 
was not calculated, planned or monitored to meet demand. Furthermore, an 
ethnographic study of the operational activities of the hospital’s emergency care system 
uncovered a lack of defined process and competent actors, departmental barriers and 
reactionary decisions leading to poor performance against the four hour wait target.   
Secondly, an intervention was introduced to examine the Enterprise Culture’s ability to 
generate efficiency and quality improvements. The intervention (care plans and drug 
chart provision for patients who required clinical observation) addressed a need, specific 
to the case site and was identified and implemented by clinicians and managers within 
the hospital’s emergency care system.  Practical barriers to conducting research in rural 
a DGH were encountered during the intervention and its evaluation.  The intervention 
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also revealed that although the Enterprise Culture enabled an improvement 
intervention to meet local needs, pressure from the central target and the competence 
of people enacting the process did not support its continued efficacy. 
In conclusion, in my contributions to subject knowledge, I argue that the Enterprise 
Culture present in the case site does not support the policy aims for generating quality 
and efficiency. The central four hour target remains too influential and causes 
reactionary operational activities.  Processes and staff competent in following them are 
not adequate to meet the demands placed on the service of the emergency care system 
studied.  Finally, the whole emergency care system has a great influence on the 
Emergency Department’s performance and should be considered when evaluating its 
performance and decisions about service structure.  
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1 Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
Government policy for English health care has, since the late 1970s, converged towards 
a system which looks to reproduce the resource utilisation, quality and efficiency 
successes of high-achieving private organisations (Turner et al., 2013a).  Wall and Owen 
term this use of policy the Enterprise Culture (2003, 113-125), which consists of two 
principal themes.  Firstly, a centralised structure for setting measures of health care 
related performance (with a target level to be achieved at a health care Trust level) and 
the means to monitor them: the command and control structure.  
To achieve these central aims, a second theme is the decentralised implementation of a 
management structure and a competitive market system. Under the Enterprise Culture, 
an increase in the number of NHS managers and decrease in clinician power was 
implemented (Baggott, 2007, 130-153). Many responsibilities that senior clinicians 
previously held (such as service provision and control of budgeted spend) were given to 
the new management structure. The decentralised market system of commissioning 
health care provision from within and outside the NHS was also developed to promote 
competition and value (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 54).    
In a government consultation in 2000, participants from the public and National Health 
Service (NHS) staff confirmed the time patients spend in an Emergency Department to 
be a critical aspect of hospital emergency care performance, because, they felt, lengths 
of stay were excessive and varied across the country.  From this consultation, targets for 
emergency care were created by the Department of Health (DH) in the NHS Plan 
(Department of Health, 2000). The DH subsequently set its strategy to deliver its 
Emergency Department performance target under the first reforming emergency care 
paper (Department of Health, 2001). The target for English Emergency Departments was 
stated: “by 2004 no-one [is] to wait more than 4 hours in an A&E [sic] department from 
arrival to admission to a bed in the hospital, transfer elsewhere or discharge. The 
average length of waiting should fall to 75 minutes”.  
A review of the aggregated national performance showed this target was achieved by 
2005 (Alberti, 2007).  However, performance is highly variable, and sustainment of the 
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improvements is unclear (Turner et al., 2013b).  Data published in the Health Service 
Journal shows a six month period in 2012 – 2013 where the English NHS failed to meet 
the four hour wait target (Clover, 2013). 
1.2  Rationale 
This research and the subsequent thesis were developed from my involvement leading 
a project to improve waiting time performance in the Emergency Department of a 
District General Hospital (DGH) in rural district of England. 
Ostensibly, the four hour target was a reflection of the performance of the Emergency 
Department; what the patients and users expected to experience when they presented 
to the department for emergency care.  However, the government understood that 
achieving the expected Emergency Department performance was also influenced by 
other factors within the hospital system such as the time to complete diagnostic test 
results and enacting bed management procedures (Lammy, 2003, 112).  Furthermore, 
as a performance improvement and statistical engineer with ten years’ experience 
working in organisations using the methodologies underpinning the Enterprise Culture, 
I deemed the systemic view to be central to the successes of private sector in quality 
and efficiency.  In emergency care, the system would be both within and beyond the 
hospital setting. The systemic view of creating performance efficiency seemed to be very 
different from the government approach of fragmenting the system and setting distinct 
performance expectations on a limited number of its components. 
I created figure 1.1 to describe at a simplistic level the nature of the Emergency 
Department which requires that all factors which cause operational increases or 
decreases in the system should be considered.  However, the improvement project 
measurement and scope assumed that only internal factors could be changed to reduce 
the time patients spent in Emergency Department.  Although this may or may not be 
true, the assumptions and un-systemic approach conflicted with the practices I had 
taken from the private sector. 
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Figure 1.1 Emergency Department Causal Loop Diagram 
 
Understanding the purpose of the Emergency Department waiting time target would 
direct the methods used in the improvement project. The Emergency Department 
waiting time measurement presented a dichotomy for the method to be used in the 
improvement project.  In an improvement engineering project the measure typically 
forms part of a statement about the problem to be solved and is inextricably linked to 
the purpose. Was the purpose of the measure to indicate whether: 
1. Patients spend excessive time in Emergency Department (as the NHS plan 
states)? Or 
2. The emergency care system was functioning well (as argued by Lammy and 
inferred the DH development of the Enterprise Culture)?  
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1.3 Aims of the Research 
These tensions inspired me to research the purpose of the waiting time target with 
academic rigour.  I aimed to test whether the methods that I had successfully used in 
the private sector could achieve the same results in a rural NHS hospital: a pragmatic 
choice as I worked in a DGH in a rural area of the English East Midlands.  I felt that it was 
important to add to the literature insights into: 
1. Any limitations to achieving the Enterprise Culture four hour target? 
2. What private sector best practice improvements are possible in an Emergency 
Department?  
The study began with the general aim of understanding whether the DH four-hour target 
supported the needs of what an Emergency Department considered to be good service 
delivery within their part of the emergency care system.  Following the literature review 
more specific aims emerged. 
The rationale for the study was then amended to understand: 
1. The dynamics, capacity and capability of the Emergency Department service; in 
particular how the presence of the Enterprise Culture affects Emergency 
Department performance.  
2. The demand from emergency care service users who present to a rural 
Emergency Department.  This includes assessing how much control the 
Emergency Department had over demand for its service and what alternative 
emergency care services exist.  Demand characteristics, patient demographics 
and acuteness, and the stochastic nature of arrival patterns required scrutiny.   
3. What capacity does the Emergency Department need in order to fulfil its role in 
providing an emergency care service?  Identification of the gaps between the 
current Emergency Department system and the Purpose Process People (PPP) 
framework in order to realise the benefits identified in the literature review was 
also necessary. What characteristics of the Emergency Department system 
would need to be changed and could this be achieved?  
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1.4 Reflections on the Hybrid Role of Researcher / NHS Manager 
At the time of conducting the research, I was employed as a manager in the trust with 
responsibility for the case site I studied, however I was not based at that hospital and 
my role was not within Emergency Care. I designed the study to ensure that my position 
was known openly to all potential participants who were approached to enroll in the 
research and actors within the case study site during my observations.   
The biggest impact of the hybrid role was through the observations.  Theoretically, the 
overt nature of my approach allowed me detailed observation of the complexities of the 
culture within the case site (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010) but raised an ethical challenge of 
reaction from the actors and changes in their behaviour because of my position as a 
manager. 
In practice, when informing staff of my position and the aims of the research, staff gave 
no indication (through comments or signals that I was able to recognise, nor through 
feedback or escalation routes) that they considered my presence to be threatening.  The 
four hour wait was seen generally as a beneficial because they believed patients should 
not be in the Emergency Department for longer periods.  However during conversations 
with some clinical staff from the Emergency Department, it emerged that there was 
resentment at the interference of central targets and external pressure to meet them 
and an investigation was often welcomed, but not challenged.   The nature of observing 
patient flow from a distance and not interfering with or investigating direct patient care 
was also deemed positive by two nurses who were recruited to the study. 
Whilst present in the emergency care environment, it was quite easy to be discreet: I 
received no comments or requests to move / leave either directly or through escalation 
and was always able to find space out of the way of clinical staff to observe or write 
notes.  I was known to the senior clinical staff and managers, however the junior doctors 
and nurses were frequently changed and (when very new) did not even know who other 
permanent members of the Emergency Department were: I was paid little attention.  
The almost constant busy state of the emergency care system, changes of rota shifts and 
movement of patients also contributed to my ability to move quietly and discreetly 
through the hospital to observe events and examine their causes. 
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Yin describes the potential for bias and lack of rigour in ethnographic study which were 
mitigated through the research design and my training (2014).  However a further 
potential for bias that is relevant to my dual position of manager and researcher comes 
from what Hammersley and Atkinson term “overrapport”:  where the “task of analysis 
is abandoned in favour of the joys of participation” (1995, 87).  The only time of anxiety 
that this level of bias might be introduced through my position was when observing a 
night shift.  My presence was much more obvious as there was less patient volume and 
staff gathered at the nurse station where I often positioned myself for observation and 
note writing.  However, the time was spent in candid conversation about the research 
and the perceptions of staff regarding patient demand and my role and trust 
responsibilities were not mentioned at all. 
Additionally, the “Hawthorne effect”, where people under observation will behave 
differently when observed (and more unpredictably when observed by a manager) was 
a potential bias (Hagel et al., 2015).  However, as noted above, there was little evidence 
of staff being noticeably aware of my presence. 
My initial assumption for the research was that the complexities of the case site could 
be studied in a systemic model manner, similar to Brailsford et al. who created a 
simulation model of performance for an urban emergency care system based on 
capacity and demand analysis (2004).  As the research progressed, this assumption was 
refuted because of the more detailed and qualitative nature of the study and through 
evidence that the performance of the system studied in the case site was: 
 Greatly affected through the agency and behaviour of its actors. 
 Subject to changing workforce dynamics 
 Influenced by internal structures within elements of the system. 
This led to the recommendation to study the whole emergency care system further 
using an agent-based simulation model where the wider impact of the research can be 
applied to systemic improvements to emergency care. 
The research conducted through the hybrid role was successful in gathering and 
analysing data which was subsequently validated by clinical staff.  The outcome of the 
14 
 
quantitative assessment from the research was used to inform local improvement 
activities within the Trust.  However in future research, I would consider more emphasis 
on the use of semi-structured interviews early in the study to understand the levels of 
agency in greater detail to complement my observations. 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
1.5.1 Structure 
This thesis is structured to follow the process of the research, firstly defining the 
research questions and then how they were addressed. Following an agreement with 
the Editor, papers relating to the chapters and the research process were published in 
series in the British Journal of Health Care Management in order to keep a consistent 
record of the progress of this research in a relevant journal.  They are presented below 
in chronological order of publication which is consistent with the research process. 
1.5.2 Chapters 
Chapter 2 records the literature review in two parts.  Part one defines the development 
and characteristics of the Enterprise Culture.  Although this literature review supported 
the original research question, which looked to address the use of needs-led indicators 
in Emergency Departments, the findings led to an understanding of the complexities and 
components of the Enterprise Culture and led to changes to the research aims and 
questions.  
The importance and impact of targets and indicators in the ‘command and control 
structure’ of the Enterprise Culture are discussed.  The centralised target system 
employed through the Enterprise Culture contrasts with the best practice effective use 
of targets and indicators controlled by decision makers at a local level. Furthermore, 
data used in the indicators should be valid and un-confounded for effective use when 
generating improvements. 
Part two examines the Enterprise Culture’s efficacy in greater detail; to understand the 
private sector framework which the Enterprise Culture looks to adopt and to develop 
the research aims and questions.  The chapter discusses the limitations of the Enterprise 
Culture in producing the high levels of performance and improvements to quality and 
efficiency seen in private sector best practice.   
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Centralised targets do not support improvement activities and the command and 
control structure can lead to a culture of fear and suspicion.  The decentralised managers 
are not always capable of enacting the changes necessary to generate the outcomes 
expected through the Enterprise Culture. 
The research methodology is discussed and justified in chapter 3.  Although a broadly 
positivist approach was adopted to create a framework for intervention, an interpretive 
perspective was included to understand the influence of human perception which was 
a critical finding from the literature review.  A critical realist approach was adopted to 
understand the causal mechanisms resulting from the rigid organisational structures 
and complex social relationships seen in the Enterprise Culture. A pragmatic paradigm 
with mixed methods was selected to achieve this.  The confirmation of the research 
rationale, theory, questions and protocol following the findings from literature reviews 
are then selected.  A deductive theory was justified to challenge and test whether the 
Enterprise Culture has provided a framework for performance improvement in a rural 
District General Hospital.  This was influenced by complexity theory and methods were 
mixed pragmatically to test the theory and answer the following research question and 
hypothesis: 
1. What is the nature of the emergency service users’ demand? 
2. What characteristics of the Enterprise Culture exist in the Emergency 
Departments and what are their effects on performance against the four-hour 
wait target? 
3. Hypothesis: the private enterprise framework adopted by the Emergency 
Department is successful in achieving the aims of the Enterprise Culture. 
4. How can the private enterprise best practice framework or other best practice 
method be introduced to meet the needs of the local emergency care system? 
 
Chapter 4 describes the methods used to answer the research questions. Data 
gathering, analysis and validation methods are described. 
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In chapter 5, the first research question is addressed. Patient demand was quantitatively 
analysed and described in terms of attendance patterns and variation. The potential 
adoption of techniques used in the private sector to calculate the productivity rates 
needed to meet targets was discussed as a means of planning the Emergency 
Department to meet the four hour target.  Issues with data recording practices were 
identified which prevented these calculations being made. 
Chapter 6 addresses the second research question.  Qualitative and quantitative 
methods were used to examine the resources, operational activities and relationship 
characteristics of the Enterprise Culture present in the Emergency Department and their 
effect on performance against the four hour wait target. The chapter discusses the 
findings regarding limited process definition and resource planning which were evident 
from the research.  These limitations led to reactionary decisions relating to patient care.  
Barriers to effective performance caused by organisational structures and relationship 
were also evident.  
The research hypothesis is addressed in chapter 7.  The findings described in chapters 5 
and 6 were validated using a modified Delphi and Nominal group technique and 
limitations caused by a lack of participant availability are discussed.  An intervention was 
planned and implemented by the staff within the hospital’s emergency care system to 
address local concerns regarding the provision of care plans and drug charts for patients 
who required clinical observation.  The efficacy of this intervention, as a study of the 
Enterprise Culture’s ability to promote quality and efficiency improvements, was 
evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively.  The influence of the four hour wait target in 
achieving the Enterprise Culture’s aims for generating quality and efficiency 
improvements is discussed along with the continued relational issues identified in a 
post-intervention ethnographic study.  Insufficient evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that the Enterprise Culture in the case study Emergency Department was 
successful in achieving quality and efficiency improvements. 
Chapter 8 addresses the fourth research question. The key differences between the 
Enterprise Culture and private sector frameworks, identified in the first three research 
questions, are discussed.  Key findings from the research suggested that the central four 
hour wait target has a significant influence on operational activities within the case site.  
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Central targets do not necessarily however address the needs of the Emergency 
Department or the whole emergency care system of which it is a part. A review of the 
whole emergency care system was proposed to understand the causal mechanisms of 
providing capacity to meet the demand for emergency care and aid decision making 
though the use of computer simulations.  Contrary to private sector success, I argue that 
the people involved in the system studied were more influential on performance than 
the process and that a clear process used by competent staff and supported by 
empowered managers who can mentor improvement is necessary.  
Chapter 9 forms the conclusion to the thesis and offers a reflective critique of 
contributions from and limitations to the research. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review is divided into two parts. Part one looks at the literature associated 
with an emerging Enterprise Culture and the use of performance indicators to inform 
the original research question proposed as the starting point for the research study: 
How have needs-led indicators been developed, what are they, to what extent are they 
implemented and do they lead to improvements in service delivery and quality of care 
in Emergency Departments in District General Hospitals? The review was completed in 
December 2012 and led the publication of a paper entitled ‘Creating Enterprise 
Efficiencies in the English NHS’.  This paper was accepted for publication in the British 
Journal of Healthcare Management in June 2013 and is included in appendix 8 (Turner 
et al., 2013a).   
However, through the first review, the components and complexity of the policy 
underlying the use of indicators were identified.  A further review was defined leading 
to changes in the research question and study aims and this review forms the second 
part of this chapter.  This literature review addresses the implementation and efficacy 
of the Enterprise Culture and a deeper examination of the best practice framework the 
Enterprise Culture was developed to adopt. The second review was completed in 
September 2013 and led to the publication of a paper entitled ‘Enterprise Efficiency 
Framework: the English NHS’.  This paper was accepted for publication in the British 
Journal of Healthcare Management in November 2013 and is included in appendix 8 
(Turner et al., 2013b).   
2.1.1 Context of the Literature Review 
This section will describe the strategy of the literature search in order to provide context 
for the results of the literature reviews discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.1.1.1 Comprehensive Search: Strategy and Systematic Techniques 
In order to fully identify subject knowledge for the reviews, a comprehensive search was 
conducted across the academic and grey literature (unpublished academic, government, 
professional and private sector publications). Search strategies were devised (and are 
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detailed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1) for both reviews in order to produce manageable 
and relevant evidence for inclusion in the literature review (Boland et al., 2014).  These 
strategies were designed using systematic techniques to manage the quality and 
quantity of returns from the search, and to provide a framework for synthesis of 
evidence.  The design of the search strategy is discussed in the next section. 
2.1.1.2 The Search Strategy Design 
The search strategy followed a protocol described in figure 2.1 
Figure 2.1: Search strategy protocol 
  
 
The components of the search strategy protocol were: 
1. A scoping search to capture the essence of the research aims was conducted in 
order to understand “the volume and type of evidence available for synthesis” 
(Boland et al., 2014, 21).   
2. From the scoping search and the research rationale, specific keywords were 
identified (and are detailed in appendices 1 and 2) to ensure the search was “as 
comprehensive [i.e. sensitive] as possible” (Booth et al., 2012, 73).  Synonyms, 
wildcards (*), truncations and Americanised spelling were considered in this step 
in order to ensure that the search returned any evidence relevant to the research 
aims but which had spellings or presentation that did not conform to accepted 
English academic standards. 
3. A search statement was formed using the keywords and Boolean operators to 
search for “specific concepts” (Jesson et al., 2011, 28) 
1. Scope 
search
2. Keyword 
formation
3. Search 
statement
4. Identify 
data sources
5. Limiting 
criteria
6. Results 
screening
7. Assessment 
and 
sysnthesis
8. Citation 
Tracking
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4. Databases specific to the research topic were identified, and are discussed and 
justified more clearly in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1.  The search statements were 
amended to include and specific thesaurus headings or database indexing. 
5. The search statements were adjusted to specify which criteria to exclude and the 
limits imposed on the search.  The exclusions and limits are defined in sections 
2.2.1 and 2.3.1.  
6. Results were screened in order to select evidence that was relevant to the 
research aims and therefore to be included in the review (detailed in section 
2.2.1. Returned documents were selected for inclusion firstly by evaluating the 
relevance of the title and then by relevance of the abstract which Booth et al. 
“believe is the most efficient way of screening studies for inclusion” (2012, 99). 
7. The remaining evidence included was critically assessed and synthesised into the 
review and is discussed in the following section. 
8. Citations found in influential evidence from the assessment, but not returned in 
their own right, were also screened and included in assessment and synthesis. 
2.1.1.3 Assessment and Synthesis Techniques 
The remaining evidence was finally adopted into the review by following the sub-steps 
described below: 
1. Critical assessment 
2. Data extraction 
3. Synthesis of data 
Critical Assessment 
The quality of the remaining evidence was critically assessed to in order to ensure that 
they provide meaningful answers to the research aims.  The Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme (CASP) was used as the assessment tool to include or disqualify evidence 
from the review.  
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Data Extraction 
From the evidence remaining from the critical assessment, relevant data were extracted 
for synthesis.  Data were identified by highlighting relevant text in hard and electronic 
copies of each individual source document and summarising the data onto paper based 
data extraction forms.  The data extraction forms detailed: 
 Theme within the research aim. 
 Description of the evidence and relevant critique. 
 Relevant quotes. 
Synthesis of Data 
Data were presented and described in narrative form in the review and no quantitative 
synthesis was necessary. The data extraction forms were grouped by theme and 
similarities and differences between evidence were interpreted and recorded in order 
to make sense of the data, both descriptively and analytically as recommended by 
Boland et al. (2014, 87). 
2.1.1.4 Screening Criteria 
Screening for inclusion in the study was conducted in two phases.  Firstly the title of the 
document returned in the search was assessed to ensure the context of the keywords, 
or associated phrase, was useful to addressing the research aims.  Documents meeting 
this condition were copied into a folder marked “Title” on my Refworks (library software 
enabling a researcher to manage text for referencing) account.   
Secondly, abstracts of the documents in the Title folder were then assessed to ensure 
that their aims and conclusions remained relevant to addressing my research aims. 
Those meeting these criteria were copied to a Refworks folder marked “Abstract” and 
this folder was used for the critique. 
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2.1.2 Existing research relevant to the aims of this study 
This section describes research relevant to my study that existed at the time of the 
literature reviews, and discusses potential knowledge gaps that my research could 
address. 
From the literature reviews, three themes emerged to describe original research that 
was relevant to the aims and rationale of my study. They were: 
1. The efficiency and quality aspects of health policy  
2. The systemic nature of Emergency Care 
3. Holistic studies which combine efficiency and complex systems 
These themes and the relevance to my study are discussed below.  Potential gaps for 
areas research are identified. 
2.1.2.1 The Efficiency and Quality Aspects of Health Policy  
The four hour wait target, and other pressures seen internationally to improve waiting 
times, has led to research examining the flow of patients through Emergency 
Departments.   Powell et al., for example, use quantitative computer models, calibrated 
with data from an urban hospital case site, to study the link between in-patient 
discharge and the patients’ stay in the Emergency Department before admission (2010). 
Powell et al. demonstrate a theoretical improvement in the time Emergency 
Department patients requiring admission need to wait before a bed is available by 
testing a series of inpatient discharge hypotheses (2010).  Although Powell et al’s. study 
is an application to local level emergency care, it focuses on one process within the 
hospital and is not a representation of the hospital or wider emergency care system 
(2010).  This creates opportunity to explore the complexities within that system in the 
model and an opportunity to test the theory of the modelled results. 
Ng et al. use manufacturing based improvement techniques in order to attempt to 
decrease waiting time (2010).  Working with clinical staff, Ng et al identify and eliminate 
“wasteful” Emergency Department activities, which cause delays to patient care, and 
combine useful activities to increase time utilisation (2010). Ng et al. demonstrate 
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improvement to the time patients stay in the Emergency Department and also add other 
measures of benefit such as patient satisfaction (2010).  This encouraging evidence 
demonstrates improvements from the removal of some causal mechanisms but, as with 
Powell et al., is also an examination of one process within the hospital system and not 
the wider system (2010). 
These studies begin to quantify causal mechanisms of the time patients spend in the 
Emergency Department and address novel and innovative ways to co-produce 
improvement with clinical staff in order to meet the aims of health policy. However, a 
gap still remains in offering a more holistic explanation of the causal mechanisms and a 
consideration of the wider emergency care system.  Some studies do address this issue 
however, and are discussed below. 
2.1.2.2 Systemic Nature of Emergency Care 
The systemic nature of Emergency Departments is evident in the literature.  Nugus et al. 
study Australian Emergency Departments as “Complex Adaptive Systems”, taking a 
qualitative account of the agency of clinicians though ethnographic study and interviews 
(2010).  This novel and relevant study has clear links to some aims of my research, 
however the specifics of Australian health policy are not considered openly (other than 
discussing the demand for integrated care).  Comparisons to the four hour wait target 
and other relevant English policy influences cannot be made, however the influence of 
the agency of clinicians is relevant to my study and is considered in the methodology 
and discussion chapters. 
Brailsford et al. study an English emergency care system to create a quantitative, logical 
model with which to test the robustness of performance within the complex system to 
meet the four hour wait target (2004).  Although actors within the system were used to 
create this model, the effects of individuals’ agency are not represented.  However, the 
study provides useful evidence for my research, taken in the context of the high-level, 
urban nature of Brailsford et al’s. methods. 
2.1.2.3 Holistic Studies 
Some studies combine both of the above elements.  Abo-Hamad and Arisha study the 
flow of patients through an Emergency Department and consider both qualitative and 
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quantitative aspects to produce a simulation model to evaluate changes in capacity and 
demand and the predicted effect on performance indicators (2012).  This model led to 
the identification of bed management as a key contributor to patient outflow from the 
Emergency Department and highlights the effects of the system outside of the 
department.  Although Abo-Hamad and Arisha study emergency care within a hospital, 
the wider emergency care system and a more detailed consideration of the agency and 
behaviours of those within it remain an opportunity for research (2012). 
The effects of the marketisation element of health policy are also studied. Jones et al. 
use ethnographic and interview methods to research how market-based policies 
affected one English health economy system (2013).  In their research, the authors find 
that policies can be contradictory and show manipulation of national policy in local 
implementation.  For example, local NHS managers make “national initiatives ‘work for 
them’ by adapting them to local interests” (Jones et al., 2013, 56) through re-labelling 
existing local initiatives as new government policy and prioritising which of the national 
health policy target to achieve. 
Market-based policies are seen to “foster an adversarial environment” (Jones et al., 
2013, 58) within health economies.  Jones et al’s. “broad focus” (2013) on a health 
economy is relevant to my research of the effects of implementing a specific policy 
target and offers guidance to focus on the effects of policy in a rural health care 
environment.  
2.1.2.4  Conclusions  
At the time of planning my study, contemporary projects relevant to my research aims 
and the opportunities they offer my protocol are shown in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Research Relevant to this Study 
Existing Research Opportunity for my Research 
Improvements examined to meet targets 
defined in policy. 
Jones et al. (2013); Abo-Hamad 
and Arisha (2012); Powell et al. 
(2010); Ng et al. (2010) 
Understand the co-production of clinical 
/ researcher interventions and apply to 
other expectations defined in policy: local 
improvements and efficiencies. 
Complex systems studied qualitatively to 
understand agency or quantitatively to 
understand the performance within the 
system. 
Jones et al. (2013); Abo-Hamad 
and Arisha (2012); Brailsford et al. 
(2004); Nugus et al. (2010) 
Explore a gap in the literature to focus a 
study of the systemic nature of the 
emergency care considering both agency 
and systemic logic. 
My research has the potential to add new knowledge through studying the 
implementation of two aspects of health policy (achieving a defined target and the need 
for efficiency) within a rural emergency care system. 
2.2 Literature Review Part One 
2.2.1 Search Strategy 
The flow of studies through the search strategy is detailed in figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Search and synthesis flowchart – part one 
 
Keywords relating to the research question were used with the relevant thesaurus 
headings to form the search strategies.  The searches for each database are listed in 
appendix 1.   
2.2.1.1 Inclusion Criteria 
Limits to the search are (where available): major concepts for thesaurus headings, 
English language articles, abstracts available and published from year 1980 onwards.  
The limits were implemented to ensure that the literature was appropriate to the 
research topic, and considered changes in the use and efficacy of healthcare in the last 
three decades.  For the emergency care indicators the search was limited to year 2000 
to ensure that the literature was appropriate to the research topic and to consider 
changes in needs-led health care since the first Department of Health (DH) public 
consultation for NHS reform in 2001.  Thesaurus headings were identified from the 
databases’ index and a review of the headings attributed to relevant papers identified 
in preliminary searches.  Additional literature was identified and reviewed from the 
reference section of articles which met the search criteria. 
2.2.1.2 Exclusion Criteria 
Articles were rejected through the title and abstract if they failed to meet the inclusion 
criteria.  Articles discussing use of indicators of health care provider performance or 
quality within the United Kingdom were included in the search.  Those concerned with 
the clinical quality of a specific condition were not included and articles relating to 
overseas research are included if they are directly related to a theme resulting from the 
review and help to inform the discussion. 
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Databases were searched separately to ensure that thesaurus terms applicable to each 
database and host are captured and to ensure that search terms translations did not 
result in missed articles. 
The original searches conducted in March 2011 were refreshed in January 2015 to 
identify new material, limiting the search to publications in the United Kingdom only.  
This search found no new relevant evidence relating to the key themes identified in the 
chapter or the purpose of the research.   
2.2.1.3 Electronic Search 
The following databases for published work were searched electronically to identify 
books and articles relevant to the research:   
 Academic Source Complete, via the EBSCO interface.  This database contains 
multi-disciplinary, scholarly periodicals. 
 Business Source Complete, via the EBSCO interface.  Business, management, 
accounting and economic journals and magazines are listed within this database. 
 COPAC Catalogue, via the Athens interface.  This resource merges the catalogues 
of the major universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland and other major 
libraries including the British Library. 
 Health Business Elite, via the NHS Evidence Health Information Resource 
interface.  This database includes health care management and administration 
journals and non-clinical information. 
 Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC), via the Athens interface.  
Health service management and administration journals from the Department 
of Health's Library and Information Services and King’s Fund Information and 
Library Service. 
 NHS Evidence Based Reviews, via the Athens Interface.  This NHS library searches 
the Bandolier, Cochrane Library, Database of Abstract of Review of Effects, 
Health Technology Assessment Database, NHS Economic Evaluation Database 
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and UK Database of Uncertainties about the Effects of Treatments for evidence 
of healthcare decision making using systematic reviews. 
 Web of Science, via the Athens interface.  Academic journal abstracts from the 
sciences and humanities are contained in this database to gather operational 
manager perspectives. 
2.2.1.4 Grey Search 
The following sources for unpublished work were searched to identify information 
through doctoral dissertations, conference papers and technical publications and other 
grey literature relevant to the research.   
 OpenSIGLE.   
 Index to Theses  
 ISI Proceedings 
 UK Clinical Research Network  
 Department of Health Performance Publications and Annual Reports 
2.2.1.5 Citation Tracking 
The terms ‘indicator’ and ‘health care’ produce a large volume of returns with a low 
relevance to this research: a significant proportion relate to indicators for clinical trials 
or progression of morbidity.  To increase the volume of relevant evidence, references 
from articles used in the literature review were identified and searches were made on 
the authors’ further work. 
2.2.2 Review of the Literature Relating to the Emerging Enterprise Culture 
2.2.2.1 Consideration of Definitions 
Measuring health care is important to both providers and recipients, and evaluating 
quality and performance levels has been an area of much research. Avedis Donabedian 
is cited widely in the academic literature and his articles referenced below represent the 
citations and core themes of his work despite their age.  Donabedian acknowledges that 
everyone will have their own descriptions and values of health care quality, but 
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summarises a definition as “a reflection of values and goals current in the medical care 
system and in the larger society of which it is a part” (1966, 167).  Quality levels are 
determined by evaluating levels of measured performance against a standard or 
evaluation value (Kazandjian et al, 2003, 266; Donabedian, 1981, 410).    
An understanding of performance measurement, and the nomenclature used to 
describe what is meant by measurement, does vary in the literature and has been 
discussed in detail since early articles started to address health care quality in depth 
(Donabedian, 1966; Sheps, 1955).  Common understanding and current terminology 
recognise that interpretation of performance in health care is widely measured through 
indicators (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 264; Kazandjian et al, 2003) and performance 
management can be achieved by assessing the progress of the indicators.  This research 
will use the term indicator to describe performance measurement of a component or 
whole health care system which can be used to inform the evaluation of quality when 
compared to targets, which the DH and recent United Kingdom literature (Propper et al, 
2008; Bevan and Hood, 2006b) use to refer to Donabedian’s term “standards”  
(Donabedian, 1986).  Other uses of the word indicator within health care, such as 
progress in a patient’s medical condition will not be considered. 
2.2.2.2 English Health Policy and Governance 
Following devolution of the UK government in 1999, NHS policy and governance has 
been the responsibility of the separate “regional” governments: Scottish Parliament, 
Northern Ireland Assembly, National Assembly for Wales and Department of Health in 
England (Greer, 2004, 1-25).  Regions have similar basic health characteristics (Greer, 
2004, 1-25) and follow a common health care funding framework and principles of 
health care delivery (Department of Health, 2000, 4); however, each government lacks 
“important powers” as they are within the supremacy of the Westminster parliament, 
which has the power to overrule or even eliminate the regional governments (Greer, 
2004, 2).  As a result health policies have diverged since devolution, despite good 
arguments to remain unified because that is the tendency for political systems in the 
course of solving problems (Greer, 2004, 1-25).  Baggott argues that public health policy 
statements issued in 1999 for the separate regions were not “the first time” that 
different policies had emerged (2000, 78).  Each region has a particular national 
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character and follows a different approach to administering performance indicators 
within policy (Blackman et al, 2009, 775).  Waiting times for elective care, for example, 
represent a “key political issue” for government and the DH follows a “command and 
control” policy using targets and sanctions, in isolation from other UK government 
policies, to manage performance of that outcome (Propper et al, 2008, 1).  As this 
research is conducted in an English DGH, the literature review will focus on DH use of 
indicators and targets within NHS England. 
2.2.2.3 History and Development 
The development and use of performance indicators in English health care is a result of 
successive governments’ health policies for operating the NHS.  This section will discuss 
the major influences on health policy in England and analyse how and why policy has 
been changed to adopt, develop and shape the use of targets and indicators in the 
English NHS.   
Baggott states that defining and analysing health policy is difficult because both health 
and policy are interpreted in many ways (2007, 1-3).   However this study will use his 
definition which he derived from consensus of a number of contemporary authors: 
“political processes that underlie the emergence of health issues, the formulation of 
policies and their implementation”.   
As health policy is a political process it is greatly influenced by party politics and 
ideologies.  Traditionally, the English political parties would bring their own ideology to 
bear when in government.  Conservatism looks to hierarchy and social order; neo-
liberalism emphasises free markets and individuals and socialism, equality and state 
ownership (Baggott, 2007, 6).  The socialist health policy under which the NHS was 
introduced by the labour government following the Second World War and was 
intended to offer equity of free health care access, funded mostly using national income 
tax: with the exception that less than 5% was to come from “contributory state 
insurance” (Hart, 2010, 1-2).  The responsible minister, Aneurin Bevan - described as “a 
real socialist” (Hart, 2010, 1), faced considerable opposition from conservative 
politicians and economists, and medical general practitioners until public popularity 
became such that, soon after the launch, the service became “politically unassailable” 
(Hart, 2010, 3).  Health policy is particularly important to political parties because it is a 
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critical public issue which captures the attention of the electorate (Baggott, 2007, 21; 
Hunter, 2003) and is a huge financial burden for the national purse (Pollock, 2005). 
Hart suggests that health economists were largely agreed on the cost-effectiveness of 
the NHS model compared to other commercial models practised around the world until 
the conservative government, elected in 1979, started to adopt more competitive 
funding options (2010, 3).  Labour increased public spending in 1974-75 but in 1976 a 
fiscal crisis provoked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to force the Labour 
government to reduce NHS expenditure (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 58). When the 
Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher succeeded Labour 
in 1979, they continued to face the financial constraints in healthcare funding and a 
policy shift was implemented to move the NHS from a hierarchical internal system to a 
free market system where public and private organisations compete to deliver health 
care within the NHS (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 54).  This “interesting combination of 
socialism and capitalism” (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 55) was fuelled by Thatcher’s 
rejection of financial pluralism, which had been the traditional socialist model that had 
prevailed since the NHS was introduced, in favour of “policies to generate incentives” 
for capitalist efficiency (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 54).   
Despite the change to the NHS’s traditional hierarchy structure, party politics are 
influenced by competition and the desire to stay in, or be elected to, government and 
parties frequently use or adopt aspects of their rivals policy and ideology (Baggott, 2007, 
9).  And Labour’s initial rebukes of the free market approach gave way to adoption of 
the enterprise policy when they regained the government in 1997 and, later, 
progressively adding to the market system when faced with their own crisis in funding 
(Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 56).  Baggott agrees and argues that, since the election of 
the Labour government in 1997, party ideology and policy have become “even less 
clear” because of Labour’s use of Conservative policy to secure votes in its manifesto 
(2007, 9) and post-election policy which was developed with “elements of both neo-
liberalism and socialism” (2007, 28).  Baggott illustrates this with examples of how 
Labour continued Conservative policy such as focus on health inequality, monitoring 
NHS performance and development of the NHS internal market – commissioners 
purchasing health care from the acute sector and using payment against results to 
increase competition (2007, 29-31).  Wall and Owen also see a shift in policy based on 
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integration of ideology arguing that political ideologies have changed since the 1980’s 
towards an “Enterprise Culture” (2003, 113-125).  The Enterprise Culture is a concept 
adopted in this research to describe the effects of the convergence of political ideologies 
within health policy which “oblige” health service providers to adopt free market 
mechanisms to provide affordable health care on the basis of need (Wall and Owen, 
2003, 117). Within the NHS, Wall and Owen argue, a culture of managerialism and 
control has replaced the traditional clinical culture because of the policy drive to imitate 
the private sector (2003, 113-125).  This shift represents a challenge to the public sector 
as the dominant force providing health care services in which the government’s 
decisions to distribute health resources according to social principles are upheld (Wall 
and Owen, 2003, 113-125). 
Although primarily a political function, parties are exposed to external influences when 
developing health policy.  International bodies such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO) also develop policy to achieve desired health outcomes, the success of which is 
measured against targets, (Baggott, 2000, 73-75).  WHO intend that policy should define 
a nation’s vision and direction for health, or as Hunter describes the “means and the 
ends” of the health system.   Hunter illustrates his point with an example of a “mean” 
being a number of clinicians and an “end” being health gains (2003, 170).  Analysis of UK 
policy led Hunter to state that the nation’s “good intentions” for improving its “ends” 
have been adversely affected by the means of “micro-managing service delivery” 
through the command and control and target policy (2003, 170). 
Lobbyist’s and pressure groups can also influence health policy direction.  Some groups 
have considerable influence from commercial interests or social movement (Baggott, 
2007, 10).  In particular the medical profession is a “potent force” and “exerts more 
influence over health policy than any other group” (Baggott, 2007, 125).  Hunter notes 
however that doctors’ influence has reduced from a position “close to absolute power” 
since the introduction of NHS managers (2003, 70), a point which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
Because of the public’s interest as voters, the media also has a keen interest in health 
policy.  Baggott describes the media’s role as complex because of its ability to both 
describe and shape health policy and the influence and bias it can bring to bear – 
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especially when using health “drama” involving celebrities (2007, 81-101).  Baggott also 
notes the increasing use that pressure groups and politicians are making of the media in 
changing policy by influencing public opinion. 
The effects of party politics and ideology have led to many changes to English health 
policy in recent years as the motivations for political power have developed the 
Enterprise Culture.  The behaviours which drive the developments can be argued as a 
political function: government must be seen to do something to health care since it is 
such an important issue to voters (Baggott, 2007, 153).  Health policy has been 
concentrated on treating sickness rather than preventing it partly because the nation’s 
short electoral cycles could not allow demonstration of a measurable improvement in 
health and the associated reductions in treatment spend: good health upstream will 
equal less treatment downstream (Hunter, 2003, 161).  Hunter also states that, despite 
the political rhetoric of a move towards health improvement rather than health care 
delivery, another reason that change to sickness prevention has not happened is 
because of the complex nature of implementing the necessary improvements.  
However, he notes that the cost of providing health care and the limitations of providing 
a health care service ensures that public and political interest and debate keeps the 
matter in constant focus (Hunter, 2003, 159-160).  These ethical issues of whether 
health policy meets the needs of the nation or whether the time scales for political focus 
and policy are sufficient to be effective are not within the scope of this research.  
However, it is useful to note such issues have a considerable impact on the contextual 
framework of this study, identifying the boundaries that party politics and ideology work 
within and why parties in government adopt or modify opposition policy and make 
constant change, and are therefore included as a matter of debate in the thesis.  Bevan 
and Robinson (2005, 71) conclude that the policy changes and adaptations across 
political ideologies since the inception of the NHS have delivered sub-optimal 
performance in cost-control, equity of health care delivery and efficiency due to path 
dependencies.  Path dependencies refer to the effects of “the inertia from the history of 
previous decisions and existing institutions” (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 53). 
Performance management has been developed from political motivations to manage 
inefficiencies within a highly emotive public service.  This has led to the development of 
an Enterprise Culture which is evolving to replicate the methods of performance 
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management that successful private companies use to remain competitive.  The next 
section will discuss the emergence of the Enterprise Culture and the role of performance 
indicators within that ideology. 
2.2.2.4 The Emerging Enterprise Culture and the use of Performance Indicators  
Wall and Owen consider that the emerging Enterprise Culture within health care 
services since the early 1980’s has increasingly involved contributions from the private 
and voluntary sectors (2003, 34-39).  The influence from private enterprise is designed 
to reduce reliance on a state monopoly of health care provision and to allow commercial 
influences to generate efficiency and resource utilisation.  Wall and Owen argue that 
synthesis is possible between various providers if strong government can ensure 
collective responsibility for the health of the nation (2003, 34-39).  Pollock, however, 
sees a “complex web of contracts that will be difficult if not impossible to enforce” 
(2005, 225) and questions the effects of market incentives in providing health care 
through such a fragmented health service (2005, 228-231). 
Traditionally, the use of voluntary or private resource provision in health care services 
is a conservative idea whilst socialist thinking would consider this approach as absolving 
the government of its responsibility to provide welfare (Wall and Owen, 2003, 34-39) - 
although Wall and Owen note that welfare pluralists would see such policy as acceptable 
because patients are being provided with the healthcare they need regardless of who 
provides it (government, voluntary or private providers).   
As noted above, despite the largely conservatism ideology of the enterprise policy, the 
Labour government that was elected in 1997 has continued to make use of private 
health care provision.  From the increasingly mixed party politics and ideology and the 
emergence of the Enterprise Culture, the use of performance indicators has gained 
prominence as a means of assuring and governing the achievement of the objectives 
defined in health policy.  The use of indicators to assure performance has been 
developed to support the emerging Enterprise Culture in two key areas: the 
centralisation and decentralisation of delivering the health service and the internal and 
external market system of providing health care. 
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The long-term trend of English health policy has been centralisation and decentralisation 
of key elements of health service delivery.  Development of health policy to focus on 
performance indicators with an “increasing use of command and control” tactics has 
necessitated centralised targets and regulation with the development of managers and 
agencies to deliver and assure performance (Baggott, 2007, 130-153).  Whilst 
centralising monitor and control activities and empowering controlling regulating 
agencies, policy has also developed to decentralise management of health care and so 
push control towards the front line – although this has often been managed through a 
bureaucratic process such as the existence of Primary Care Trusts (PCT) (Wall and Owen, 
2003, 163-167).  Hunter agrees with this analysis of health policy evolution, commenting 
that health policy has been based on “complex solutions to complex problems” which 
has resulted in centralised, top down targets;  a policy which has failed to lead to a shift 
towards health rather than health care (Hunter, 2003, 162-164). 
Decentralisation has led to a more important role for NHS managers who are expected 
to improve efficiency, as managers would in a commercial business, as a result of the 
perception of a “wasteful” public sector with performance indicators intended to be a 
means of evaluating their level of success (Wall and Owen, 2003, 57-70).  Despite this, 
there has been criticism of how management has been developed within the NHS. 
Hunter considers the management function to be “based crudely on traditional or 
‘Fordist’ management” techniques which ignore the complexity of health care (Hunter, 
2003, 162) and O’Regan considers the workforce demarcation “Taylorism in the 
extreme” (2006, 126).  Also, although management has been developed as a key 
element to deliver policy, the presence of managers has not proved popular with 
clinicians (Wall and Owen, 2003, 57-70) and the power of the medical profession in 
particular has continued to obstruct the efficiency gains that policy hoped for (Baggott, 
2007, 103-107).  Managers may not have had the impact that political and ideological 
decentralisation expected of them because of clinical opposition, however the medical 
profession appears less powerful as a result of the emergence of the Enterprise Culture 
(Wall and Owen, 2003, 55-71; Hunter, 2003, 70).  However, political use of command 
and control and targets continues, despite criticism, partly because governments do not 
trust managers to implement policy service reforms in respect to their re-election 
aspirations and need indicators and measures to judge performance against (Hunter, 
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2003, 165).  Hunter believes that the system of management should be focussed on 
leading for health rather than health care and that judgement of health systems should 
not be based on the analysis of “politics and power” which has led to command and 
control and target cultures but instead towards analysis of “defects and deficits” within 
the health system (2003, 182). 
The combination of centralisation and decentralisation within the emerging Enterprise 
Culture and use of performance indicators to evaluate its success has led to concern that 
blame is simply shifted from government to operational management through the 
devolved responsibility that command and control enforces (Baggott, 2007, 153).  The 
number of targets to be achieved and the skills of NHS managers to achieve them (and 
other policy objectives) have led to concern.  Hunter believes that targets focus 
managers away from long term organisational development, stifling innovation and 
improvement (2003, 165).  Fewer targets and greater skills for managers would allow 
them to be more creative (Hunter, 2003, 165-166) although concern remains about the 
proportion of NHS budget spent on management and administration – a figure that has 
increased since the introduction of the Enterprise Culture (Pollock, 2005, 260)  which 
she feels has not delivered the improved efficiency that policy expected.  Public views 
have also been shown to strongly question the value of managers, and managers 
themselves are criticised for being responsible for building a complex role around a 
management ideology that is driven primarily by efficiency and not patient care 
(Learmonth, 1997, 216-220).  Propper et al. however consider that managers’ 
performance is shaped by policy arguing that, in their study of waiting time reductions 
in the English NHS, managers were presented with escalating targets, financial sanctions 
and a greater focus on performance which, when combined, changed behaviours (2008, 
21).  
The Enterprise Culture has two market systems which are intended to encourage 
competition and efficiency: the internal and external markets.  The internal market 
consists of trades between commissioners of health care and health care providers.  
Although originally a Conservative policy, Labour have developed the internal market 
towards “privatisation” adding capitalist concepts such as Private Finance Initiative 
whereby private investment builds or develops acute health provision but receives 
contracts for servicing the facilities over future (“thirty or more”) years (Pollock, 2005, 
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27).  Pollock believes this push towards market trading and choice in healthcare lacks a 
mechanism for democratic local control which in turn produces variation depending on 
where the patient lives Pollock (2005, 45-56).  Wall and Owen also see policy moving 
towards further evolution of primary care organisations ability to trade with providers 
in Britain (2003, 144).  This approach seems justified given that Conservative 
government reforms which started in 2011 will see the formation of clinical 
commissioning groups with autonomy to purchase local healthcare services from private 
and NHS providers (Department of Health, 2011a).  This should allow commissioners to 
achieve performance targets through greater patient choice.  
Additionally, development of the external health care market – the transition from a 
public system accountable to Parliament towards a mixed public / private system 
accountable to independent regulators and influenced by financial penalties and 
incentives to those within the system – has been continued (Talbot-Smith et al., 2006, 
104).  Although this policy is intended to improve efficiency through competition not all 
commentators see this as a welcome move.  Pollock raises concerns about more of the 
NHS budget going to private companies as a result of the NHS external market which 
destabilises NHS organisations and their finances and ultimately raises their costs (2005, 
84).  This view is contested by Wright who believes that the Labour government reform 
is not a change for self-interested politicians seeking re-election (which he believes 
would have been ill-founded in any case) and is not a replication of previous privatisation 
or reform models, but is a serious attempt to confront the problems the European Union 
(EU) is facing (2009, 354).  Blair’s Labour government summarised  this tension of finding 
the most effective way control limited healthcare funding by stating that “there should 
be no organisational or ideological barriers to the delivery of high-quality health care 
free at the point of delivery” (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 68-69) and proceeded to push 
forward extensions of the market systems such as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which 
allows private companies to finance, build and maintain ‘non-clinical services’ over a 
contracted period (Bevan and Robinson, 2005, 69).  
From this analysis of the development of English health policy, the conclusion is drawn 
that the increasing emergence of performance indicators are developed as a tool to 
support the emerging Enterprise Culture.  Performance indicators are designed to 
provide information to evaluate the efficacy of decentralised management to achieve 
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centralised command and control targets.  Development of the internal and external 
market systems is designed to provide an environment where the efficiency 
expectations from decentralisation can manifest and be evaluated through performance 
measures.  The following section will analyse and debate the theory of performance 
indicators and the efficacy of implemented indicators in achieving the political 
motivations and intended uses behind the theory. 
2.2.3 Effective use of Indicators 
In a review of the literature concerning use of performance indicators for health care 
improvements, Freeman summarises two uses for indicators: firstly, as a summative 
means for external evaluation and secondly, used as an internal tool for quality 
improvement (2002).  Freeman notes that the literature is “largely discursive, with an 
underdeveloped empirical base” but argues that the summative approach suffers 
because of the necessity for validity in both the selection of indicators used and the 
underlying data needed to make judgements on quality of care (2002, 128); instead he 
favours indicators used internally for continuous improvement of local contexts.  
However the performance indicators used for centralised command and control are 
summative and this section will analyse the debate around the use of summative 
indicators.  The benefits of internal performance indicators will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
Pronovost and Lilford discuss the tensions which exist between scientists and policy 
makers when using performance indicators stating that policy makers are responsible 
for protecting the public interest and scientists are “dubious about the validity of many 
metrics” (2011, 569).  The introduction of performance indicators has shifted the focus 
of trust in a system from internal and unrecorded controls to quantified metrics, a move 
which Freeman argues “may generate suspicion and fear” instead of trust which 
undermines the improvements that the indicators should deliver (2002, 129).  
Performance Indicators are recognised to achieve the control expected in policy.  Davies 
and Lampel acknowledge the effects that measuring and controlling performance had 
on waste and spend reduction and productivity increases in the NHS in the 1980s, and 
state that continuation was encouraged by the successes in the private sector (1998, 
160).  Now, however, they claim that the private sector is “abandoning control as the 
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key mechanism for achieving better results” in favour of decentralised autonomy to 
allow greater innovation and efficiency (1998, 160).  Indeed in the most advanced 
innovative private companies “questioning, coaching and teaching take precedence 
over commanding and controlling” (Shook, 2008, 2), but this means managers having 
access to clear, unambiguous performance data to focus their resources.  Even this is 
not within context of the advanced, innovative and efficient organisations.  Womack 
emphasises that an organisation’s purpose is the first thing to define in achieving the 
Enterprise Culture: what does the organisation need to do to improve customer (or 
patient and other stakeholder) satisfaction and what does the organisation need to do 
to survive and prosper (2011, 3-9)?  Then measures for these purposes can be 
developed, owned by a manager responsible for delivering value directly to the 
customer and shared with everyone who works on delivering that value to the customer.  
This should drive the improvements by concentrating efforts on processes then people 
(Womack, 2011, 3-9). 
As noted, the seriousness of the pressures on the health service, and the nature of 
reform and development of performance indicators, has been seen as a reasonable 
means of assuring that investment in health care results in service improvement.  Wright 
acknowledges the financial investment noting that the Labour government has “doubled 
the NHS budget” between 1997 and 2005 but underpinned it with the ideals of national 
citizenship, economic management and full employment (2009, 335-335).  Wright also 
argues that early moves by the Labour government to strengthen the centralised 
command and control system “through centralised targets [and] performance 
indicators” for improved delivery of care was followed by needs-led benefits of 
decentralised service improvements, patient choice and competition (2009, 336).  This 
approach, he argues, is a necessary mechanism to tackle such a socio-economic 
problem.   
Whilst the seriousness of the pressures on the health service is not commonly disputed 
in the literature, the efficacy of performance indicators to achieve the necessary 
improvements are questioned.  Goddard et al. note that the nature (and reality) of using 
summative performance indicators is to manage poor performers rather than to identify 
best practice and encourage improved system-wide performance (1999), despite 
improved performance being a key factor in performance management in an Enterprise 
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Culture.  Measurement systems are also deemed to be “imperfect” and in need of 
improvement in order to remove “imprecision and bias” and so to be of use to policy 
makers and health care providers (Pronovost and Lilford, 2011, 572).  Chosen indicators 
must also evaluate the needs of the service users.  Adab et al. note that not all health 
care outcomes that society values can be measured and suggest that although the public 
and purchasers of health care services have the right to understand the quality of their 
health services it is “irresponsible” to provide poor quality information that is difficult 
to interpret (2002, 96). 
Furthermore, the disadvantages of using performance indicators to relieve health 
service pressure can lie within the historic nature of the indicators themselves.  
Performance indicators are incapable of “showing why particular results were obtained” 
(Freeman, 2002, 130) and measure “end of process error detection rather than built in 
quality”, meaning that delays in improvement can only occur after the event (Davies and 
Lampel, 1998, 160).  This mis-use of performance indicators is even endemic in the 
private sector which the Enterprise Culture is designed to emulate.  Mauboussin states 
that common performance measures fail to comply with to two tests of usefulness: that 
measurement systems will produce a consistent metric over time for the same action 
and that they demonstrate cause and effect to meet an objective (2012, 48-53).  Davies 
and Lampel also state concerns about drawing useful interpretation from unstable 
observational data and that measuring performance, which is motivational or coercive, 
will lead to behaviour that is not representative of the underlying process (1998, 160) – 
discussed in detail later in this chapter.  A common theme in the literature is that the 
nature of performance indicators does not testify the reality of process performance but 
that evaluation of the results leads the individuals responsible for the underlying data 
into defensive action instead of innovation to improve the needs of their process (Davies 
and Lampel, 1998; Bevan and Hood, 2006b; Freeman, 2002).  A reason for this may be 
found in research undertaken by Giuffrida et al. which investigated the effect that 
factors outside the control of primary care services had on their ability to meet 
performance targets.  This study concludes that “performance indicators should relate 
to the aspects of care that can be controlled by decision makers” (1999, 94).  
Furthermore, Freeman stresses the need to remove confounding factors (for example 
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local health economy and socio-economic variations) which may cause variation in the 
output being measured (2002, 131). 
Performance indicators also offer only a limited opportunity to identify opportunities 
for improvement to health services and encourage the improvements to be made.  In 
an editorial for the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Mulligan and Appleby question how 
well summative performance indicators help to “identify which parts of a system 
contribute the most to improved health” and also question the extent to which those 
indicators show how well the services measured affect the nation’s health - considering 
“people with poorer health in particular” (2000, 191-192).  Mulligan and Appleby answer 
both questions with “little” because they argue that there is no way of understanding 
such a complex system’s details based on indicators alone.  This is unfortunate because 
they consider that indicators are “the only show in town” for managing health service 
improvement (2000, 191-192). 
Investigation into public demand for information provided by performance indicators is 
scarce.  Magee et al. found through research using focus groups that public reaction was 
“ambivalent to the value of performance indicators”, however the focus groups felt that 
accountability and monitoring of health service provision was necessary (2003, 341).  A 
further finding of the study suggests that education is needed for the public and 
clinicians to interpret and use the data.  Magee et al. formed focus groups in urban and 
densely populated English cities and regions and did not include the more rural health 
providers whose patients are less able to benefit from a choice of health care provider, 
this gap in the literature presents is valuable to this research because of the rural patient 
and low population urban area the case study hospital serves (2003). 
Performance indicators and measures can be useful if restricted to factors controlled by 
decision makers, use valid and un-confounded data and do not cross complex system 
boundaries, but this is unlikely in health care in England because of the complexities that 
Mulligan and Appleby note (2000).  Performance indicators “are not axiomatically good” 
and “may be inaccurate, misleading and even dangerous” (Freeman, 2002, 134). 
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2.2.3.1 Theoretical Concepts of Political Ideologies and Performance Indicators in 
English Health Care: A Summary 
English health policy has developed largely under the influence of party politics and 
ideology with additional input from external bodies.  Analysis of politics suggests an 
unwillingness to transform the long term needs of the health service towards good 
health which will prevent future treatment in favour of more measurable short term 
change which will be observable within electoral cycles.  To achieve this, command and 
control (using performance indicators and targets) is used to manage policy and judge 
its efficacy. 
The Labour government elected in 1997 formed English health policy as a contract 
between the individual and the state and began to set targets for key performance 
indicators (Baggott, 2007).  However the internal and external market systems of health 
care delivery, decentralised management systems and centralisation of power and 
regulation have been increasing since the mid 1980s – following a conservatism ideology 
through successive governments (Baggott, 2007).  These policy changes have fuelled the 
need for performance indicators and the command and control and target based 
culture, which has been criticised because it does not focus on improved health and 
blocks creative leadership, is not appropriate to complex systems such as English health 
care and is beyond the decision making capability of the decentralised management 
structure that the Enterprise Culture has developed. 
Baggott concludes that command and control and the “initiativitis” of NHS change are 
“likely to lead to further gaps between policy and practice in the future” (2007, 153).  
Although current health policy and strategy are largely shaped to achieve measurable 
targets Baggott provides a useful conclusion: “goals and targets can only set a direction, 
they cannot guarantee success”, (2000, 84). 
2.2.3.2 The Application of Performance Indicators in the English NHS 
NHS improvement, including the associated increases in spend and initial targets, was 
set out in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000); proposing more autonomy for the 
NHS to achieve greater health care outcomes (demonstrated in targets and indicators) 
but with more accountability for the increased investment.   Failure to meet this 
“aggressive target regime” carries heavy sanctions (Propper et al, 2008, 18), however 
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achievement of performance targets may lead to reward (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 
251; Department of Health, 2000, 67).  Since the implementation of the NHS plan, 
English health care targets and indicators are intended for use as a means of informing 
choice for health care users and stakeholders as well “as a means of improving health 
care services” (Propper et al, 2006, 1) and a means to reduce key variables such as 
waiting times (Damiani et al, 2005, 1).  Propper et al. also comment on choice as an 
enabler of economic efficiency, relating to the consumer’s power of choice which drives 
private firms to such improvements (2006, 1).     
Patient choice and social engagement have been at the fore of NHS policy since the 
publication of the NHS Plan where patients are increasingly defined and treated as 
consumers, being well informed, literate and clear in their expectations of health care 
(Morris et al, 2006).   The DH framework for the policy of providing choice in health care 
includes incentives for commissioners and providers of health care to improve 
(performance management and payment by results) and patient booking systems to 
allow patients enact their choice (Department of Health 2004).  
Following a change of government in 2010, the DH re-confirmed patients and 
commissioners as critical users of health care indicators and stressed the importance of 
the link between performance information and improved quality of health care services 
(Department of Health, 2011a).  An “information revolution” consultation was launched 
to define the best ways to provide clear and accessible information for patients to make 
decisions about health care quality when considering choice of provider (Department of 
Health, 2011a).  
Since the implementation of the NHS Plan, further implementation of the Enterprise 
Culture has emerged through performance management and choice of health care 
provision mechanisms. 
2.2.3.3 Efficacy of Performance Indicators in the English NHS 
Managing performance indicators has been shown to improve performance in key NHS 
policy process targets such as waiting time reduction (Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Bevan 
and Hood 2006b; Propper et al, 2008) and emergency care targets (Alberti, 2007).  Using 
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performance indicators to improve health outcomes is also seen as “appropriate” 
providing data standardisation and case-mix adjustments (Mant, 2001, 479).   
However, the nature of targets and the means of measuring and achieving them have 
faced criticism because of the “incentives to cheat both by target setters and target 
managers” (Bevan and Hood, 2006b, 519).  These incentives are negative (risk of 
dismissal and “name and shame”) and positive (bonuses and budget allocation), (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006b, 518-519).  Furthermore, competitive management, encouraged 
through the Enterprise Culture, causes a great incentive when a “main lever was the 
threat to senior managers’ jobs” (Propper et al, 2008, 4).  Propper et al state that 
attainment of a target may not result in wider welfare increases because “reducing long 
waits does not necessarily lead to shorter mean or median waiting times” (2008, 21).  
Use of indicators as a basis for praise or sanction is seen as “almost inevitably corrosive 
and corrupting” as it places trust in systems and not individuals (Freeman, 2002, 134).  
Bevan and Hood suggest that two assumptions are made when governing through 
targets: synecdoche (assuming that conclusions about part of a population can stand for 
the whole) and game proof design (2006b, 533), concluding that the assumptions are 
not justified in NHS target governance.   
The Enterprise Culture also appears unpopular with the public.  Wallace and Taylor-
Gooby’s research of NHS users finds that market system, management structures and 
targets do not conform to patients’ deontological and teleological values (2009, 210-
216).  Targets are criticised in Wallace and Taylor-Gooby’s paper as “short-sighted” 
(2009, 210) and the authors conclude that patients’ view of care performance should be 
established “not just through rational calculus, but within and through normative value 
frames” (2009, 216). 
Additionally, large occurrences of statistical outliers (over-dispersion) have also been 
linked to NHS indicators focussing on emergency readmissions (Spiegelhalter, 2005).  
Outliers occur when indicator values lie outside two or three standard deviations from 
the mean and so are exceptions to the central tendency of the data. Spiegelhalter 
concludes that the cause of the high volume of outliers is due to many small factors 
which occur within individual organisations and that “these may not be particularly 
important nor indicate poor quality care” (2005, 348).  Spiegelhalter suggests that this 
45 
 
problem can be managed by either not using the indicator or by incorporating a random 
effects model (which seeks to control unobserved heterogeneity in data) to reduce 
variation by smoothing the stochastic nature of the data (2005, 351).  
Data ambiguity, perverse outcomes and fabrication have also been reported when 
organisations’ measurement of the indicator has contributed to target achievement 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006a). Bevan and Hood describe “gaming” to achieve targets giving 
examples of General Practitioners managing the target for patients waiting no more 
than two days for an appointment by refusing patients the opportunity to book 
appointment more than two days in advance and patients waiting in Ambulances 
outside Emergency Department to avoid breaching the Emergency Department four 
hour or less wait target (2006a, 421).  Freeman also concludes that “the precision of 
data required to make summative comparisons” between separate NHS Trusts presents 
technical problems when using indicators which may lead to negative unintended 
consequences (2002, 134) such as measurement system bias.   Walburg notes that the 
quality and selection of indicators can be over-simplified in order to make measurement 
possible and notes an equally important factor for using indicators: the means and 
frequency of data feedback is essential for “permanent improvement” from indicator 
use (2006, 35): a more localised consideration than the incentives and punishments 
driven by policy interpretation of indicators. 
Definition and administration of health policy delivery has been devolved to multiple 
government agencies.  Some indicators have been developed by separate agencies 
which conflict with each other causing confusion at a local level as to which indicator or 
target achievement takes priority, problems in establishing relationships between 
indicators and misunderstanding when establishing connections between indicators and 
targets (Micheli and Neely, 2010).  
Even with uncorrupted information, indicators may not lead to useful relative 
performance management tools within the public sector.  Variations in measures may 
be caused by local differences (clinical-mix, for example) and some adjustment may be 
necessary for the heterogeneity of the inputs (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 264).  
Additionally, as indicators in healthcare often measure outcomes, the use of internal 
process indicators to improve production and to reward good health outcomes is 
46 
 
recommended (Mant, 2001, 479; Propper and Wilson, 2003, 264; Department of Health, 
2010a).  Achievement of a suitable target with a reliable central outcome indicator may 
be at the expense of local needs and demands and can lead to “managers doing what 
was expected of them rather than what was desirable locally” (Hunter, 2003, 95).  
Success in target achievement does not necessarily equate to better health care or 
achievement of policy outcomes.  Bevan and Hood conclude that “a consequence was 
that although there were indeed dramatic improvements in reported performance, we 
do not know the extent to which these were genuine or offset by gaming that resulted 
in reductions in performance that was not captured by targets” from their research 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006b, 533).   
Centrally driven targets such as the English command and control approach - which 
makes use of a “strong audit culture” and performance management - (Blackman et al., 
2009, 763) to health inequalities are criticised because they do not fit with complex 
system and or multi-agency problems and may have little effect improving performance 
to policy expectations (Blackman et al., 2009; Raine and McIvor, 2006).  Some research 
also argues that public sector agencies have multiple stakeholders with sometimes 
conflicting goals leading to complexity and confusion in the purpose of outcomes, failure 
to achieve policy and a potential need for a range of indicators to be used in 
performance management (Propper and Wilson, 2003, 264; Hunter, 2003, 126-136). 
The efficacy of targets and indicators in patient and commissioner choice is unclear.  
Research has suggested that competition between hospitals can improve outcomes – 
subject to certain conditions – but that no firm conclusions exist to support competition 
as a useful indicator for choice between health care providers (Propper et al, 2006, 16).  
Propper et al. note a gap in the literature due to the lack of evidence for evaluating 
choice in English healthcare and note that much evidence was taken from American 
research (2006, 13).  Furthermore, in spite of government intentions to improve patient 
choice through general practitioner commissioning consortia (Department of Health, 
2010a), evidence suggests the choices made by patients may conflict with those who 
pay for healthcare (Propper et al, 2006, 16).  Also, although the internal and external 
markets should allow empowerment to patients, Wall and Owen find the evidence of 
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this “limited and piecemeal” however they do note that doctors can “no longer dictate 
to their patients as they once could” (2003, 62).   
Research regarding the impact that publication of performance information has on care 
quality has been difficult to find through the review, however despite the “scant 
evidence” one research of largely non-UK healthcare establishments suggests that 
public release does stimulate quality improvements (Fung et al., 2008).  
2.2.3.4 The Future of Performance Indicators in English Health Care 
Following the criticism of the limitations of indicators and targets and their use in English 
health care policy, research suggests a move away from “myopic” performance 
management towards targets for which an entire health system is responsible (Hunter, 
2003, 96), which have clear priorities and where the role that the system is to fulfil is 
established (Micheli and Neely, 2010).  Local management and continuous improvement 
of the factors and needs which influence improved health in individuals and 
communities, and the time to implement and check progress, should be a suitable 
replacement (Hunter, 2003, 101-136; Freeman, 2002, 134).  
A government White Paper issued in 2010 set out a framework to change the 
measurements within health care (Department of Health, 2010a).  The White Paper 
confirmed that patients are “at the heart of the NHS” and detailed shared clinician / 
patient responsibility for decision making, greater choice for patients in who provides 
their primary and secondary care and the ability to “rate” hospitals and clinical 
departments in order to encourage high standards through competitiveness 
(Department of Health, 2010a).  The focus of targets and indicators was to be directed 
towards clinically credible health outcomes rather than “process” - meaning time-led 
and not internal process - targets (Department of Health, 2011a).  Following 
consultation on the White Paper, the DH declared “widespread enthusiasm” for the 
proposed changes and noted clinical involvement in target setting (Department of 
Health, 2011a).  The standards for emergency care (detailed in part two of the chapter) 
for example, involved clinical input from the College of Emergency Medicine and the 
Royal College of Nursing (Department of Health, 2010b).   
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Despite this policy change, however, emotive responses have been made to the use of 
outcomes based indicators and targets used in a competitive financial health care sector 
(Whitehead et al, 2010).  And outcome based measures applied across a nation do not 
meet the local system indicators for continuous improvement advocated by Freeman, 
Mant and Hunter and which move towards the purpose measures that Womack 
identified as a characteristic in successful enterprise organisations. 
2.2.3.5 Summary of the Effective use of Indicators 
Performance indicators are developing in order to evaluate the emerging Enterprise 
Culture.  The Enterprise Culture itself is a political attempt to improve efficiency and 
reduce pressures on the health service.  Indicators developed are centralised and used 
in a command and control fashion to evaluated decentralised management within a 
health market environment.  
Indicators used in English health care have shown progress towards expectation but 
have been criticised because of the efficacy of targets to achieve policy, unsuitable use 
and volume of indicators and the quality of data.  Better use of indicators suggests fewer 
but more specific measures, system wide indicators, local usage to address internal 
system needs and variations and more use of process indicators relevant to that system.   
The indicators and targets in England moved to outcomes based measurements in the 
financial year 2011/12 (Department of Health, 2011a) and in the second part of the 
chapter (section 2.3), the use of indicators in Emergency Departments will be discussed 
in context of the needs of emergency care provided by DGH. 
2.2.4 Conclusions to the Review of the Literature Relating to the Emerging 
Enterprise Culture 
The successful use of enterprise performance indicators and measures is dependent on 
their design and application.  To replicate the successes demonstrated in enterprise, 
performance indicators require the following characteristics. Firstly they should be 
restricted to factors controlled by decision makers and not centralised policy makers in 
order to address localised improvement opportunities without the need for defensive 
action.  Secondly, they should use valid and un-confounded data with no crossing of 
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complex system boundaries to ensure an accurate evaluation of the improvement 
purpose.   
These characteristics are unlikely to be found in English health care because of the 
complexities of the Enterprise Culture which underpins their design and use.  Centralised 
targets and the command and control approach of monitoring and adjusting can remove 
focus from local problems and encourage data inaccuracies and an environment of 
suspicion and fear.  Instead of empowered and skilled managers who embrace 
improvement opportunities shown by indicators, the NHS often encounters expensive 
and defensive actions from managers the effects of which are described clearly in the 
Francis report (Public Inquiry, 2013). The Francis report investigates system wide cases 
of patient safety, care quality and concerns over culture and management at an English 
acute healthcare Trust. 
The key points identified from this literature review of the emerging Enterprise Culture 
are: 
 Centralised target culture draws focus away from local long term development 
and system defects and innovation. 
 Enterprise efficiency comes from decentralised autonomy, not centralised 
command and control. 
 Greater management skills and fewer targets are required to improve efficiency. 
Following the findings of this literature review, the original research question, ‘How have 
needs-led indicators been developed, what are they, to what extent are they 
implemented and do they lead to improvements in service delivery and quality of care 
in Emergency Departments in District General Hospitals?’, is incomplete.  The 
components and complexities of the Enterprise Culture are far wider than the 
implementation of indicators. The key points identified above are taken forward to part 
two of the literature review which examines enterprise efficiencies in the English NHS 
and the framework underpinning enterprise best practice. 
50 
 
2.3 Literature Review Part Two 
The purpose of the this section of the literature review  is to examine in greater detail 
the implementation and efficacy of the Enterprise Culture identified in the first part of 
this chapter and to refine the findings of the review into a clear research subject.  The 
review considers the framework underpinning the successful improvements in quality 
and efficiency seen in the private sector and how it is reflected in the Enterprise Culture. 
The review also identifies differences between the Enterprise Culture and the private 
sector framework and leads to development of the research theory and refinement of 
the research questions.  
2.3.1 Search Strategy 
The search strategy for this literature review was identical to that of the search detailed 
in part one with the following exceptions. 
Additional databases searched were:   
 CINAHL, via the EBSCO interface. This database contains nursing and allied health 
journals, evidence-based care sheets.  
 PubMed, via the NCBI interface.  This database’s publications are scholarly 
journals which cover the areas of life sciences, behavioural sciences, chemical 
sciences and bioengineering.  The database includes the MEDLINE and other life 
science databases. 
An additional search structure is detailed in appendix 2.  The flow of studies through the 
search strategy is detailed in figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Search and synthesis flowchart – part two 
 
 
2.3.2 Review of the Literature relating to the Efficacy of the Enterprise Culture  
2.3.2.1 Emergency Department Indicators Implemented Following the NHS Plan 
As outlined in the earlier part of chapter 2, in a government consultation in 2000 
participants from the public and NHS staff deemed Emergency Department waiting 
times to be a critical aspect of emergency care performance, and judged waits to be 
excessive and varied across the country. From this consultation, targets for emergency 
care were created by the DH in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000). The DH 
subsequently set its strategy to deliver its Emergency Department performance target 
under the first reforming emergency care paper (Department of Health, 2001). The 
target for Emergency Departments was stated: “by 2004 no-one [is] to wait more than 
4 hours in an A&E [sic] department from arrival to admission to a bed in the hospital, 
transfer elsewhere or discharge. The average length of waiting should fall to 75 
minutes”. 
The DH understood that not all patients could be admitted or treated and discharged 
within four hours so the target was expected to be met in 98% of Emergency 
Department attendances. The remaining two per cent acknowledged patients with 
certain complicated or special needs (clinical exceptions) whose quality of care was best 
placed with the Emergency Department (Department of Health, 2003).  
Despite this, Emergency Departments experienced difficulties in achieving the target 
and a House of Commons Committee review of public accounts in 2005 reported 
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incidences of Emergency Departments breaching the four hour target more often than 
the 2% expected. However, they also noted an increased national demand for 
emergency care within Emergency Departments. The Committee’s paper stated that “a 
number of Trusts still have some way to go since only around seventy Trusts had 
consistently achieved the weekly mark of 98%” (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2005). The paper also reported clinical staff’s defence of the target breaches 
citing high volumes of highly acute or dependant patients whose Emergency 
Department care required more than four hours. This, however, was dismissed by the 
DH in the paper stating that the “98% target was not chosen arbitrarily and certain 
categories of patient, such as those with mental ill-health, were included in the clinical 
exceptions”. Nevertheless, clinical pressure remained (College of Emergency Medicine, 
2008) and the DH tolerance was raised to five per cent following the 2010 change of 
government (Lansley, 2010) – although local NHS commissioner Trusts continue to be 
able to set their own targets in their contracts with Emergency Department providers. 
Since publication of the NHS Plan in 2000, the government has invested heavily in 
supporting emergency care provision.  Patients who require emergency care were 
offered alternatives facilities to Emergency Departments, improvements were made to 
Emergency Department facilities and more devolved clinical decision making was 
pursued to assist Emergency Departments to meet the targets (Alberti, 2004 and 2007). 
Best practice frameworks and methods such as the NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement’s ‘Productive’ series and the Emergency Care Intensive Support Team 
(ECIST) have been developed to support health care providers. These functions and 
resources are implemented to help to standardise practice (Alberti, 2007, Office of 
Strategic Health Authorities, 2009) through dissemination of best practice and 
innovation techniques.  
2.3.2.2 Efficacy of Emergency Department Indicators Following the NHS Plan 
As a result of the increased government investment, performance, as measured against 
the target, has been encouraging and nationally the target was achieved in 2005 (Alberti, 
2007). However, as noted in the earlier part of chapter 2, target attainment has faced 
much criticism and the Emergency Department target achievement is associated with 
dysfunction through inappropriate patient management, data manipulation and costly 
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staff supplements (British Medical Association, 2005).  Furthermore, performance is 
highly variable, and sustainment of the improvements is unclear.  Data published in the 
Health Service Journal shows a 6 month period in 2012 – 2013 where the English NHS 
have failed to meet the four hour wait target (Clover, 2013).      
The literature also describes consequential dysfunctions identified as a result of the use 
of indicators. British Medical Association’s (BMA) report gave examples of cancellation 
of elective surgery, discharge of Emergency Department patients who were not 
stabilised or adequately assessed and hospitals recruiting additional agency staff during 
the periods of measurement in order to attain targets. Models for efficient care, where 
Emergency Department and Medical Assessment Units were co-located and shared the 
same four hour targets, also provide positive results in target attainment and continuous 
patient care (Boyle et al, 2008). However, Boyle et al. note that physical and financial 
resources and admission direct to the appropriate specialty are required; criteria that 
may not be available to a DGH. Boyle et al. also stress that that the efficiencies “place 
the hospital at a financial disadvantage” from reduced tariff payments for patients who 
would previously have been admitted (2008).   
Kelman and Friedman researched some of these claims and found that, at a national 
level, there is no evidence to support the dysfunctional consequences of the four hour 
wait target attainment (2009).  Kelman and Friedman’s work is limited in drawing wide 
assurances that the four hour wait is not gained at the expense of dysfunctional 
consequences elsewhere (2009).  Firstly, they acknowledge that not all of the 
improvements to waiting times are attributable to the target – as noted the NHS 
received significantly increased investment following the publication of the NHS plan.  
Secondly, the hypotheses that Kelman and Friedman test do not account for all of the 
accusations levelled at target achievement: namely data falsification – although Kelman 
and Friedman are sceptical about the magnitude of the problem and the bias falsified 
data would have had on their research (2009, 941).  Achievement of the targets and the 
measurement of a limited number of consequential effects do not mean that the 
indicators support the local organisation’s best interests. Micheli and Neeley note that 
local organisations “are forced to adopt measurement targets and indicators that can 
be used in the political negotiation process” (2010, 15). This causes a system breakdown 
because, although targets may come down from central government in a clear and easy 
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manner, it is not clear to organisations how demands for support and decision making 
power go back up to central government (Micheli and Neeley, 2010, 15). 
The consequences of the Enterprise Culture are also studied by Blunt et al. who research 
the reason for increased emergency admissions between 2004 and 2009 (2010).  The 
number of emergency admissions is an important metric for an emergency department 
and the hospital finances since emergencies admissions in excess of those recorded in 
the financial year 2008 / 2009 are paid at 30% of tariff unless the provider Trust has a 
special agreement with its commissioners.  The reason for this within the Enterprise 
Culture is to encourage hospital avoidance so acute health services do not to admit and 
discharge patients unnecessarily (Blunt et al., 2010, 5) and commissioning Trusts retain 
money to treat the patient in the right place at the right time – i.e. care in the 
community.  
The result of Blunt et al.’s study indicates that the increase in admissions is higher than 
the associated increase in Emergency Department attendances, but this is not 
associated with a particular type of illness or age group and that an increase in short 
stays of the additional patients together with lower mortality rates suggests that lower 
acuteness (the severity of the patients’ condition) cases are being admitted (2010, 8).  
Blunt et al. state that higher admissions form part of a long term trend but that policies 
such as the four hour maximum wait may have exacerbated the problem (2010, 8).  The 
research compares the relationship between breaches and zero day length of stay 
admissions to investigate the problem of patients being admitted simply to avoid a 
breach and concludes that, at a national level, there is nothing to suggest this is a 
significant effect on the increase in admissions - although some individual Trusts “show 
patterns that indicate a link between admissions and targets” (Blunt et al., 2010, 5-6). 
Moreover, the four hour wait indicator is a measure of hospital efficiency, a fact that the 
government acknowledged before introducing the target in an editorial in the 
Emergency Medicine Journal where the need for collaborative, system wide 
relationships and factors affecting patient admission were described (Lammy, 2003, 
112).  This is a requirement of the Enterprise Culture method as the four hour target is 
linked to a higher level centralised objective which is then cascaded and aligned to local 
usage through linked targets and indicators: the “golden thread” (Micheli and Neeley, 
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2010, 5).  The objective that the four hour wait target supports is to “improve service 
standards” in acute hospitals along with targets addressing inpatient and outpatient 
waiting time, appointment waits and access to professional and public accountability 
(Micheli and Neeley, 2010, 11).  Cooke et al. demonstrate this link stating that “waits 
over four hours are correlated with the average bed occupancy in acute Trusts” (2004, 
575).  This may be acceptable as an Enterprise Culture ideal: patients in Emergency 
Departments want their care to progress quickly and are not concerned about how it is 
facilitated, but the command and control function and decentralised management 
within the English NHS, discussed in the first part of the chapter, means that Emergency 
Department managers will feel the punitive repercussions of failing the target, or 
indulge in gaming (Bevan and Hood, 2006b).   
2.3.2.3 Changes to Indicators in English Emergency Departments 
Following intense lobbying and a change of government, in June 2010 the College of 
Emergency Medicine secured an agreement from the Secretary of State for Health to 
abolish the four hour standard from April 2011. In its place the Secretary requested that 
clinicians develop a new dashboard of quality indicators whilst still recognising that 
“timeliness of care is an important element of quality” (Lansley, 2010).  The clinician 
developed Emergency Care Quality Indicators (listed below) which followed 
consultation were created to improve health outcomes and shift away from targets 
which focus only on the process, such as the emergency care four hour wait limit, which 
“get in the way of patient care” (Department of Health, 2011a).   
 Left department before being seen for treatment rate 
 Re-attendance rate 
 Time to initial assessment 
 Time to treatment  
 Total time in Emergency Department  
Published as experimental statistics by the Health and Social Care Information Centre 
(HSCIC) these data are provided to “help share information on the quality of care of 
[Emergency Department] services to stimulate the discussion and debate between 
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patients, clinicians, providers and commissioners, which is needed in a culture of 
continuous improvement” (HSCIC, 2013). 
To manage delivery of the health outcome targets, the DH noted the increased 
regulatory role of Monitor (the health care regulator) to “promote the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of service” (Department of Health, 2011a).  
This confirmation that the changes will continue to support the Enterprise Culture 
caused concern that the Emergency Department Quality Indicators will be used for 
performance management using similar command and control tactics to the policies 
described in part one of the chapter and not clinical best practice and improvement 
(Whitehead et al, 2010).  
2.3.2.4 Health Outcome and Process Indicators 
The four hour wait indicator implemented as a result of the NHS Plan was intended to 
be a measure of the performance of hospitals’ emergency care processes and practices 
of meeting a target (Department of Health, 2000).  But as noted, the changes to 
Emergency Department indicators are a move towards representation of health 
outcomes (Department of Health, 2011a) and performance improvement (HSCIC, 2013). 
However, health outcome indicators represent the “final outcome of a patient 
encounter with the health sector” and the literature contains agreement that 
Emergency Department indicators should focus on areas under the emergency clinicians 
influence (Cameron et al., 2011, 735), while Beattie and Mackway-Jones note that  
“health care providers are being urged to measure outcomes” (2004, 48).  Emergency 
medicine, however, is different from other medical and surgical specialties because 
Emergency Departments are presented with symptoms and the patient’s episode in the 
department may not result in a confirmed diagnosis.  This makes health outcomes 
“difficult” to measure (Cameron et al., 2011, 735) and although Emergency Department 
influence other NHS indicators, such as outcomes for trauma patients, the contribution 
is “difficult to quantify” (Beattie and Mackway-Jones, 2004, 47).  Additionally, patients 
whose time in an Emergency Department is only part of their acute care are more likely 
to be concerned with “timeliness and appropriateness of the diagnostic and therapeutic 
processes” when evaluating Emergency Department performance (Beattie and 
Mackway-Jones, 2004, 48). 
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The government move from process to outcome indicators does not address the issues 
for locally derived indicators discussed in the first part of chapter two.  Research has also 
demonstrated that Emergency Department indicators need to have a combination of 
indicator types in order to be useful for improvement purposes.  Furthermore, 
Whitehead et al note that risks to equity can result from financial penalties linked to 
health outcomes if “providers focus their efforts on healthier more affluent populations 
for whom improved outcomes would be easier to achieve” (2010, 1374). 
Research undertaken by Beattie and Mackway-Jones using a Delphi method identifies 
thirty six potential indicators for Emergency Departments, only two of which are 
outcome indicators, ten are structure and the remaining twenty four are process (2004, 
49).   
Cameron et al.’s research to suggest parameters to measure quality emergency care 
notes the needs of Emergency Department stakeholders and their differing reasons for 
“collecting, monitoring and analysing” Emergency Department quality measures (2011, 
735).  Donabedian’s definition of types of indicator is considered in Cameron et al.’s 
research.  Firstly, structure indicators represent physical facility, finances and staff 
consumption. Secondly, process indicators record elements of the patient’s journey.  
Lastly, outcome indicators measure the final result to a patient’s health from the 
intervention.   The research suggests indicators based on “common” domains of quality 
derived from the literature, namely: safety, effectiveness, patient centeredness, 
timeliness, efficiency and equity (Cameron et al., 2011, 737). 
Cameron et al. suggest a combination of indicator types concluding, more importantly, 
that indicators need to be set according to the “priorities of the institution” in order to 
stimulate improvement rather that allowing the measures to become “an outcome in 
themselves” (2011, 739).  Because these indicators are locally developed they are not 
useful for national comparison (2011, 739).   
2.3.2.5 Summary of Literature Review Relating to the Efficacy of the Enterprise 
Culture 
The use of indicators developed through the Enterprise Culture for Emergency 
Departments has had a nationally positive, if not unstable and possibly unsustainable, 
effect on the outcome that policy is developed to achieve as well as unintended and 
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damaging consequences.  The usefulness of indicators for holistic local improvement 
falls short of the recommendations defined in the literature and reviewed in the earlier 
part of chapter 2. 
The results and consequences of the use of indicators under the Enterprise Culture 
reflect tensions on the capability of the people and process that must change in order 
to meet them.  These tensions and the gaps in the characteristic identified between the 
English NHS and the best enterprises are discussed in the next section. 
2.3.3 Enterprise Best Practice 
2.3.3.1 Purpose, Process and People: the Conceptual Framework of Enterprise 
Improvement in the English NHS 
This section discusses how Purpose, Process and People (PPP), a conceptual 
underpinning of enterprise performance and efficiency improvement and the associated 
best use of indicators as a tool to achieve them, are represented within the English NHS 
and its implementation of the Enterprise Culture.  The findings are related to those used 
by successful enterprises through interviews with experts who have worked in both 
enterprise and health care quality and efficiency improvement.  The conclusions will 
form part of the ethnographic research with the intention to test further gaps and 
particular issues for rural or remote hospitals. 
2.3.3.2 Lean and the Purpose, Process and People Framework Characteristics 
Womack, as noted in part one of chapter 2, argues that successful enterprises 
improvements come from a pathway of clear (quantified) purpose, robust processes and 
capable, empowered people, the PPP framework common to innovative enterprises 
(2011).  
The PPP framework is derived from Lean production, a concept investigated and named 
by Womack, Jones and Roos, following their research into why Japanese car 
manufacturers had achieved significant global dominance through efficiency and 
quality, and published in the seminal work published in 1990 - ‘The Machine That 
Changed The World’. 
Lean production is so named as it follows the opposite principles to mass production 
(Womack et al., 2007, 2). References and comparisons to Taylor and Ford, two pioneers 
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of mass production, in the English NHS’s adoption of the Enterprise Culture suggest a 
significant gap from lean techniques as a best practice.  Lean techniques started to be 
developed in post-war Japan when the Toyota motor company began rebuilding itself 
after suffering from poor management, mass employee dismissals, a militant workforce 
and a broken national economy (Womack et al., 2007, 47-67).  Progress was made by 
development of a system that addresses: 
 The design of the product or service 
 The supply system for the product or service (balancing supply and demand) 
 The place of production or provision 
 The characteristics of the customer using the product or service 
This whole system of producing quality and efficiency is supported, not controlled, by a 
finance and management structure.  To generate quality and efficiency improvement it 
is stressed “that problem solving is the most important part of any job” (Womack et al. 
2007, 204).  All managers are expected to work “on the shop floor”, rotating through 
design, supply, production and customer relations because they believe that “the point 
of production where value is truly added” and leads to a culture where a managers’ role 
is to teach empowered workers to solve “increasingly challenging problems” (Womack 
et al. 2007, 204).  However Womack et al. emphasise, in an afterword in the 2007 
publication, that problem solving is the last portion of the lean system to be 
implemented and must follow the introduction of well-defined and managed standard 
processes (2007, 290). 
This systemic view is designed to generate efficiency through quality improvement 
(Womack et al., 2007, 73), which is the best practice underpinning the Enterprise Culture 
within health care.  This (Lean) system was adopted by other Japanese manufacturers 
and later, through the work of Womack, Jones and Roos, by many other nations and 
industries (2007, 67-69).   
Womack’s method of applying Lean techniques is examination of first purpose, then 
process and finally people.  In a publication for a conference for health care 
improvement, Womack states that all value (achievement of purpose) “is the result of a 
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process” which should be the focus of managers’ attention (2005, 3). The efficiencies of 
a Lean enterprise can only come from a process where purpose is clear and an 
organisation must “accurately specify the value desired by the customer” (Womack, 
2005, 3).  Another key element of designing a robust process is “the actions in the 
process are satisfying for people to perform, managers to manage, and customers 
(patients) to experience’ adding that “putting good people in a bad process is the best 
way to produce ‘bad’ people” (Womack, 2005, 9). 
Advising health care leaders on how to implement PPP, Womack observes that 
organisations are often not structured to meet process perfection.  Most organisations 
are vertically structured, in departments with a responsible manager, but that processes 
flow horizontally, towards the patient (2005, 17). Furthermore, the measurement and 
indication of performance use metrics “inconsistent with a perfect process” such as 
asset utilisation (Womack, 2005, 17).  To overcome these organisational issues and 
become a Lean health care enterprise Womack suggests matching the organisation to 
the process and Identifying and empowering a process owner to manage value 
horizontally across the process (2005). 
Using PPP as an enterprise tool to create customer value and competitive advantage 
means developing a robust organisational framework.  This framework includes a clearly 
defined purpose to meet customer value, the standardisation of a systemic and 
horizontal process through the organisation and management capable of mentorship 
and problem solving. 
2.3.3.3 English NHS: Cultural Reflections on Purpose, Process and People  
Health care has faced criticism for its poor capacity to undertake changes which lead to 
improved safe, reliable outcomes (its purpose) which Frankel et al. argue is a result of 
differences in the characteristics of health care organisations and those of high reliability 
industries (2006, 1690-91). 
The first characteristic identified is the people and process based element of 
organisational culture where the NHS “anomie” of underpowered and organisationally 
restricted people do not think in terms of process or systems (O’Regan, 2006, 123).  
However Frankel et al., like Womack, believe that leaders drive values, values drive 
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behaviours and behaviours drive performance and also deem culture to be the product 
of collective behaviours (2006, 1707).  The reality of O’Regan’s findings presents a clear 
difference in the organisational culture characteristic between health care organisations 
and high reliability industries.  
Organisations are “as willing to expose areas of weakness as they are display areas of 
excellence” (Frankel et al., 2006, 1692).  Frankel et al. propose a culture which produces 
accountable and empowered staff whose experience is respected regardless of 
experience (2006, 1692). This, Frankel et al. argue, leads to good performance (2006, 
1707).  Creating this culture needs firm leadership to acknowledge performance gaps 
and then be held to account for, and be capable of, closing them (Frankel et al., 2006, 
1706-1707).  The weaknesses of the NHS culture, leadership and respecting, and 
listening to, staff and the prevalence of fear and suspicion (noted earlier in the chapter) 
were key criticisms of the failings in safe health care and the tragic outcomes (high 
mortality rates) found in the public inquiry, chaired by Robert Francis QC, into the Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’s performance failings (Public Inquiry, 2013).  One 
unintended result of the introduction of internal markets and a drive for efficiency 
through the Enterprise Culture is the inability of people to change process and meet 
local need (purpose).  The drive for efficiency pitches one health care Trust against 
another creating internal service rivalry which “led to a reinforcement of clinical empires 
and ring fencing of departmental boundaries” (O’Regan, 2006, 123).  O’Regan argues 
that such “strong vertical lines demarcating roles and the provision of services” (2006, 
123) produces differentiation which, with centralised command and control, focusses 
“all the attention on externally imposed targets” meaning that “little thought is given to 
the internal needs of the organisation” (2006, 124). System and process thinking are 
missing from the NHS Enterprise Culture because of a professional workforce is 
alienated by the command and control and managerial issues detailed earlier in the 
chapter, functional silos caused by demarcation and professionals who lack autonomy 
to make change (O’Regan, 2006, 126-127).   
Pronovost et al. also consider the relationship between people and process in delivering 
safe health care and recommend that a framework that encompasses organisational 
culture by targeting senior managers, team leaders and front line staff by educating 
them in facilitating change management and standardised operations, or processes 
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(2006, 1612).  The shortcomings of most individual hospitals, Pronovost et al. argue, is 
the limited resources that would not be sufficient to develop measures and the data 
collection necessary to fulfil the framework and so suggest that it should be 
implemented across a consortium of hospitals such as the NHS (2006, 1612).  However, 
this centralised approach to change management and process frameworks bears the 
same limitations and the centralised approach to targets and indicators and still misses 
the local defects and systems which cause quality issues (O’Regan, 2006; Hunter, 2003, 
101-136) identified in the Francis report (Public Inquiry, 2013).  Furthermore, 
Worthington considers that a “combined force of opposition to change, clinicians’ 
traditional professional autonomy and their attachment” to elite professional status 
within the NHS causes a continued problem for change managers (2004, 65).  Running 
NHS Trusts “as a business” striving for integration and standardisation and adopting 
audit, check, countercheck and regulation of clinical guidelines stifles innovation 
(O’Regan, 2006, 123-126); although this perception of enterprise does not follow the 
purpose, process, people framework of best practice that Womack describes.  A further 
characteristic of health care culture that causes unreliable, unsafe outcomes is the 
constant of change which induces anxiety in staff (Walsh et al., 2011, 206).  Constant 
change reflects historic failures and similar solutions repeatedly applied, divisions 
between levels of staff and a workforce that is not always conscious of the rational 
perspective of change (Walsh et al., 2011, 210). 
2.3.3.4 Process Complexity 
As discussed in part one of chapter 2, process complexity and insufficient time to 
implement change are common factors in public sector organisations that may lead to 
undesirable results (Hunter, 2003, 126-136).    Also as noted, policy ensures that public 
sector responses to complex problems are complex answers (Hunter, 2003, 162-164).  
O’Regan states that current vertical functional rigidity of health care organisations does 
not allow for systems thinking, a term meaning the review how independent functions 
within a system influence each other holistically (2006, 126).  Rigid, complex and vertical 
organisations and processes do not encourage the systemic solutions that Womack et 
al. advise.   Allder et al. illustrate the example of process complexity and rigid 
organisation through research into bed availability and patient flow through hospitals 
(2010).  The authors argue that complexities of bed availability is not resolved by adding 
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more beds, which just adds more complexity to the system, but by taking a system 
perspective to understand that different patient dynamics and to smooth predictable 
but varied demand that the process amplifies as the patient moves through the hospital 
departments (Allder et al., 2010, 14-15). Process complexity and a lack of system 
thinking is encouraged through command and control, such as National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence who “monitor, evaluate and set down clinical guidelines” 
(O’Regan, 2006, 124).   
In addition to process complexity, the design and application of the process to meet user 
demand, a key criterion of lean and system thinking, must be considered.  Silvester et 
al. ask if “increasing capacity [is] a prerequisite to local organisations achieving and 
sustaining performance at the level of access targets” (2004, 105)?  In conclusion to their 
study, Silvester states that the “majority” of capacity plans in the NHS are based on 
historic average and do not account for variation in demand or capacity which inevitably 
causes variation, and queues (2006) which Lean thinking is designed to eradicate 
(Silvester et al., 2004, 105). 
As concluded in the previous section, the English NHS has an abundance of centralised 
targets and indicators which are not appropriate for local decision making and are 
limited in their ability to meet a defined outcome purpose.  Processes for the targets 
and indicators are similarly centralised and do not address local deficiencies and the 
challenges from the cultural aspects identified above describe how the ’People’ element 
influence outcomes. 
In the previous sections, the use of indicators as a local improvement tool and their link 
to purpose are explained.  This section has reviewed the process and people in the 
context of purpose and explores the reasons for behavioural differences between the 
NHS and enterprise in successfully achieving purpose.   
The NHS, despite advancing with a competitive means of achieving efficiency through 
the implementation of the Enterprise Culture, does not appear prepared in terms of 
enterprise’s best practice framework.  In place of the desired purpose-driven horizontal, 
systemic process we find rigid, vertical functions monitored externally and managed by 
un-empowered management. 
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The next section will conclude with interviews with experts who have made the 
transition between enterprise best practice and health care improvement to review the 
findings of the literature and identify key considerations when developing the 
methodology. 
2.3.3.5 Achieving Enterprise Success in the English NHS: An Evaluation with 
Experts 
This boxed text in this section describes a series of conversations with experts in 
innovation and efficiency improvements in health care. 
Following their seminal work with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professors 
Womack and Jones developed the Lean Enterprise Institute and Lean Enterprise 
Academy respectively.  These non-profit education and research organisations have led 
advancement of lean techniques into health care. 
To evaluate the findings of the literature reviews and to present useful conclusions for 
the methodology and research, a series of discussions were conducted with two former 
engineers who have become senior faculty members of the Lean Enterprise Academy 
and have led improvement in healthcare across health systems in Europe. The 
evaluation confirms the importance of purpose, process and people in enterprise 
success and a major failing of NHS change and measurement systems.  The key themes 
that these two experts commonly encounter in the NHS are discussed below.  
Because of the horizontal structure of NHS organisations, value is rarely defined 
properly, if at all.  This is because systemic value, towards the patient, cannot be seen 
and short term targets held by each manager are the only visible measure of value.  For 
example, a manager of a porter facility may have a target to cut costs and will only be 
able to do this through personnel reduction.  This happens and the value stream (the 
process giving value to the patient) is interrupted because patients have to queue to go 
be admitted, go to diagnostic, discharge lounge, etc.  This leads to variation being 
amplified and poor use of clinical time because patients are batched up and arrive at the 
clinical space in large numbers instead of in a manageable stream.  This leads to another 
observation: finance departments have considerably more influence in health care than 
in the leading enterprise organisations.  Finance departments in health care set the 
budgets in the functions and design cost improvement plans for each function 
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independently.  The systems of delivering value are not considered at all which leads to 
poor management decisions such as the one illustrated above. Finance is a support 
function in enterprise, not a control.  Some of the accounting techniques also seem to 
be significantly behind the enterprise expectations.  When exploring finances in NHS 
organisations, finance staff refer to stock as an asset because ‘we paid for it’.  However, 
when considering the treatment of stock, how long it remains unused, that lack of 
control over its purchase, deliver and use, and the significant amounts discarded, the 
enterprise thinking considers the treatment of stock a considerable liability. 
Another finding of the evaluation is that responses and reactions implemented by health 
care organisations to resolve quality failures continuously add complexity to the system.  
Examples discussed are:  
 Adding a quality assurance check at the end of the process instead of resolving the 
cause of the quality issue.  Checking often fails because staff undertaking the checks 
are poorly trained and the standards for the process are unclear.  This leads to a 
further potential to reduce the quality of the system which creates less value for the 
system (the NHS is paying for a member of, often clinical, staff to perform an action 
that detracts quality from the patient). 
 The implementation of a new management or governance body which may employ 
some of the best staff in the value adding process as well as moving value further 
away from the patient.  These bodies seek to manage a programme of mostly 
financially driven, improvements but often reinforce the horizontal functions and 
not the inefficiencies in the system.   
Clearly defining the purpose in order to focus improvement is agreed as essential, 
however, because of the horizontal functions within the NHS and the inability of most 
systems to assign one owner to the system, it is necessary to experiment with change in 
a carefully defined area with a willing clinical lead and prove the concept to other 
clinicians and managers.  Then improvement projects should consider how to achieve 
the solution.  For example, to achieve the Emergency Department 4 hour targets 
considerable effort is given by hospitals to make capacity more efficient however, when 
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viewed in terms of Little’s Law, this is only half of the possible equation.  Little’s Law 
applied to queuing in hospitals states that: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
So if there are one hundred patients in an Emergency Department which is working at a 
rate of discharging twenty patients per hour the average time in department is five 
hours.  Trying to adjust the productivity rate will affect quality, balancing the flow of 
patient demand to eighty patients would achieve the four hour target. This level of 
thinking is not common in the NHS because, the experts believe: 
a) Managers are not trained to think that way and are therefore often not skilled or 
capable 
b) There is an underlying NHS behaviour that looks to productivity for improvement 
and does not believe that it is possible to make changes to demand: ‘we can’t buffer 
patients like car parts’. 
The behavioural problem is deemed a significant factor in implementing Enterprise 
Culture change in the NHS.  Clinical Consultant influence and departmental 
management, as well as powerful support services such as finance functions add delay 
to implementation and reduce the efficacy of improvements. Also instigating 
improvement is often a process of negotiation to gain enough support make change.  
Interestingly, the behavioural issues, defining standardisation and educating managers 
can be addressed using techniques introduced by the Training Within Industry (TWI) 
effort, introduced by the United States Department of War to improve efficiency during 
the World War II.  Job Description (JD) and Job Instruction (JI) ensure that all actors in a 
process understand the purpose of the work, the standard way of achieving it and the 
skill to instruct others in how to become capable of working in the process. 
The above evaluation confirms the findings of the literature review and provides useful 
reflections to consider in the ethnographic study. 
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2.3.3.6 Summary of Enterprise Best Practice 
NHS Enterprise Culture does not replicate the successes of enterprise because of the 
differences between the NHS centralisation of targets and processes compared with the 
decentralised PPP approach of leading private sector organisations.  The culture of fear 
and suspicion is not present in best enterprises because indicators are used for feedback 
for improvement through structured management and an empowered workforce (not 
to manage the poorly performing). Metrics show the potential and improvement is 
delivered through an experiment to change. 
Command and control misses the key point of enterprise benefits: the need for capable 
management to define customer purpose, standardise processes and allow people to 
understand and fix the local complexities in order to achieve improvement and 
competitive efficiency. 
2.3.4 Conclusion to Part Two of the Literature Review 
The mandatory indicators that the DH uses to assess performance in English Emergency 
Department and which will be inherent in emergency care systems evaluated in this 
research have been described so far in this text.  These indicators are intended to 
measure health outcomes and which will stimulate innovation and competition within 
the NHS and provide information for patient choice.  They purposefully move away from 
process based measures and do not respond to the arguments for locally based 
indicators for internal improvement described in this chapter.  Nor does the DH 
emphasise the other organisational characteristics that successful enterprises use with 
indicators to achieve successful outcomes.  Despite the DH rhetoric for improved 
innovation and better patient choice, concern is expressed that pressure from regulators 
will represent more performance management.    
The literature suggests that implementation of market systems and command and 
control techniques using inappropriate, centralised indicators through decentralised, 
unpowered managers has not achieved the sustained benefits expected in the policy.  
This is because the conceptual framework of enterprise efficiency has not been applied 
or, perhaps, fully understood.  In the NHS culture, suspicion and fear replace the 
innovation and opportunity that indicators present to the Enterprise culture, as the 
tragic events described in the Francis report attest. 
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2.3.5 Developing the Research Rationale and Refining the Research Questions 
Findings from the literature review to be considered in developing the theoretical 
framework for the study are: 
a) The behavioural aspects of staff in Emergency Departments and wider health 
care organisations  
b) The impact of functional and structural influences in health care organisations 
c) Management and non-clinical or support service influences and controls on the 
system of work 
d) The skills and improvement framework and preparation for change present in 
the Emergency Department 
e) Identifying the local purposes (needs) and complexities and purpose, process 
and people characteristics 
The study began with the proposal to understand the extent to which the four hour wait 
target would affect the performance and needs of the local emergency care system.  
However, the findings of the literature reviews revealed that targets and indicators are 
components of the wider Enterprise Culture policy to adopt successes seen in private 
sector best practice.  
The limitations of the prevalent Enterprise Culture in providing an organisational 
framework capable of achieving policy were exposed and, as a result, more specific aims 
emerged. 
Following the literature review, the rationale for the study was to understand the extent 
to which the Enterprise Culture in the NHS provides an organisational framework 
capable of achieving current NHS policy.  The aims of the study are to understand:  
1. The dynamics, capacity and capability of the Emergency Department service; in 
particular how the presence of the Enterprise Culture affects Emergency 
Department performance.  
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2. The demand from emergency care service users who present to a rural 
Emergency Department.  This includes assessing how much control the 
Emergency Department had over demand for its service and what alternative 
emergency care services exist.  Demand characteristics, patient demographics 
and acuteness, and the stochastic nature or arrival patterns required scrutiny.   
3. What capacity does the Emergency Department need in order to fulfil its role in 
providing an emergency care service?  Identification of the gaps between the 
current Emergency Department system and the Purpose Process People (PPP) 
framework in order to realise the benefits identified in the literature review was 
also necessary. What characteristics of the Emergency Department system 
would need to be changed and could this be achieved?  
At the initial proposal stage of the study, the research question was; ‘how have 
needs-led indicators been developed, what are they, to what extent are they 
implemented and do they lead to improvements in service delivery and quality of 
care in Emergency Departments in District General Hospitals?’.   
However, following the refinement of study rationale and the aims identified above and 
the development of a testable theory, this evolved into the following, specific questions: 
1. What is the nature of the emergency service users’ demand? 
2. What characteristics of the Enterprise Culture exist in the Emergency 
Departments and what are their effects on performance against the four-hour 
wait target? 
3. Hypothesis: the private enterprise framework adopted by the Emergency 
Department is successful in achieving the aims of the Enterprise Culture. 
4. How can the private enterprise best practice framework or other best practice 
method be introduced to meet the needs of the local emergency care system? 
The following chapter discusses the methodological theories, conceptual framework 
underpinning the research and the aims and research questions developed in this thesis.  
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3 Methodology: Research Philosophy, Theoretical Framework and 
Strategy  
3.1 Philosophical Considerations for the Research 
This section discusses and justifies the ontological and epistemological stances based on 
the findings from the literature review and outlines the importance of considering the 
researcher’s ontological and epistemological stances. Justification of the ontological and 
epistemological stance adopted in the research is then presented 
3.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology is the science or study of being, although Crotty debates the wider 
philosophical meaning attributed to the science, citing views from the literature that 
ontology can describe the assumptions that research makes about the nature of reality 
in social structures (1998).   Although Crotty believes this is helpful in “dealing with 
ontological issues as they emerge without expanding our [epistemological] schema to 
include ontology”, he believes that the term is best used “when we do need to talk about 
being” (1998, 11), a definition adopted in this research. 
Snape and Spencer consider that one of the social researcher’s “key ontological debates 
surrounds whether there is a captive social reality and how it should be constructed” 
(2003, 11).  This leads to their definition of three “broad” ontological stances: realism, 
materialism and idealism (Snape and Spencer, 2003, 11). 
1. A realist position considers that reality exists independently of our beliefs and 
understanding, or how people perceive the world. There is a distinction between 
the reality of the world and the meaning given to it by individuals’ perceptions. 
2. Materialists consider that reality exists independently of our beliefs and 
understanding, but that only the material or physical world is real.  Individuals’ 
values and beliefs arise from but do not shape the world. 
3. Idealists take the view that no reality exists independently of our beliefs and 
understanding, or that the world exists only as people perceive it. 
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The literature describes a multifarious system of rigid organisational structures and rules 
and complex social and relational phenomena which together produce a varied level of 
output when viewed through performance indicators (Turner et al., 2013a; 2013b).  This 
presents the researcher with an environment where the ontological assumptions made 
to “talk about being” (Crotty, 1998, 11) need to consider two distinct causal features 
when examining their relationship with the effect on performance: organisation 
structure and social nature.   
3.1.1.1 Realism 
Toyota, the pioneering organisation that led Womack et al.’s seminal work on the 
successful private organisation’s use of efficiency and effectiveness techniques which 
the Enterprise Culture looks to reproduce, has a maxim of achieving excellent quality in 
purpose through people striving for a perfect process (2007).  A former Toyota 
Chairman, Fujio Cho, stated that “We get brilliant results from average people managing 
brilliant processes, while our competitors get average or worse results from brilliant 
people managing broken processes” (Chartered Quality Institute, 2013). Also, the 
process and organisational structures within the Enterprise Culture have an objective 
causal relationship with performance outcomes (Turner et al., 2013b).  These 
conclusions tend towards the realist assumption; of distinction between the reality of 
the world and the meaning given to it by individual perceptions (Snape and Spencer, 
2003, 11).  
However, many of the potential causes of the health care performance issues identified 
in the literature are not derived from a typical realist view.  Social structures and 
interaction and the ‘average person’ depicted by Toyota are complex and hard or 
impossible to measure.  For this reason these aspects are often omitted from a realist 
model, however such factors “can always be quantified” and represented in a 
mathematical or statistical model (Richmond, 2004, 31).  Although the social aspects are 
often omitted from a realist model these complex beliefs and tensions are critical and 
do need to be investigated in order to “address research questions that require 
explanation or understand social phenomena in their social contexts” (Snape and 
Spencer, 2003, 5).   
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3.1.1.2 Idealism 
I am drawn to the realist position because of my background as a statistical engineer 
where laws and models are created to identify causes of outcome variation to “drive 
improvement” (Hoerl and Snee, 2010, 121).  However the adoption of an idealist aspect, 
and thus a rejection of the pure materialist approach, must recognise the weight and 
complex nature of the social tensions.  An ontological position is necessary to 
understand the systemic and social complexities, explain their influence and resulting 
variance shown in performance outcomes, contribute to the model build and enable 
intervention in terms of a realist framework, which enterprise best practice and the 
Department of Health (DH) use to some extent.  Hoerl and Snee argue that the 
development of statistical engineering and statistical science represents a paradigm 
shift towards offering academic research a discipline to “promote deeper thought about 
the context of the data and about the processes that produced that data” (2010, 121-
124). This shift (from statistics as a pure science to a paradigm combining pure science 
and engineering science which  produces “a body of knowledge and teaching curricula”) 
enables an academic approach to address unsolved problems of older paradigms “based 
on societies needs at this time” (Hoerl and Snee, 2010, 124-128). 
The research takes the ontological view that reality within the Enterprise Culture is 
created through a function of complex social structures and the existence of a reality 
that is influenced by organisational laws and models.  The ontological stance selected is 
a position between the realist and idealist extremes, adopting the critical realism 
position.  
Critical realism allows researchers to “explain the mechanisms that inﬂuence 
information seeking, not only on an empirical level, but also by revealing possible 
underlying causes and relations” (Wikgren, 2005, 11).  DeForge and Shaw add that the 
essence of critical realism is uncovering the underlying generative (causal) mechanisms 
(the interplay of conditions) “that give rise to the demi-regularities we observe and 
experience daily” (2012, 85).   
 
73 
 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology concerns the study of knowledge.  The researcher must consider the 
theory of knowledge and have faith in the “truth, or validity of that knowledge”, 
acknowledging that different epistemological assumptions lead to different research 
techniques and questions and ultimately different ways of “knowing the world” (Green 
and Thorogood, 2004, 10). 
Snape and Spencer describe two epistemological stances for how a researcher to might 
come to “know about the world” (2003, 16): 
 Positivism assumes that “the world is independent of and unaffected by the 
researcher” and that quantitative research techniques are appropriate to social 
research “because human behaviour is governed by law-like regularities” (Snape 
and Spencer 2003, 16). 
 Interpretivism assumes that human behaviour is not governed in such a way and 
that the researcher must understand social structures in a qualitative way, using 
the “participant’s and the researcher’s understanding” (Snape and Spencer 
2003, 16). 
Green and Thorogood add a second “qualitative tradition”, constructivism, which looks 
to understand how social processes construct phenomena (2004, 13). 
A positivist approach views knowledge of social reality as a “stable reality which can be 
studied within scientific implications, namely, empiricism, unity of method and value-
free enquiry” (Green and Thorogood, 2004, 12).  Although it views human behaviour 
through scientific implication, positivism is criticised for its lack of regard for human 
individuality implying that human behaviour is passive or controlled by “law-like ways” 
(Green and Thorogood, 2004, 12-25).   Turner et al., describe evidence of such law-like 
ways and structures within the Enterprise Culture but also criticise its ability to produce 
expected results because of the influence of complex social interactions which are 
difficult to appraise objectively (2013 b).  
The view that such an objective stance should be replaced by subjectivity led to the 
qualitative paradigms where social reality is viewed through interpretation of the 
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meaning of processes and individuals or is constructed by society (Green and 
Thorogood, 2004).  The interpretivist view that reality is complex, unpredictable and not 
suitable for objective study and that an outcome has many interlinked causal factors is 
also deemed necessary to produce a fuller understanding of cause and effect (Green and 
Thorogood, 2004, 12-25).  Although qualitative paradigms overcome concerns about 
studying social structures through objective science, qualitative techniques are criticised 
because of the nature of subjectivity and meaning.  Snape and Spencer note fears that 
“no definitive account or explanation” can be produced from qualitative research (2003, 
9).   
The epistemological stance selected within this thesis follows the ontological position 
where a quantified, positivist approach is deemed necessary to fit understanding and 
intervention to an improvement framework, but which relies heavily on an 
interpretative approach to identify the social tensions and construct them into the 
framework.  This leaves an epistemology in the middle of the positivist and interpretivist 
poles which allows critical realism to appreciate and value “context-specific conditions” 
(DeForge and Shaw, 2012, 85). 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Research Scope 
The key points identified from the literature review define an Enterprise Culture in which 
centralised targets are a predominant factor in the health policy attempt to adopt the 
efficiency improvements seen in the private sector.  However, efficiency is seen to be 
generated through decentralised, local autonomy, greater management skills and fewer 
targets rather than central command and control (Turner et al., 2013a).  The capability 
of management within the rigid organisation structure of the English NHS and the 
centralisation of targets and culture of fear affect the ability of the Enterprise Culture to 
achieve the policy aims and sustained target achievement (Turner et al., 2013b). 
Although the DH move from measuring processes to measuring outcomes in Emergency 
Departments’ performance has resulted in new indicators being used within the 
Enterprise Culture, it does not address the issues for locally derived indicators to gain 
the overall policy expectation of efficiency.  Furthermore, the damaging consequences 
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noted in chapter 3 suggest that the application of indicators within the Enterprise 
Culture - in Emergency Departments in the English NHS - represent a deviation from the 
PPP framework which can be researched in a contained area.  This thesis focuses on the 
application of the Enterprise Culture within Emergency Department care in the English 
NHS. 
3.2.2 Choice of Paradigm 
Morgan discusses paradigms as a central concept in social science research but 
describes the multiple meanings that have developed when using the word for research 
purposes (2007, 49).  The widespread use of paradigms in social science, Morgan argues, 
“emphasise metaphysical issues related to the nature and reality of truth” in order to 
summarise the researchers’ ontological and epistemological beliefs about creating 
knowledge (2007, 49).   However, Morgan argues for an alternative version to paradigms 
in which a system of beliefs and practices influence the selection of research methods 
and questions: the pragmatic approach (2007, 49).  Although the term ‘paradigm’ is used 
throughout this thesis and the associated publications, the definition for its application 
in this research adopts Morgan’s view of a pragmatic summary of its efforts to define 
the research methodology to consider the social complexities and organisational 
structures identified in the literature (2007).  
In defining the paradigm, consideration is given to the nature of the social phenomena 
studied and addressed in the ontological and epistemological stance.  Although the 
Enterprise Culture relies on an objective regime (the command and control structure 
described in the literature) and would expect such models as managerial and target 
frameworks to deliver results, the findings from the literature review also reveal a 
complex, human behaviour which I have argued is suitable for interpretative study.  
Furthermore, the base of knowledge required to make an intervention towards 
enterprise best practice relies on an understanding of the complexities of purpose, 
process and people (Turner et al., 2014).  This knowledge is determined from an 
interpretive study of individuals and the environment or system. 
The review of ontology and epistemology has led to the research being based on a 
paradigm comprising a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to meet the 
stance between realism and idealism, positivism and interpretivism.     
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The above paradigm is selected to balance the risk of uncontrolled or unidentified study 
of causal variables from qualitative stances and the risk of reliance on statistical testing 
to define and progress scientific research (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988, 572). 
3.2.3 Research Aims 
The study began with the proposal to understand the extent to which the four hour wait 
target would affect the performance and needs of the local emergency care system.  
However, the findings of the literature review revealed that targets and indicators are 
components of the wider Enterprise Culture policy to adopt successes seen in private 
sector best practice (Turner et al., 2013a; 2013b).   The limitations of the Enterprise 
Culture’s ability to provide an organisational framework capable of achieving policy 
were exposed and, as a result, more specific aims emerged. 
The study aims to conduct research into effectiveness and efficiency in the Emergency 
Department of a rural hospital using a mixed methods approach which to create a 
framework for intervention (Turner et al., 2014). 
Following the literature review, the rationale for the study was to understand: 
1. The dynamics, capacity and capability of the Emergency Department service; in 
particular how the presence of the Enterprise Culture affects Emergency 
Department performance.  
2. The demand from emergency care service users who present to a rural 
Emergency Department.  This includes assessing how much control the 
Emergency Department had over demand for its service and what alternative 
emergency care services exist.  Demand characteristics, patient demographics 
and acuteness, and the stochastic nature or arrival patterns required scrutiny.   
3. What capacity does the Emergency Department need in order to fulfil its role in 
providing an emergency care service?  Identification of the gaps between the 
current Emergency Department system and the Purpose Process People (PPP) 
framework in order to realise the benefits identified in the literature review was 
also necessary. What characteristics of the Emergency Department system 
would need to be changed and could this be achieved? 
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In developing and defining a theory to test, the complexity of the adaptive nature of the 
Emergency Department system was examined as part of the performance cause and 
effect relationship. The theory was developed to support the pragmatic paradigm and 
ontological and epistemological positions discussed earlier in the chapter. 
3.2.4 Theory   
In a quantitative study, a theory is typically developed deductively as a framework to 
generate research questions and hypotheses by which to confirm or refute its validity 
(Creswell, 1994, 87).  In qualitative studies, a theory emerges though an inductive 
approach of data collection and analysis, and comparison to other theories (Creswell, 
1994, 94). 
Anderson et al. argue that the unsuccessful adoption of Enterprise Culture practices in 
health care is because “a system can be understood only as an integrated whole” (2005, 
672).  Because health care organisations are complex adaptive systems, Anderson et al. 
justify the application of complexity theory to examine the relationships of the 
component parts (2005, 672) since complexity theories assume that “employees work 
in a common direction through self-control” (2005, 671).  The character of complex 
systems, Byrne and Callaghan argue, is the consequence of interactions within the 
system and with other systems with which it intersects (2014, 173).  The systems created 
by the Enterprise Culture are heavily influenced by such interactions, making complexity 
theory a compelling approach (Turner et al., 2014). 
Complexity theory is a framework for understanding which Byrne and Callaghan define 
as an ontological position of complex realism, based on a “synthesis” (2014, 8) of the 
critical realism stance adopted in this research. Byrne and Callaghan state that although 
this framework of understanding is more than a theory of causation, it can be used as 
such or can be used to generate theories of causation. 
This tension between a deductive theory, derived to test a robust framework, and an 
inductive theory developed from understanding the self-control of the workforce is 
inescapable in this mixed method study.  However, both framework and people are 
essential aspects of private enterprise success.  
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It is accepted that examining the complex adaptive health care workforce is necessary – 
as this complexity represents a potential cause of poor performance improvement in 
the English National Health Service (NHS).  However the literature review leads to the 
deductive reasoning that the Enterprise Culture is not reproducing performance 
improvement in the NHS because the Enterprise Culture framework is very different 
from that in private sector best practice (Turner et al., 2013a; Turner et al., 2013b). The 
operational activities enacted by the NHS workforce cannot lead to positive results if the 
framework to empower the staff to a common purpose (or direction) is not in place. 
This research accepts the complexity of the Enterprise Culture within emergency care 
systems and uses a deductive approach to develop the theoretical underpinning to 
challenge and test if the Enterprise Culture has provided a framework for performance 
improvement in a rural District General Hospital (DGH).   
3.2.5 Research Questions 
At the proposal stage of the study, the research question was; ‘how have needs-led 
indicators been developed, what are they, to what extent are they implemented and do 
they lead to improvements in service delivery and quality of care in Emergency 
Departments in District General Hospitals?’.   
However, following the refinement of study rationale and the aims identified above and 
the development of a testable theory, this evolved into the following, specific questions: 
1. What is the nature of the emergency service users’ demand? 
2. What characteristics of the Enterprise Culture exist in the Emergency 
Departments and what are their effects on performance against the four-hour 
wait target? 
3. Hypothesis: the private enterprise framework adopted by the Emergency 
Department is successful in achieving the aims of the Enterprise Culture. 
4. How can the private enterprise best practice framework or other best practice 
method be introduced to meet the needs of the local emergency care system? 
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Although Keogh acknowledges the breadth of emergency care, which covers a wide 
spectrum of needs from advice for self-care-help to major trauma cases (Public Inquiry, 
2013, 12), this research primarily focuses on care provided in the DGH Emergency 
Department.   
Essential to answering these questions, however, is the whole system perspective that 
is central to the PPP framework, described in chapter 2, and central to complexity 
theory.  This means gaining an understanding of social perspectives, capacity and 
demand data, organisational and management controls and resource characteristics. A 
mixed qualitative and quantitative approach is needed to achieve this.  Although archival 
quantitative data are available from a variety of sources, they carry the risks of error 
that are seen in the literature: researchers must “be careful to ascertain the conditions 
under which [the evidence] was produced as well as its accuracy” (Yin, 2014, 109).    
Therefore critical evaluation from observation of how the system works is also necessary 
as well as scrutiny of how data are measured and recorded for publication in order to 
assess systemic performance. 
3.2.6 Research Strategy 
3.2.7 Mixed Methods 
To test the theory and address the research questions, this mixed method study is 
designed to use qualitative data to provide “meaningful social context” (Bowling, 2009, 
381) to quantitative data to fulfil the paradigm justified in this research.  Morgan argues 
for the pragmatic approach of knowledge produced from movement back and forth 
between qualitative and quantitative research in order to “search for useful points of 
connection” rather than base knowledge on “wholly incompatible assumptions” from 
distinct use of the two approaches (2007, 71). 
Mixed method research combines at least one method from both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques (Simons and Lathlean, 2010).  Mixing methods is argued as 
useful “to account for, and reflect on, the increasing complexity of contemporary 
understandings of health and health care” because health care is delivered through 
multidisciplinary teams that have multiple sources of knowledge which can only be 
studied using more than one research method (Simons and Lathlean, 2010, 332).    Critics 
of mixed methods consider that the “nature of reality and truth is different in each 
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paradigm” because complex meanings from qualitative approaches generate multiple 
truths but quantitative objectivity is measured at one point (Simons and Lathlean, 2010, 
333).  However, Tashakkori and Teddlie state that the research question and not the 
paradigm should dictate the research method, but draw attention to logic of the 
combination and sequence of the methods used which should be informed not only 
through the research question but also the researcher’s “epistemological commitment 
and ontological views” (1998, 20-39).   
Mixed method studies have compelling features which are appropriate for answering 
the research question of this thesis.  Purposes for using mixed methods include 
triangulation and facilitation.  Triangulation – using three or more methods to verify 
findings by “independent sources” (Bowling, 2009, 392) – will help to understand the 
Emergency Department needs from the different perspectives of the multiple teams 
engaged in such a department.  Facilitation, taking findings from one method to inform 
subsequent stages of the research, enables improvements to be designed within the 
context of earlier findings (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  In this research observations 
and numerical and categorical data about Emergency Department systems will be used 
as a basis for gaining consensus of the system’s needs and then statistical testing will be 
used to challenge how successful needs-led changes would be. 
Parts of the research are interpretive in nature but quantitative methods are used for 
reasons of triangulation and facilitation.  Additionally, quantitative methods allow 
judgements and intervention to be made within a system framework and the numerical 
analysis to enable the research questions to be answered.  The logic and sequence of 
mixing the methods is discussed in chapter 5.  The knowledge which will result from this 
research will be a quantified assessment of how the mandatory indicators, and the 
emergency care systems enacted to achieve them, meet the needs of a DGH Emergency 
Department and a review of the efficacy of system changes made to achieve needs-led 
indicators defined by local emergency care actors.  An examination of the replication of 
these findings across DGHs is made in chapter 9. 
3.2.8 Combining Methods 
This section addresses the evolution of combining methods and their use in this 
research. In 1994 Creswell first defined three models of combining quantitative and 
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qualitative paradigms (Creswell, 1994, 177).  The two-phase design undertakes both 
paradigms in separate phases and allows assumptions to be drawn from each.  The 
dominant – less dominant design “presents the study within a single dominant 
paradigm” with the other contributing a smaller component.  The mixed methodology 
design mixes the paradigms at “all or many of the methodological steps” (Creswell, 
1994, 177).  However, Tashakkori and Teddlie consider Creswell’s initial classification of 
mixed methodology design belongs to an earlier step in the evolution of combining 
studies (1998, 15-53).  As the qualitative-quantitative distinction is wider than applying 
both aspects to one study, Tashakkori and Teddlie argue that the next step is “mixing 
models” (in which qualitative and quantitative paradigms are mixed within stages of the 
study) which “more accurately reflects the research cycle” (1998, 52).  Sandelowski 
develops this theme of classifying combined methods into usable research templates, 
noting that combined studies are not only mixtures of paradigms but of which 
techniques to combine them and how and why to combine them (2000, 247). This is 
because “methods, like paradigms are not specifically linked to techniques” 
(Sandelowski, 2000, 248). 
This pragmatic approach assumes that researchers view the research question to be 
more important than the method or paradigm (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  The 
breadth and combination of techniques available to the pragmatic approach offer the 
opportunity to “provide a fuller description of cases” and “guide purposeful sampling” 
(Sandelowski, 2000, 251-252).  
Care must be taken not to abuse the ‘limitless’ possibilities of mixing so many available 
techniques.  Although they may offer convergent validity and triangulation, without a 
“clear view of their viewing positions and what dynamic mixes they suggest or permit”, 
researchers could lose the completeness they seek in their study (Sandelowski, 2000, 
249-254).   
The deductive theory for this study that was derived from the literature review suggests 
a dominant quantitative element, using less dominant qualitative techniques to develop 
a framework to explore the expected causal relationships.  This study adopted a 
pragmatic selection based on the evolution of Creswell’s work, which was guided 
through a dominant – less dominant design which aims to test the deductive theoretical 
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framework and resists the risk of unstructured research and that “more is better” 
(Sandelowski, 2000, 254). 
3.2.9 Strategy for Social Research 
Yin defines five strategies for social research: experiment, surveys, archival analysis, 
history and case studies.  When selecting the most appropriate strategy, Yin argues that 
three criteria should be considered: the nature of research question to be answered; 
the amount of control the researcher has over the events studied and the contemporary 
or historic focus of the research (2014, 9-15).   
Following Yin’s selection criteria, a case study approach was preferred over other social 
research strategies, as it is the only technique to fulfil all of the criteria.  Firstly, the 
research questions aim to examine and understand the cause and effect relationship 
and social phenomena of the Enterprise Culture in Emergency Department 
performance.  Yin argues that strategies appropriate to this type of explanatory research 
should focus on “operational links needing to be traced over time rather than 
frequencies or incidence”: the appropriate strategies for this type of research and theory 
include case studies, histories and experiments (2014, 10).   
Cronin specifically argues that the case study researcher considers the context in which 
multiple perspectives happen in order to understand “the system being examined” 
(2014, 21).  Anderson et al. believe case studies are valuable to examine a phenomenon 
systemically (2005).  Additionally, human and group behaviour is difficult to capture in 
“manufactured” evidence from experimental investigations and surveys which can 
happen under “laboratory conditions; ill-suited to specificity of real-life phenomena” 
(Gillham, 2000, 4-6). 
Secondly, this research aims to test a theory by understanding the application of the 
Enterprise Culture in the rural English NHS Emergency Department environment.  No 
control is assumed by the researcher over the phenomena or cause and effect 
relationships studied in the research environment.  This eliminates experimental studies 
where control is necessary (Yin, 2014, 12-13).    
Finally, Yin argues that the strategy should consider whether the focus is on 
contemporary or historic phenomena (Yin, 2014, 12-13).  As the research is 
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contemporary, a historical study is rejected and a case study approach is justified using 
Yin's selection criteria. Moreover, case studies offer the pragmatic researcher multiple 
sources of evidence which is a “major strength” of the strategy as they can be used to 
address a broader range of issues than strategies using single sources of evidence (Yin, 
2014, 119). This range of sources, and available techniques to gather the evidence, 
enables study of the critical components and relations of a complex integrated system 
(Anderson et al., 2005; Bowling, 2009, 434).  Additionally, multiple sources of evidence 
can be used for triangulation and validity of the research findings (Yin, 2014, 120) which 
is a key function of combining methods.   
Anderson et al. conclude when justifying case studies for studying complex health care 
systems that “a key to knowing when to use a case study lies in the nature of the 
research process” rather than past work and knowledge (2005, 681).  The nature of this 
research process demands a study environment where complex social structures can be 
examined alongside rigid organisational frameworks.  A case study approach offers the 
ability to study these phenomena systemically (Anderson et al., 2005).  For example, 
Mazzocato et al. adopted a mixed method, single case site approach to examine the 
intervention of private sector best practice inspired framework in a Swedish Emergency 
Department (2012).  This research was designed to “track operational performance 
changes over time” and to “describe the intervention and to provide data to help explain 
how the intervention worked based on four theoretical PPP principles” in their aim to 
add to the knowledge of why such interventions succeed or fail (Mazzocato et al., 2012, 
3).  
Single case study sites are preferable to multiple sites in a number of situations, one of 
which is where the case is “critical” in testing existing theory (Yin, 2014, 51-56). A single 
case study site is selected because of the nature of the critical case being examined; that 
of an Emergency Department in a rural DGH with performance measures below 
expectations, which could “represent a significant contribution to knowledge and 
theory-building” (Yin, 2014, 51) for emergency care services in rural areas. The case 
study site selected was a District General Hospital (DGH) providing acute care to a 
market town in the East Midlands of England. This hospital was selected because of its 
characteristics as a DGH.   The case site is situated 30 miles from the nearest DGH.   It 
serves one administrative district of its county with a population of 64,600 (Office for 
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National Statistics, 2012) and other rural communities from the county and other parts 
of the region.  Local commissioning Trusts are largely reliant on the case site for most of 
the acute services it provides because of the cost and inconvenience of sending patients 
to other local facilities.  Within the context of the theoretical framework of the research 
this is an important factor as competition expectations from health policy are not so 
applicable to rural populations who have little access to alternative health care 
provision.  As a result the public cannot chose a provider based on performance and 
comparison against its peers and the provider cannot focus on a specialising service 
delivery. 
An analytical strategy is necessary to ensure sufficient presentation of collected 
evidence and consideration of any alternative interpretations (Yin, 2014, 133-136).  Yin 
describes four general analytic strategies: one which relies on theoretical propositions; 
a second to develop a case description; a third to create concepts from data analysis and 
a fourth which examines rival explanations (2014, 136-142).  This research uses the 
theoretical proposition strategy to study causal relationships adopting the “explanation 
building” mode of analysis to “stipulate a presumed set of causal links” (Yin, 2014, 147) 
necessary to test the theoretical proposition central to this study.    
Quantitative analytical techniques are described in the method chapter to suit the data 
types and distributions from the data gathered in order to examine the causal links. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The rigid organisational structures and complex social and relational phenomena 
represent a research environment with aspects of reality both independent of, and 
heavily influenced by, human perception. By adopting a critical realist stance, the 
research seeks to examine the mechanisms of cause and effect.  The examination 
follows a broadly positivist approach to create a framework for intervention, but which 
includes interpretive assumptions to reflect the social constructs inherent in the 
research environment.  The ontological and epistemological stances are summarised in 
a pragmatic paradigm which supports the need to combine qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches to define the research questions and generate knowledge. 
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The study aims to conduct research into effectiveness and efficiency in the Emergency 
Department of a rural hospital using a mixed methods approach which to create a 
framework for intervention (Turner et al., 2014). 
The next chapter justifies the methods selected to be applied in the methodology 
discussed in this chapter. 
The work described in this chapter led to the publication of two papers which are found 
in appendix 8:   
 The Efficacy of the Enterprise Culture in the English NHS was accepted by the 
British Journal of Healthcare Management in March 2014 (Turner et al., 2014).   
 Combining Methods to Research an Emergency Department: a Case Study was 
accepted for publication in the British Journal of Healthcare Management in 
January 2015 (Turner et al., 2015a). 
 
  
86 
 
4 Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details protocol development and adherence, methods of data collection 
and analysis from the case study site to test the theory and address the research 
questions developed in the previous chapter.  The study was designed in three stages: 
 The examination of the current state, which looked to understand the 
Enterprise Culture in place at the case study site, described in section 4.2. 
 The implementation of the intervention, which recorded the implementation of 
an improvement designed within the Enterprise Culture, described in section 4.3. 
 The evaluation of the intervention, which examined the efficacy of the 
intervention in achieving Enterprise Culture policy aims, described in section 4.4. 
The protocol described below was issued at the time of application for ethical approval.  
However, changes to the case site management structure, unavailability of some 
participants and reaction to findings from preceding stages in the study required some 
adjustment to the planned research and the changes and actual methods used are 
described in this chapter.   
Planned Research Protocol 
1. Using an ethnographic study method, the Emergency Department processes and 
systems of work will be investigated.   This research will study the processes and 
staff within the Emergency Department and will not include patients or personal 
patient information.  Routinely captured admission and discharge data, 
recording demographic and medical cohorts of Emergency Department users, 
will be identified, aggregated and anonymised if necessary. This data will be 
integrated into a detailed representation of the patient management pathways 
within the Emergency Department whilst working towards time-led targets.  
2. The controls and activities in place within the Emergency Department to support 
or achieve the time-led target will be identified through the Delphi method of 
group work. The group will include the incumbent Emergency Department 
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Clinical Director, who is clinically accountable for the Emergency Department 
performance, and the Business Manager, who is accountable for performance 
against commissioned contracts service levels.   
3. Delphi method workgroups will be used to establish consensus for appropriate 
quality measures amongst clinical staff within the Emergency Department.  
Senior clinical staff will formulate clinical indicators necessary to measure good 
quality performance and any set specifications or targets.  These indicators and 
targets will be established to meet the needs of the town and district health 
community.  The group will review the research findings, data detailing local 
patient cohorts and draw on their tacit knowledge to achieve consensus.    
4. By comparing random samples of data in the Emergency Department patient 
management system to patient notes, the quality and completeness of historic 
data captured under time-led pathways will be assessed.  If credible, a 
calculation of how that system would have performed under the newly identified 
needs-led targets will then be made.  
5. Using the Delphi method, described in detail later in the chapter, the Emergency 
Department senior clinical staff will identify an intervention to attain the needs-
led measures.  Implementation of the intervention will be planned and agreed.  
6. Using statistical hypothesis tests appropriate to data type, data distribution and 
sample size, the needs-led measures from the time-led target system in point 4 
will be compared to the changed system of work from point 5.   This will be 
demonstrated using interrupted time series methods and quantified with 
appropriate regression or variance analysis tests. The significance of the change 
will be reviewed.  
The protocol was implemented in three phases, described in the research schematic in 
figure 4.1.   
 Protocol points one and two are addressed in the Current State phase in which 
the ethnographic study, quantitative analysis and Delphi method were used.  
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 Protocol point three and five are addressed in the Intervention phase. Because 
of barriers in the case study site, discussed below, point four was not possible. 
 Protocol point six is addressed in the Evaluation phase. 
The research methods employed in each stage of the study and their relevance in 
answering the research questions are described in sections 4.2 – 4.4 and, more briefly, 
in the relevant results chapters and associated papers.  A summary of the research 
stages and the methods for data collection and analysis is shown in figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Research Schematic 
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4.2 Examination of the Current State 
The current state of the Enterprise Culture present in the case site Emergency 
Department was studied to examine the first two research questions.   
4.2.1 Research Question 1: What is the nature of the emergency service users’ 
demand? 
To answer this question: 
1. Routine data recording Emergency Department patient attendances were 
extracted and analysed to describe demand characteristics of the case site 
Emergency Department (see sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2).  
2. Techniques used in private sector best practice in order to understand 
demand data in order to inform productivity requirements against a target 
were reviewed from the literature (see section 4.2.1.3). 
3. The opportunity of the Emergency Department to use PPP methods to 
achieve the central the four-hour wait target in a rural hospital was evaluated 
(see section 4.2.1.4). 
4.2.1.1 Demand Data Extraction 
Ethical approval was granted to use routinely recorded and anonymised patient data. 
Opportunities for routine data relevant to examining the research question were 
discussed with the Trust’s Information Services Department in April 2012.  The Trust 
used a computer system for the Emergency Department (Caydar) which operated 
separately from the main Patient Administration System (PAS). Caydar was used to log 
each patient attendance and had data categories to record certain features of the 
patients’ personal circumstances (for example name, age, gender, address) and the care 
provided to them (for example, time of arrival, time of triage, diagnosis).  Caydar allowed 
Emergency Department staff to make free text data entries to many of the data 
categories, rather than selection of pre-defined responses and as a result some potential 
sources were discarded because data which did exist were of poor quality.  Additionally, 
many categories were not mandatory for the user to enter and further data sources 
were discarded because they were insufficient. 
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A one-year extract of anonymised data (for the twelve months immediately preceding 
the qualitative study: 1st April 2011 to 31st March 2012) detailing all attendances was 
sourced. Because of a lack of access to reliable data following system and coding 
changes at the site, data could not be extracted prior to 1st April 2011.  The data 
extraction contained: 
 Patient ID 
 Patient age 
 Patient’s General Practitioner 
 Patient’s post code 
 Arrival date and time 
 Arrival mode (car,  ambulance, etc) 
 Departure date and time 
 Departure method (from the Emergency Department, i.e. home, admitted to 
hospital, etc) 
 Referral source (self, GP, etc) 
 Presenting complaint (the patient’s description of symptoms at arrival) 
 Diagnosis (the clinical outcome recorded by the discharging doctor) 
4.2.1.2 Demand Data Analysis 
Emergency Department demand information was analysed from the data detailing all 
patients attending the department and accessing the service in the extraction period. 
The individual data were summarised and presented graphically in order to understand 
the pressures on the Emergency Department.  The graphical representations of the data 
aim to show demand pressures and variations through the volume of patients and their 
patterns of attendance over time (i.e. annually, day of week, hour of day).  Condensing 
a large amount of information into descriptions of location (centre of the data 
distribution) and spread (variability of the data) helps the user to consider the data in “a 
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few intelligible numbers” (Campbell et al., 2007, 28).  Arithmetic means and descriptions 
of the extent of variation were used in the analysis to aid understanding of the nature 
of demand.   
Although the limited duration of the data available could not enable identification of 
long-term trends, the analysis represents the case study population and was validated 
by four members of staff from the Emergency Department recruited as participants to 
the study, described later in the chapter.  
The results of the analysis of the demand data are presented in chapter 5.  
4.2.1.3 Review of Private Sector Productivity Techniques 
The importance of understanding variations in demand, argued by Silvester et al. (2004), 
was discussed in the literature review.  Silvester et al’s. acknowledgement of Lean 
techniques as appropriate for use in managing variations in demand within health care 
(2004, 105),  was reviewed in more detail to establish individual techniques appropriate 
to understand the productivity required to achieve time based targets from variable 
demand patterns.  A further review was undertaken to examine appropriate Lean 
techniques in more detail and the results are presented in section 5.2 and 5.3. 
4.2.1.4 Evaluation of Emergency Department Use of Private Sector Techniques 
An evaluation of the use of the private sector techniques in the Emergency Department 
was undertaken.  The nature of the demand placed on the case site and the 
appropriateness and data requirements for the techniques were considered.  
To evaluate the techniques: 
1. The intelligence generated by the techniques and how it applied to the 
Enterprise Culture purpose in the Emergency Department was assessed. 
2. The data required by the formula in the technique was compared to routine data 
available in the Emergency Department. 
The results of the evaluation are reported in sections 5.2 – 5.4. 
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4.2.2 Research Question 2: What characteristics of the Enterprise Culture exist 
in the Emergency Department and what are their effects on performance 
against the four-hour wait target? 
To answer this question: 
1. Quantitative archival evidence of the Emergency Department’s provision of 
capacity to meet the demand identified in question 1 was extracted, 
reviewed and analysed.  This included staff rotas, bed capacity and 
departmental procedures (see section 4.2.2.1 for details of extraction 
methods and 4.2.2.2 for analysis). 
2. Using published performance data and the findings from the capacity and 
demand analysis, the case site’s ability to achieve the four hour wait target 
was evaluated (see section 4.2.2.3). 
3. Using an ethnographic study method, the Emergency Department’s 
processes and systems of work were investigated.  Any areas of interest 
identified in the quantified capacity and demand analysis were also 
evaluated (see section 4.2.2.4). 
4.2.2.1 Archival Capacity Data Extraction 
Quantitative archival data from available computer and physical records were identified 
and accessed through discussion with the Emergency Department’s Clinical Director and 
Business Manager. A review was undertaken to identify anonymised archival evidence 
available to the study which could quantify numbers of staff members in different 
grades or roles and other resources that had been planned or actually used to provide 
capacity in the Emergency Department.  The review also identified policy and procedural 
documents which could affect how much capacity was provided to the Emergency 
Department and how the capacity should be used in the service. 
Planned duty rotas from the department’s clinical establishment during the demand 
data capture were made available, along with a floor plan of the Emergency 
Department’s physical space.  Evidence of staff actually on duty during the data capture 
was not available as archival data.  Anonymised data could have been requested to show 
permanent staff who were paid on a given day for working a shift.  However, because 
94 
 
the department relied heavily on bank and agency staff, and matrons and the site sister 
often made staff transfers to balance the availability of experienced staff across all acute 
wards at the start of a shift, these data were not deemed credible. 
4.2.2.2 Archival Capacity Data Analysis 
Because the capacity provided at the case site was not available from archival data, the 
analysis used the planned provision of the staff on rota, illustrated with the average 
patient attendances over one day. The analysis, details of physical capacity and relevant 
policies are listed in the results of the analysis in chapter 6. 
4.2.2.3 Performance Data Extraction and Analysis 
Performance data were taken from the demand data extraction listed in section 4.2.1.1.  
The performance data (time spent in department) were calculated from the patient 
arrival and discharge data and were reconciled to the monthly performance data 
published by the DH (web source no-longer available). Analyses describing the hospital’s 
performance against the four-hour wait target were taken from the data extraction 
detailed earlier in this chapter.  These analyses involved: 
 Presentation of the time spent in the department as a histogram to understand 
the distribution of the overall data 
 A graph describing variation in time spent in the department categorised the 
hour of arrival (taken from the demand data extraction) of arrival. 
4.2.2.4 Ethnographic Study: Data Collection and Analysis 
Ethnography is used within the critical realist construct of this research.  Rees and 
Gatenby argue that ethnography in critical realism should explain and not just describe 
social phenomena (2014).  In providing “connective tissue” to sociological components 
of causal mechanism, Rees and Gatenby argue that traditional ethnographic technique 
of “getting inside the heads of individuals” is insufficient (2014, 2).  Instead, 
ethnographic enquiry must be made within a concept of social structure (Porter, 2002; 
Rees and Gatenby, 2014) by explaining the observable events through consideration of 
the conditions that enabled these events (Rees and Gatenby, 2014, 5).  Describing the 
process for the ethnographer in organsiational studies, Rees and Gatenby emphasise 
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the need to reveal “the complex interaction between relevant corporate agents, 
structural conditions and situational contingencies” which is adopted in this research 
(2014, 7). 
Detailed ethnographic observation has advantages over measurement scales, 
interviews and questionnaires which do not “capture the subjectivity of human beings” 
(Bowling, 2009, 380).  This research combined the advantages of observation which 
produces the most valid data on social behaviour (Green and Thorogood, 2004, 133) 
with quantified data analysis for validation in Delphi groups – the technique selected to 
form consensus, discussed and justified in the next section.  This approach addressed 
the emergency system in a framework for understanding the complexity which Byrne 
and Callaghan argue defines the “theory” in complexity theories: a means to assert the 
ontological position that complexity is present in such systems and that “if we want to 
understand [the world and its social factors] we have to understand it in those terms” 
(2014, 8). 
The ethnographic study used overt participant and structured observation as the 
qualitative methodological approach.  This level of study enabled understanding of the 
complexity and tacit knowledge of an Emergency Department and the needs of its 
system of work and the cultural group enacting it (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010).  A 
structured approach to observation was selected over an unstructured one because the 
latter can result in extensive unstructured notes and may “lose the richness” (Bowling, 
2009, 395) needed to assess the use of indicators within the Emergency Department 
system. 
The ethnographic study was guided by significant findings from analysis of planned 
resource capacity and four-hour wait target performance data from the same 
Emergency Department. The process for the ethnographic study was: 
1. Preparation 
2. Ethnographic data collection 
3. Ethnographic data analysis 
4. Comparison to findings from the quantitative study and final analysis 
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Preparation 
The ethnographic study was conducted over a twelve week period from 2nd April 2012. 
Data were gathered in two to four hour sessions structured to cover a wide range of 
operational states within the department including shift changes, evening and night 
work, weekends and peak and low demand times identified from the quantitative 
analysis.  
The overt participation process was agreed with the Clinical Director of the Emergency 
Department. Prior to the start of the study, I met the Emergency Department’s 
Consultant and Registrar doctors, Business Manager, Sisters and Administrator to 
explain the process – the process was disseminated to staff by the Manager. 
Data Collection 
 The process of observation, data capture and recording was: 
1. Inform the Nurse in Charge (NIC) of the department upon entering the 
department of my presence and inquire about any unusual phenomena 
(extremes in demand or staff shortages, for example) in the Department at that 
time and my structured observation criteria (see point 3, below). 
2. Sit in the nursing station at the centre of the department where the Caydar 
information, ambulance patient access and most of the treatment rooms were 
visible. 
3. Observations were my visual accounts of events which appeared to be either a 
cause or effect of the performance of the Emergency Department.  No 
observation was made of direct patient care. 
4. Using Caydar information, prompts from the NIC and observations of patient, 
staff and resources, I noted my observations structured in the categories listed 
below which were identified from the quantitative analysis of demand, capacity 
and performance data. My observations looked to capture frequencies, severity 
and consequences of capacity and demand phenomena on performance against 
the four hour target. The behaviours of humans, use of physical resources and 
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organisational structure were observed to identify causes between capacity and 
demand and subsequent performance. 
a. Staff capacity 
b. Bed and clinical space utilisation 
c. Patients in the department 
d. Patient admission patterns and reasons 
e. Adherence to care standards (time related, not clinical care) 
f. Patients leaving after spending around 240 minutes in the department 
5. Some unstructured observation followed when a patient might be followed to a 
ward or other clinical area for observation of the phenomena in that area. 
6. Observations were recorded as data in a written field note diary during the point 
of observation. 
7. Diary notes were immediately typed into a field note journal on return to the 
nursing station. 
Ethnographic Data Analysis 
The process of analysis followed a Root Cause Analysis approach in order to identify the 
causal mechanisms behind observed event or the effect observed events had on wider 
emergency care performance.  The process was: 
1. The journal was printed and cut into individual notes. 
2. Each note was reviewed and grouped with similar content to create an affinity 
diagram. 
3. Themes from the affinity diagram were reviewed to show how capacity and 
demand affected performance outcomes and associated workflow diagrams. 
Comparison to Quantitative Data and Final Analysis 
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The tools from the ethnographic data analysis were then compared to the findings from 
the quantitative study. The comparison focussed on identifying any inconsistencies or 
harmonies between the two studies and were presented in the Process and People 
elements of the PPP framework. 
Both sets of data were then compiled into a Value Stream Map - a PPP tool to represent 
how the process operates (Womack, 2005) – to visually represent the causal 
mechanisms that affect the Emergency Department performance and address this 
research question (discussed in chapter 6). 
Validation of the ethnographic data analysis is described in section 4.2.3 and the results 
are presented in chapter 6. 
4.2.3 Validation of the Current State Data Analysis: Delphi Group 1 
Validation of the results of the analysis, described in this section, was undertaken in 
order to offer credible evidence to the clinical body of the Emergency Department that 
they could use to create an intervention.   
4.2.3.1 Validation Methods Planned 
In the original design of the study, the protocol written to examine the research 
questions anticipated the availability of a wide range of participants and a selection of 
research methods based on justified techniques.  The method set out in the original 
protocol for the validation of the case study findings described in chapters 6 and 7 was: 
1. The controls and activities in place within the Emergency Department to support 
or achieve the time-led target will be identified through the Delphi method of 
group work. The group will include the incumbent Emergency Department 
Clinical Director, who is clinically accountable for the Emergency Department 
performance, and the Business Manager, who is accountable for performance 
against commissioned contracts service levels.   
2. Delphi method workgroups will be used to establish consensus for appropriate 
quality measures amongst clinical staff within the Emergency Department.  
Senior clinical staff will formulate clinical indicators necessary to measure good 
quality performance and any set specifications or targets.  These indicators and 
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targets will be established to meet the needs of the district health community.  
The group will review the research findings, data detailing local patient cohorts 
and draw on their tacit knowledge to achieve consensus.    
3. By comparing random samples of data in the Emergency Department patient 
management system to patient notes, the quality and completeness of historic 
data captured under time-led pathways will be assessed.  If credible, a 
calculation of how that system would have performed under the newly identified 
needs-led targets will then be made.  
4. Using the Delphi method, the Emergency Department senior clinical staff will 
identify changes necessary to attain the needs-led measures.  Implementation 
of the changes will be planned and agreed.  
5. Using statistical hypothesis tests appropriate to data type, data distribution and 
sample size, the needs-led measures from the time-led target system in point 4 
will be compared to the changed system of work from point 5.   This will be 
demonstrated using interrupted time series methods and quantified with 
appropriate regression or variance analysis tests. The significance of the change 
will be reviewed.  
However, during the process of recruiting participants to the study, the limited number 
and availability of those staff members who met the inclusion criteria (permanent staff 
members with at least one year experience in the Emergency Department) became 
clear.  Discussions with the Clinical Director and Business Manager revealed that, from 
the total number of Emergency Department staff, twelve were experienced enough to 
validate the findings.  Although it was hoped that all twelve could be recruited, due to 
long-term illnesses and work secondments, only eight were in a position to be 
approached.  
These limitations led to changes in the protocol resulting in the research schematic 
described earlier in the chapter. The change in protocol represented the first major 
barrier to conducting research in practice within the environment of a small, rural DGH.  
It also represented the possibility of pragmatically mixing techniques to best address the 
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research questions (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) and provide a detailed case site 
description (Sandelowski, 2000, 251-252).  
4.2.3.2 Validation Methods Used 
Validation of the data was achieved by presenting the analysed summary data to the 
eight staff who were successfully recruited to the study using online survey software 
which protected their anonymity.  The staff were asked to agree the accuracy of the 
findings and comment on any concerns or points of interest. 
The validation assisted the study by mitigating against the risks that Yin describes when 
using archival evidence: researchers must “be careful to ascertain the conditions under 
which [the evidence] was produced as well as its accuracy” (2014, 109).  Selecting the 
population of all attending patients avoids sample error (Campbell et al., 2007, 81).  
These data are deemed relevant to investigate the theory in the contemporary case 
study (Yin, 2014, 109-110) by describing the site in context of the ethnography that 
followed the analysis.   
Only local data were extracted and analysed because the study aimed to test the theory 
of the efficacy of the Enterprise Culture in the case site and be generalisable to the 
theoretic proposition, not as a sample of a population (Yin, 2014, 21).  No comparison 
to national or alternative emergency care provider data was therefore considered 
necessary.  However, during the validation some comments were received suggesting 
certain demand features may be unique to the case site and analysis was performed to 
examine the claims and assess the impact on potential use of the PPP framework. 
Three popular options described for gaining consensus are: Delphi Groups, Nominal 
Group Technique and Consensus Conferences (Green and Thorogood, 2004, 109; 
Bowling 2009, 437).  Bowling describes issues with using these techniques.  Firstly, bias 
may be problematic because of suitable representation of participants and secondly 
there is debate about the “validity and reliability of the techniques” because there is no 
agreement about which is the most appropriate and they are, in any case, often used in 
combination (Bowling, 2009, 437).   
Delphi Groups use questionnaires which rank participants’ agreement with certain 
statements and are usually conducted by post or electronic means in order to maintain 
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anonymity of the participants. Rounds of questionnaires are used until the level of 
consensus reaches a pre-determined level. 
Nominal Groups bring together experts who have decided and quantified their views on 
a topic before meeting and then have a chance to review this following consolidation of 
all participants’ views and subsequent debate. 
Consensus Conferences generate consensus through debate amongst experts or lay 
people and are not structured or quantified in the same way as the Delphi and Nominal 
group techniques. 
Consensus Conferences were discarded because the experts in the Emergency 
Department system are few in number and greatly varied in levels of responsibility. In 
addition, with more senior, stronger participants, there is a risk that they might exert a 
disproportionate influence in this unstructured, open debate.  Because the 
ethnographic evidence needed detailed explanation from the researcher and 
participants needed time for discussion about social interactions a nominal group 
meeting of experts was deemed more appropriate than postal questionnaires.  
However, developing and quantifying participants’ views were also considered critical 
so the Delphi technique of questioning was also chosen.   
The Delphi technique gains consensus through asking an open question to “obtain ideas 
or attitudes” which are summarised to generate closed questions which “rank 
agreement” with certain topics (Bowling, 2009, 437) – agreement usually being 
measured using a Likert scale. 
A modified Delphi study, including a nominal group, was planned to validate the case 
study’s capacity and demand findings discussed in previous chapters. A group approach 
was preferred to interviews with individuals because groups provide greater “access to 
interaction between participants, and thus some insight into how social knowledge is 
produced”, (Green and Thorogood, 2004, 107).  Green and Thorogood state that “the 
type of group chosen will depend on the aim of the study” (2004, 109).   
An open question Delphi round to “obtain ideas or attitudes” (Bowling, 2009, 437), was 
undertaken using online survey software.  The research findings from the analysis of 
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demand, capacity, performance and the ethnographic study together with summarised 
comments about the validity of the analyses from the Delphi round were then presented 
to the participants in advance of a smaller nominal group to achieve consensus.   
Likert scales record an ordinal response – where there is no expected interval or 
continuous relationship between answers (Bowling, 2009, 313).   Consensus agreement 
through response to Likert scales is a point of debate.  Bowling emphasises “there is no 
assumption of equal intervals on the scale” (2009, 316) and so they are ordinal in their 
data distribution.  A nine point Likert scale to rank participants’ responses does not 
remove the middle response but gives a greater range for analysing a central tendency 
(a typical value to indicate the centre of a distribution, namely the mean, mode or 
median) to identify consensus.  Bowling also notes that a middle response may attract 
participants who wish to remain neutral (2009, 321).   Although recognising that the 
data are ordinal and not continuous, the research used the median score, which is more 
robust than the mean to outliers (a particular concern given the effect small sample size) 
and is the “preferred” central tendency for analysis (Bowling, 2009, 440).   
Validation was achieved in the group by discussion of the findings and comments and 
ranking of agreement using a nine point Likert scale, the results are detailed in section 
7.2.  Consensus was achieved using Bowling’s rules to analyse median consensus levels 
from all responses (Bowling, 2009):  
 1-3 points – the findings are not validated. 
 4-6 points – no consensus is achieved. 
 7-9 points – the findings are validated. 
4.2.3.3 Participants 
Bloor et al. suggest that a minimum Delphi group size is four, however they argue that 
a more important factor in the group dynamic is a balance of “viewpoints, experience 
and interests” (2015, 66) and the study aimed to achieve this within the restrictions of 
the limited number of potential participants available in this small, rural DGH.  Potential 
participants were approached individually and were taken through information sheets 
regarding the research and were invited to participate.  Time was given to the potential 
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participants to ask questions and chose whether or not to participate.  Wording from 
the participant information sheet is included in appendix 6. 
Initially, participants were required under the original protocol for three Delphi groups 
to gain consensus from the participants.  Six members of staff were successfully 
registered to the study.  These participants represented the following areas of DGH 
emergency care. 
 Consultant in Emergency Care 
 Consultant in Acute Medical Care 
 Registrar in Emergency Care 
 Emergency Department Nurse Sister 
 Emergency Department Staff Nurse  
 Business Director for Emergency Care 
The changes to the protocol meant that only one Delphi study was necessary.  The 
participants were retained however, following their agreement for further involvement 
using the participation information and consent forms (not appended in order to protect 
the anonymity of individuals and the case study site) and formed the sampling frame for 
the semi-structured interviews. 
4.3 Implementation of the Intervention 
An intervention to improve the transfer of patients between the Emergency Department 
and a ward which specialised in decisions to admit or discharge patients was developed 
by the department’s consultants.  The intervention was designed and implemented in 
order to allow an evaluation of the efficacy of the Enterprise Culture present in the 
Emergency Department when undertaking improvements to quality and efficiency 
recommended from this research.  Evaluation of the intervention (discussed in the next 
section) addresses research question 3.  In order to create an intervention to test: 
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 The findings of the quantitative capacity and demand analysis and the 
ethnographic study were confirmed through the Delphi method of group 
work (described above). 
 Using the outcomes from the Delphi workgroup, senior clinical staff 
formulated clinical indicators and pathway changes necessary to measure 
good quality performance and any set specifications and targets.      
4.3.1 Methods for the Intervention 
The intervention allowed the consultant body of the Emergency Department to select 
an area of concern within the boundaries of their clinical responsibility and propose and 
implement a solution.  The process for implementing the intervention was: 
1. Define the intervention topic  
2. Agree the criteria for the intervention  
3. Develop the intervention 
4. Communicate the intervention and implement 
Defining the Intervention 
A meeting of the Emergency Department Consultants was scheduled on 2nd September 
2013 with the single purpose of defining the intervention topic.  Two weeks before the 
meeting I had met with both of the substantive Consultants and discussed the findings 
of my research and the need to meet to agree an intervention.  The purpose of the 
meeting was described as an open discussion for Consultants to decide the area for 
intervention and an associated outcome using any evidence that they felt was 
reasonable.  I gave each consultant a paper copy of the evidence from my quantitative 
and qualitative analysis and followed this up with an email of the same data, a link to 
the results of a recent clinical audit of the Emergency Department and a re-iteration of 
the purpose of the meeting.  
The meeting was scheduled to use some of the time of an existing weekly session during 
which the Consultants discussed the department’s performance against the four hour 
wait target with the Business Manager.  The Clinical Director offered this opportunity to 
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overcome the usual six-week notice required by Consultants to arrange non-clinical time 
and because of the relevance of my topic to the originally planned session. 
Although ninety minutes were available for my meeting, the Consultants required less 
than twenty minutes to define their intervention - described below (in section 7.3).  Both 
had discussed, and held strong and matching views on, the intervention need before the 
meeting.  There was no formal structure to the meeting, however following my re-
iteration of the purpose, the Clinical Director proposed the intervention topic and the 
expectations of the improvements to service.   
He expressed his plan to set the criteria for the intervention using consensus from 
requested my help in using the Delphi method to achieve this. 
Agreeing the Intervention’s Criteria 
The Clinical Director’s for Emergency Care and Acute Medicine convened during week 
commencing 2nd September 2013 to discuss potential criteria for the intervention and 
compiled a list of aspects of care that could be included in the new pathway.  I was 
requested to create a Delphi tool to gain consensus of which criteria to include the 
intervention.  I was given a list of participants that the Consultants had created which 
represented clinical and administrative staff and patent group representatives and over 
three weeks from 9th September 2013 the following process was undertaken: 
 In round one, participants were invited to read a background document on the 
problem and proposed intervention that the consultants had written.  They were 
invited, using the Survey Monkey online questionnaire, to answer an open 
question asking what criteria of care the intervention pathway should include. 
 The Consultants took the answers from round one and amended their original 
list of questions to form round two.  
 Participants were invited to answer the round two questions which used the 
same scoring criteria as the Delphi group described above. 
 I produced analysis for consensus for the Consultants against the same 
acceptance level for consensus described above. 
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Develop the Intervention 
During week commencing 30th September 2013, the Consultants listed all of the criteria 
which achieved consensus for inclusion and combined them into a policy document 
describing the clinical pathway that staff in the Emergency Department and the Clinical 
Decision Unit should follow.  The target of achievement for the pathway was set at 
100%.   
The policy document was sent to participants for comment, amended and agreed by the 
Consultants from the Emergency Department and the Clinical Director from the Clinical 
Decision Unit. 
Implementing the Intervention 
The policy was communicated to the relevant staff during the week commencing 21st 
October 2013.  
4.4 Evaluation of the Intervention 
To measure the effect of the intervention, sets of patient notes were reviewed by the 
Clinical Director.  In total, seventeen sets of notes from patients following the 
intervention were randomly selected from the week following implementation of the 
intervention.  It was estimated by the Clinical Director that around eighty patients 
requiring observation may have transferred from the Emergency Department to CDU in 
the week but data was not available to confirm this. The sample size reflected only the 
time that the Clinical Director was able to commit and not a number calculated to give 
precision to a statistical test.  Because the intervention chosen by the consultants 
represented a new process, comparative tests against previous performance were not 
possible.  However the proportion of patients complying with the intervention indicators 
(when reviewed by the Clinical Director) was calculated.  The confidence interval of the 
proportion of patients in the sample who complied with the intervention was calculated 
to “define a range of values in which we are confident the population parameter is likely 
to lie” (Campbell et al., 2007, 89). 
The evaluation of the implementation was designed to address the final two research 
questions. 
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4.4.1 Research Question 3: The private enterprise framework adopted by the 
Emergency Department is successful in achieving the aims of the 
Enterprise Culture. 
To answer this hypothesis: 
 Using statistical methods appropriate to data type, data distribution and 
sample size, the efficacy of the intervention was evaluated (described in 
section 4.4.1.1.   
 Additionally, a further ethnographic study to observe post intervention 
practices was undertaken, described in section 4.4.1.2. 
 Using the semi-structured interviews, the Emergency Department senior 
clinical staff assessed the efficacy of the changes and draw conclusions to the 
identification and use of needs-led indicators, described in section 4.4.1.3.  
 The findings from all research methods were compared to PPP expectations 
and the hypothesis outcome was justified, the results are discussed in 
chapter 7. 
4.4.1.1 Statistical Evaluation of the Intervention Efficacy 
The intervention looked to resolve a clinical issue where patients requiring hospital 
clinical observation (but not admission to a specialty ward) did not always have an 
adequate care plan and drug chart when leaving the Emergency Department. The 
intervention was implemented through the introduction of procedures to ensure that 
the care plan and drug chart were created in the Emergency Department and 
transferred with the patient to the ward responsible for observation.   
The confidence level calculated carried risks when drawing conclusions about the 
efficacy of the intervention. Two risks in particular were identified, firstly the limitations 
of the small sample size caused a risk of falsely representing the population leading to 
inaccurate test results (Campbell et al., 2007, 79-94).  Secondly, there was a risk that the 
results could be unrepresentative of long-term performance because they were taken 
from one week close to the implementation of the intervention when performance may 
be affected through the novelty of the practices.  The effect of expected observation 
may have been anticipated by staff leading to an unnatural and temporary increase in 
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performance levels.  These risks led to a need to triangulate the quantitative analysis of 
the intervention, as detailed above.  Two methods were devised to achieve this; a 
further period of ethnographic observation and interviews with the participants who 
registered for the Delphi study.  The schematic in figure 4.2 describes the evaluation 
timeline from the implementation of the intervention. 
Figure 4.2: Schematic of Post-Intervention Evaluation 
 
4.4.1.2 Post Intervention Ethnographic Study 
In order to observe the nature of the implementation and the potential for longer-term 
performance patterns, a second period of observation was undertaken two months 
after the implementation of the intervention.  This study commenced in January 2013 
and was undertaken over four weeks and totalled ten hours of observation of 
compliance with the intervention process during a time of high winter pressure for acute 
hospital beds.  The observation was undertaken using the same method as the initial 
research: a critical ethnographic study using overt participant, structured observation, 
but focussed only on patients following the observation pathway.  Fourteen patients 
were followed through the observation pathway in the study.  In the study, the 
identification of observation patients, their transfer from the Emergency Department to 
the CDU, clinical handover, and presence of a care plan and drug chart was observed.  
Although the contents of the care plans and drug charts were not reviewed, the actions 
of CDU staff to follow-up care or drug related queries with the Emergency Department 
was also observed.  Due to the application of the pathway, the study was split between 
the Emergency Department and the Clinical Decision Unit. 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Implementation
Quantitative 
Data Analysis
Quantitative 
Data Collection
Ethnographic Study 
and Concurrent
Analysis
Interview Data 
Collection and 
Concurrent Analysis
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The study was structured to follow the progress (although no clinical interventions) one 
observation patient at a time through the intervention pathway.  Observation patients 
were identified by the NIC who informed me of their status and location.  Following 
notification I went to the Emergency Department to check the patients’ time of arrival 
and observe preparation for transferring the patient.  I then followed the transfer to the 
CDU where I observed the nurse to nurse handover from the nursing station.  Following 
the handover, I reviewed the transfer documentation and compiled my field notes.  The 
fourteen patients observed in the study represent the total notifications I received from 
the NIC during the study time.  No overlap between patients occurred allowing me to 
observe their progress individually.   
4.4.1.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviews were selected to allow me to use open questions to control the line of 
questioning and limit the indirect views of the interviewee (Creswell, 2014).  Questions 
used easy and non-threatening language to reduce the possibility of bias (Bowling, 2009, 
321-325).   This questioning focussed on compliance to the targets of the intervention 
and subsequent additional ethnography.  Additionally, interviewing the participants 
avoided the barriers of assembling groups due to conflicting duty rotas. 
The purpose of the interview aspect of the qualitative research was to evaluate the 
efficacy of the intervention and, in doing so, understand the nature of social 
complexities and behaviours of the actors within the Enterprise Culture present in the 
case site.  Existing findings from the earlier stages in the research were used to shape 
the analytical method and although no deductive hypotheses were developed prior to 
the qualitative data analysis the analytical process was not purely inductive either.  This 
analysis followed an abductive framework, using earlier research findings rather than 
“setting all preconceived” ideas aside (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012, 180). 
Creswell and Clark argue that qualitative data analysis involves coding data and then 
grouping those codes into themes (2011, 208).  Coding is the organisation and 
classification of data into key themes (Bowling, 2009, 415-425).  Bazeley asserts that 
data from transcripts require classification in order to make sense of them and that 
coding offers a method to “build knowledge” from the data (2007, 66).  Punch states 
that coding is the starting activity to be used as the foundation for qualitative analysis 
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(2014, 172), however Creswell and Clark recommend an exploration of the data prior to 
coding, “to develop a general understanding of the database” through memos in the 
transcripts (2011, 207).  Although Saldana considers criticisms against coding as 
originating from post-positivist approaches which often generated “topic-driven lists”, 
he acknowledges that coding is not the only way to analyse qualitative data and there 
are times when it is necessary and times when it is inappropriate (2013, 39-40).  Saldana 
prefers a pragmatist approach, choosing the best tool for the research topic (2013, 2).  
When complete, codes “are grouped together into broader themes” and the themes 
grouped into “even larger dimensions” to give perspectives of the findings that provide 
answers to the research purpose and questions (Creswell and Clark, 2011, 208).  Coding 
and thematic analysis are justified as the suitable tools to analyse the responses from 
participants in the context of the themes derived from the post-implementation 
quantitative analysis and ethnographic study.  
Bowling describes the interpretative imperative that is placed on the researcher in 
coding qualitative data as a “strength and weakness” (2009, 415) of the method.  
Considering this imperative, Bazeley discusses approaches to coding and broadly defines 
“splitters… who maximize [sic] differences between text passages” to form detailed 
themes and “lumpers” who look for overarching themes or an approach which combines 
the two (2007, 66-67). Although Saldana argues that “no one… can claim final authority 
on the best way to code data” he states that answering the research question will 
influence the choice (2013, 60). Saldana asserts that “rarely will anyone get coding right 
the first time” and argues that codes will develop through cycles of data analysis (2013, 
10-11).   
The interviews were undertaken between January and March 2013.  Four of the original 
six participants who remained in post or available to the study were interviewed.  To 
gain consent, I met the participants individually and explained the purpose of the 
interviews and the process of conducting them. Participants were left with information 
sheets and consent forms before making a decision (see appendix 6 for the content of 
the participant information sheet).  The interviews were conducted in private meeting 
rooms and recorded and data was transcribed in preparation for analysis (Creswell and 
Clark 2011, 206), and lasted between 15 and 55 minutes. The content from the 
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transcribed data was checked for accuracy, explored using memos (Creswell and Clark 
2011, 206) and then manually coded on hard copy printouts, which Saldana argues, gives 
more control over process for small scale studies (2013, 26).  First cycle coding was 
undertaken to define broad categories from all transcriptions and second cycle coding 
refined participant comments into key themes. These themes were considered in 
context of the other findings of the post-implementation evaluation. 
4.4.2 Research Question 4: How can the private enterprise best practice 
framework or other best practice method be introduced to meet the 
needs of the local emergency care system? 
Using the findings from the analysis of the demand, capacity, performance and 
ethnographic studies and their subsequent validation together with the findings from 
the evaluation of the intervention, this research question was addressed by the 
following protocol: 
 The key differences between Enterprise Culture and PPP identified in the 
study were reviewed and cause and effect relationships and mechanisms 
established. 
 Gaps and limitations in the research were identified. 
 Practical methods to address the opportunities identified from the research 
and its limitations were proposed. 
This discussion is described in chapter 8 where future research possibilities are 
identified. 
4.5 Ethical Approval 
The ethical concerns of researching in an environment where I was a senior manager 
were addressed by the design of the research protocol and the ethical approval granted 
to follow it.  As a manager I was able, and often had to, access and analyse confidential 
patient data as part of my employment.  However, I could not do this within the 
boundaries of the research and any data and knowledge I had from my employment was 
not usable in the research.  Although I was a manager within the Trust running the case 
site, I was employed at a different hospital and I did not access confidential data relevant 
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to my research at any time during the study.  Despite this, however, I did have 
knowledge of some areas which may have been potential causal factors from briefings 
and reports.  This background knowledge was used to structure observation planning. 
The research design identified and managed the risk of ethical issues which were 
reviewed and approved by ethics committees in the University of Lincoln (appendix 3). 
The hospital’s Research and Development (not included for anonymity) and the National 
Research Ethics Service (not included for anonymity).  The ethical tensions identified 
related to the safety and confidentiality of patient and staff participants.  To ensure that 
potential ethical issues and adverse events were mitigated against, the research was 
designed with the following considerations. 
 This research did not directly involve patient contact or personalised patient 
information. The ethnographic research focussed only on patient movement as 
a process step or clinical activity as they progressed through the Emergency 
Department and looked only to classify patients by presenting condition or other 
clinical attribute. No personal information was obtained and any patient specific 
information used a non-identifiable code. 
 Clinical safety remained the responsibility of the Clinical Director of the 
Emergency Department at all times and any changes to clinical practice through 
the research will be authorised by the Clinical Director and Trust governance 
processes. 
 Interviews and work with staff were to be undertaken only after I had obtained 
informed consent. Participants were able to opt out of the research with no 
detriment to their work activity. 
 Recordings and transcription of the information were made anonymous and 
were stored as electronic sound or text files on an encrypted, password 
protected computer. 
 I abided by the Caldicott principles of data gathering and storage (Department 
of Health, 1997).  These principles set quality standards for health and social care 
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organisations that manage and use their clients’ personal information.  The 
principles ensure confidentiality and protection to clients’ information. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The study aims to conduct research into effectiveness and efficiency in the Emergency 
Department of a rural hospital using a mixed methods approach which to create a 
framework for intervention (Turner et al., 2014). 
Although the PPP framework is suggestive of organisational theories, the nature of 
health care systems are more aligned to complexity theories.  This research adopted a 
deductive theory which aims to test the organisational and social factors within the 
framework implemented by the Enterprise Culture and their effect on performance 
improvement outcomes. 
A pragmatic view of combining methods allows limitless opportunities to test the theory 
however the study adopted a dominant quantitative element to test the deductive 
theory and provide a guide to focus the research and avoid a loss of control.  A case 
study approach is justified to allow a wide range of techniques to answer the research 
questions and examine the social and organisational elements through pragmatic 
selection and application.  
This theory and the strategy to test it is broadly positivist but include “interpretive 
assumptions to reflect the social constructs inherent in the research environment” 
(Turner et al., 2014).  
The case site selected is the Emergency Department of a rural DGH.  Although I was a 
manager in the Trust responsible for operating the case site, which presented some 
ethical considerations and potential limitations in conducting research, the study was 
planned to mitigate any significant complications and approval was granted from the 
relevant ethics committees. 
The data strands described in this section have been presented in their roles to answer 
each of the research questions which in turn are designed to test the theory discussed 
in chapter 3.  Although always designed as a mixed method study, changes to the original 
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protocol have been justified to address the research questions whilst keeping the 
integrity necessary to the Critical Realist construct. 
The stands of quantitative capacity and demand data are given additional probity 
through the critical realism ethnography to explore causal mechanisms of the 
Emergency Department’s performance against the four hour wait target and scrutinised 
through a Delphi group technique to gain validation from the staff of the case site.   
From the intervention quantitative and qualitative data were used to examine the aims 
of the Enterprise Culture.  Qualitative data was deemed necessary to address some 
concerns over evaluating the effects of the intervention by adding context to the 
outcomes. 
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5 Results: The nature of Emergency Service Users’ Demand 
5.1 Introduction 
The results of the study are presented across the next three chapters.  This chapter 
records the demand placed by patients on the case study site within the context of the 
Purpose, Process People (PPP) framework, leading to the publication of a paper entitled 
an ‘Evaluation of Demand in a Rural English Hospital Emergency Department’ (Turner et 
al., 2015b).  The paper was accepted for publication in the British Journal of Healthcare 
Management in June 2015 and is included in appendix 8.  
The purpose of this chapter is to address the research question ‘what is the nature of 
the emergency service users’ demand?’ using the methods described in chapter 4.  
5.2 Understanding Demand 
Efficiency and quality through the PPP framework are achieved by designing and 
implementing processes and people skills to meet a clear and accurately specified 
customer purpose (Turner et al., 2013b).  Although Turner et al. (2013b) argue that the 
centralised targets introduced through the Enterprise Culture are not developed within 
the PPP “purpose” context of “precisely the right value for the customer” (Womack, 
2005, 6), central targets do present a performance improvement outcome against which 
to test this study’s theory (to test if the Enterprise Culture has provided a framework for 
performance improvement in a rural DGH).  The Emergency Department performance 
target developed through the Enterprise Culture under the Department of Health’s first 
reforming emergency care paper states that patients should not “wait more than four 
hours in an [Emergency Department] from arrival to admission to a bed in the hospital, 
transfer elsewhere or discharge. The average length of waiting should fall to 75 
minutes”.  (Department of Health, 2001).   
This section discusses a typical PPP response to analysing demand to inform the rate of 
productivity necessary when planning the processes and people skills. 
Improving time related delivery through the PPP framework requires an understanding 
of the demand placed on a service and the rate at which work is completed.  Time taken 
to deliver work (Lead Time) can be calculated using Little’s Law where work in progress 
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is the number of items waiting to be completed and the completion rate is the number 
of items that can be completed in a specified time frame (George, 2003, 26).  
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 − 𝐼𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
Within an Emergency Department this formula would read:   
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
To improve performance in time spent in the Emergency Department, two options are 
available; decrease the patients in the department or increase the rate of discharge.  
Understanding demand is necessary in order to intervene on both of these options, 
either through diversion of patients or improving process or people to increase the 
completion rate for patient cohorts. 
5.3 Demand Analysis 
5.3.1 Annual Demand Patterns 
48,919 patients attended the Emergency Department over the year. The daily 
attendance figures, in chronological order from 1st April 2011 (data point 1), are shown 
in figure 5.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
117 
 
Figure 5.1: Daily attendances 
 
These data show no clear evidence of trend or seasonal patterns.  Daily attendances are 
accepted as normally distributed in the year (p=0.2 in both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality) around a daily mean of 133 patients with a standard 
deviation of 13.6 patients.  
These data were validated by the participants who considered it representative of usual 
annual performance patterns.  One participant did suggest that summer attendances 
were thought to be higher as the coastal holiday attractions within 20 miles of the 
hospital increased the population during that time.  Analysis of attendees’ permanent 
Post Code revealed evidence to support this theory. Average daily attendances from 
patients presenting to the Emergency Department whose permanent Post Code was not 
in the local health commissioning area are shown by month in table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: Average daily attendances from non-local patients by month 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
4.0 3.1 5.2 8.3 8.4 7.7 8.3 13.4 7.9 6.7 4.5 4.5 
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However, for PPP planning purposes the overall attendance distribution gives a stable 
expectation for attendances and is not affected by the seasonal movement of patients 
from outside the health commissioning area.  In a normal distribution, 68.3% of the 
population lay within one standard deviation either side of the mean and 95% within 
1.96 standard deviations (Campbell et al., 2007, 72).  This means that, given no seasonal 
variations, the emergency department can be 68.3% confident of between 119 and 147 
patients attending on an average day and 95% confident of between 106 and 160 
attendances.  
Moreover, these data follow the national pattern of attending patients described by 
Downing and Wilson (2002, 533-534) who found no significant seasonal variation overall 
in their study of temporal and demographic variations in NHS Emergency Department 
attendees.   
5.3.2 Hourly Demand Patterns 
Daily attendance patterns are reasonably stable and unvaried, however analysis of a 
shorter time-frame shows greater levels of variation.  Figure 5.2 describes the 95% 
confidence interval for mean hourly attendances by weekday. 
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Figure 5.2: Hourly attendances by day of week – all patients 
 
Adjustments in the service capacity provided across the day-by-hour period, to 
synchronise the rate of discharge to the demand for service, are necessary to avoid 
build-up of patients in department (Womack and Jones, 1996, 55-56).  The PPP response 
to this concept is the ‘takt-time’ technique.  Takt-time is the average elapsed time 
between patient discharges – and movement between each treatment step whilst in 
department – (Womack and Jones, 1996, 55).   It is calculated by taking the time 
available in a work period divided by the number of patient attendances.  As “takt-times 
change when customer demand changes” (Miltenburg, 2007, 3556), when calculated, 
takt-time by hour over the week can become a local departmental indicator against 
which to measure performance and investigate improvement potential. 
However, the Emergency Department had two work-streams which split patient 
demand: major work-streams (including resuscitation) – more acutely ill patients who 
were likely to be admitted – and a minor work- stream.  The Emergency Department 
definition of patients presenting to the major stream were all arrivals through 
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emergency services and any other patients assessed as such at triage.  All other patients 
were classed as minor.  The data extract did not allow analysis using the Emergency 
Department’s definition of the stream patients were treated in as no such data category 
was available.  However, an analysis of patients admitted as a hospital in-patient or who 
died in the department is shown in figure 5.3 to offer a comparison (these patients were 
deemed ‘major’ by the Information Services Department who provide the data). 
Figure 5.3: Hourly attendances by day of week – patients admitted or died in 
department 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that attendances by week day and hour of day followed similar 
patterns, although a chi-square test comparing the frequency of attendances rejected 
the hypothesis that the observed number of patients  attending by day and hour is 
consistent with the expected attendances by day and hour (p=0.001). However, this 
analysis could be used as a starting point for calculating the takt-time for a ‘baseline’ day 
for patients demanding higher levels of care.    
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Although there is variation between weekdays, the largest source of uncertainty from 
the data was the width of the confidence intervals around the mean.    When grouped 
by arrival hour, all tests for normality were rejected (p=0.00 in both Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality for all hours) and each hour fits an 
exponential distribution.  To describe the range of data around the median, a boxplot is 
used in figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Hourly attendance – patients admitted or died in department 
 
Although the inter-quartile ranges (vertical oblong boxes) and median (horizontal black 
line within the inter-quartile range) have a relatively small extent, the data outside this 
area (particularly the extent over the 75th percentile) extend significantly further.  
Statistical outliers (marked o or *) also show a variation in the attendance outside of the 
central tendency.  
The hourly demand data were recognised as valid by the staff and no comments were 
made about the accuracy or interpretation of the data.  However, two participants did 
request further analysis to show attendance profiles by diagnosis type.  This was 
unfortunately not possible as over 30% of the data were not recorded for attending 
patients and the Clinical Director declared that the remaining data did not appear to 
122 
 
represent the case-mix of patients in the department in his experience. The detailed 
diagnosis data were entered in a free-text field meaning that the operator entering the 
data had to type in details based on the patients’ notes and not by selecting from a pre-
defined list.  This resulted in instances of undecipherable spelling and irrelevant data in 
some instances where the data were provided.   
5.4 Discussion 
Through the PPP framework, I argue that the amount of time patients wait in an 
Emergency Department can be calculated using an adaptation of Little’s Law following 
George’s use of the formula in the private sector to study time to deliver work (2003).  
The numerator in the formula demands a count of the number of patients in the 
department.  The denominator demands the rate of discharges.   
To ensure that discharge is synchronised to demand patterns, takt-time can be 
calculated to quantify the productivity needed from the department’s processes and 
people.  Such evidence leads to the production of departmental indicators which 
highlight the need for immediate intervention if a problem occurs. 
The purpose of this analysis was to provide an initial profile for matching demand with 
discharge performance in order to meet the central target.    The range of arrival data 
and variation described in the case site may present difficulties if used in planning 
resources to meet productivity, but knowledge of this level of variation is critical to 
inform baseline processes and staff planning in order to provide a flexible service.  A 
constant view of patient arrival is necessary to ensure Miltenburg’s flexible takt-times 
(2007, 3556) so that discharge productivity can be adjusted when demand varies 
significantly (or indeed case-mix deviates from expectation – a level of analysis not 
possible from this case site data).  The purpose of takt-time is to provide a clear 
indication of the rate of productivity to be achieved if the target is to be met and this is 
an indicator for immediate local action.   
The analysis has shown a PPP response to the purpose value assigned to an Emergency 
Department in a rural DGH emergency care system under the Enterprise Culture.  
Although a PPP response to the four-hour wait target cannot be fully calculated from 
the source data, a framework to achieve the purpose can be planned at a local level.   
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The quality of data available to identify significant local patient cohorts and create 
meaningful takt-time calculations presented a significant improvement opportunity for 
the Emergency Department.  In discussions with the department’s managers regarding 
the data quality limitations, the Clinical Director suggested a review of a sample of 
patients’ notes to begin to provide evidence of cohorts and form calculations.  This level 
of discussion was encouraging and Emergency Department staff were able to 
anecdotally identify cohorts of patients who they believed generally arrived at certain 
times. For example, it was proposed that significant numbers of patients aged 65 and 
over attended between the hours of 09:00 and 11:30 with minor illnesses as they were 
not able to get appointments with their own General Practitioner. This could form the 
basis of a PPP analysis to quantify the theory which, if it were true, could be resolved 
with the two options under Little’s Law: diverting patients to a more suitable location (if 
possible or desirable given local circumstances) or takt-time calculation for a suitable 
practitioner within the department to care for those patients.  
Although discussed as a possible intervention for this research, this idea was not 
pursued because of the lack of clinical time available to perform the review.   
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the research question ‘what is the nature of the emergency 
service users’ demand?’  In simple terms, demand through patient attendance is easy to 
describe and the normally distributed nature of the attendances per day and the 
common profile of those attendances by day and hour offer a good opportunity to use 
PPP techniques to calculate productivity rates (by providing necessary to meet the 
Enterprise Culture four hour wait target). 
However, the detail of the patient attendances requires more work and accurate cohorts 
of attendees may give greater opportunities for planning care provision and achieving 
the target. This analysis can be used to inform an Emergency Department’s work rate 
and the people skills required despite the high levels of variation in arrivals if a flexible 
approach is used.  
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6 Results: The Characteristics of the Enterprise Culture in the 
Emergency Department  
6.1 Introduction 
Following the description of the case study site’s demand from patients in the 
emergency setting, this chapter records the analysis of emergency care capacity and 
performance.  Data recording the capacity provided or planned is described and an 
evaluation of how capacity and demand affect performance against the four-hour wait 
performance target is made.  The performance target used is the Enterprise Culture’s 
indicator to measure emergency care provided in hospital Emergency Departments: to 
ensure that patients should not “wait more than four hours in an [Emergency 
Department] from arrival to admission to a bed in the hospital, transfer elsewhere or 
discharge” (Department of Health, 2001).   
The research in this chapter led to a paper awaiting publication entitled ‘Ensuring 
Capacity Meets Demand: A Case Study’ (Turner et al., 2015c).  This paper was accepted 
for publication in the British Journal of Health Care Management in September 2015 and 
is included in appendix 8.   
By understanding the characteristics of patient demand, Chapter 6 focussed on the 
‘purpose’ aspect of the Purpose, Process, People (PPP) framework in the Enterprise 
Culture. Using the methods described in chapter 5, the purpose of this chapter is to 
understand its ‘process’ and ‘people’ aspects in order to address the second research 
question: what characteristics of the Enterprise Culture exist in the Emergency 
Department and what are their effects on performance against the four-hour wait 
target?  
6.2 Planned Resource Data 
Staff rotas, bed and resource capacity, and Emergency Department work protocols were 
reviewed on 01 April 2012.  Over the following twelve week study period, these capacity 
elements were observed in the ethnographic study in order to understand their efficacy 
and influence on performance.   
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Staff rotas in the Emergency Department provided capacity to meet demand attendance 
profiles.  Figure 6.1 shows the staff rota by clinical role and the average patient demand 
profile over the day.  This graph shows only the establishment of staff planned to be on 
shift, however actual staff presence against this plan was reviewed during the 
ethnographic study because these data were not available from archive records.   
Figure 6.1: Emergency Department Staff Capacity and Intraday Patient Demand 
 
The staff rota profile did increase to meet demand throughout the day. Although there 
is a disproportionately higher level of staff capacity to meet patient demand in the early 
hours of the day (00:00 to 08:00), staff on rota were set to minimum requirements under 
the hospital Trust’s rules to provide a safe service during these hours and not to match 
demand patterns.  The basis of the calculation used to set the minimum requirement 
was not known by the Emergency Department’s clinical or business managers. 
However, this matching of capacity and demand was of limited significance because it 
considered demand only in terms of the total number of attending patients and capacity 
only in terms of staff headcount.  By matching the productivity of staff on rota to the 
total number of patients in the department at hourly intervals (which will differ from 
the attendance pattern because the patients’ time spent in the department varies), the 
pressure on capacity to meet the number of patients discharges required to meet the 
target was exposed more clearly (Womack and Jones, 1996, 55-56).   Archival data were 
not available to measure the number of patients in the department or the factors 
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affecting the rate at which patients were discharged during the study period and were 
observed in the ethnographic study. 
The Emergency Department in this case study contained twenty-two spaces in which to 
perform an individual patient consultation.  Although these spaces were designed to 
meet a specific clinical purpose, for example resuscitation bays, a meaningful 
comparison of space capacity against attending patient demand requires data showing 
the total number of patients who required a clinical space at a set time.  As noted, these 
data, and the effect clinical space has on productivity rates, were not available and this 
limitation was observed in the ethnographic study.  
Additionally, two hundred and sixty-one beds were available within the wider hospital 
for admitted adult emergency patients (excluding maternity cases), although hospital 
policy expected a maximum bed occupancy of 95%. This would reduce the capacity to 
two hundred and forty-seven if the expectation was met.  Examination of limited bed 
occupancy data revealed that the beds were regularly occupied over this level.  
Furthermore, fifteen additional escalation beds were available for emergency patients 
which were intended to be used only during times of extraordinary demand for 
emergency care.  Also, in addition to the emergency care beds, ninety beds were 
available for elective care patients.  The examination of the bed occupancy data also 
showed constant use of the escalation beds and evidence that elective patients care was 
cancelled due to emergency care patients taking elective care beds. 
Furthermore, the Emergency Department had an attendance to admission conversion 
of 33.5% compared to an overall English mean of 24.1% (Department of Health, 2011b).  
The admission process and its effect on the performance target were observed in the 
ethnographic study.   
Finally, the Emergency Department was under the governance of a number of policies 
and procedures.  The Clinical Director dismissed the guidelines for performing clinical 
procedures and care (because these were relevant only to confidential patient care and 
not within the ethical approval or relevance in this research).  The Clinical Director then 
determined that the most notable evidence of processes to assure performance against 
the Enterprise Culture target was the Urgent Care Standards (UCS), laid out in the 
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Emergency Department’s Staff Handbook (SH).  These locally defined standards were 
that all patients should receive: 
1. Triage within fifteen minutes 
2. Review within one hour by junior or middle grade doctor 
3. Discuss plan with senior doctor within two hours 
4. Bed request or referral by three hours 
Adherence to these standards was observed in the ethnographic study. 
6.3 Performance Data 
An analysis of performance data was conducted to identify any characteristics of 
performance outcomes which resulted from the prevailing Enterprise Culture.  
Performance was measured using the Enterprise Culture’s four hour wait target (Turner 
et al. 2013b).  These data were analysed to show the distribution and variation of time 
patients spend the Emergency Department.   
Figure 6.2 describes the overall distribution of patients’ time spent in the Emergency 
Department and figure 6.3, how variations apply to hour of arrival.  
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Figure 6.2: Time spent by patients in department  
Figure 6.2 shows that the amount of time patients spent in Emergency Department was 
widely distributed (unseen on figure 6.2 are individual data points where patient had 
longer stays up to 1,462 minutes).  The data show characteristics typical of patient 
waiting time variables. Campbell et al. describe distributions that are constrained at one 
end, such as hospital waiting times, as more likely to be skewed (where the tail of the 
distribution is longer on one side of the mean value) (2007, 38).  This is because waiting 
time “cannot be negative, but can be very [long] for some patients and relatively short 
for the majority” (Campbell et al., 2007, 38).  Here, the median tendency (180 minutes) 
is followed by a more gradual descent to a long tail, as the more acutely ill patients 
continue to be treated. However, an unusual addition is the spike of patients staying 240 
minutes which coincides with the four-hour target. No data were available to identify 
any patients who may be tested to explain this distribution, such as case mix and 
acuteness of patients’ condition and the phenomena causing the distribution 
characteristics were observed in the ethnographic study. 
129 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Distribution of time spent in department by hour of arrival  
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the distribution of the amount of time patients spent in the 
Emergency Department does not greatly vary depending on the hour of arrival.  The data 
indicate that the available capacity maintained the level of performance throughout the 
day.  This analysis of performance led to some inconsistencies to be investigated further.  
For example, despite the clinician to patient ratio being higher at night, the length of 
stay remained the same.  Challenge to the Emergency Department’s ability to achieve a 
constant productivity rate was considered in the ethnography. 
6.4 Ethnography  
The ethnographic study, justified in section 4.2.2.4, which was conducted over twelve 
weeks from April 2012 to examine the observations identified in the quantitative 
analysis and described using the process and people elements of the PPP framework, 
produced the following key findings.  
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6.4.1 Process 
Process, Productivity and the Urgent Care Standards 
Although the UCS expectations were clearly defined in terms of times at which clinical 
tasks should be completed, no formal documented processes were observed to achieve 
them; despite evidence of many policies that affected how patients moved through 
emergency care within the hospital.  These policies were documented in the Trust’s 
online library, but unclear version control and out of date releases made them unreliable 
as a data source.  A review of the policy concerning the treatment of patients requiring 
mental health referral revealed a complicated description in prose rather than a 
systematic view of the process steps necessary to complete the task.  The policy 
documents were viewed as unpopular by many clinical staff who stated indifferently 
that they had to sign that they had read policies, periodically.  However, a commonly 
accepted working practice observed and consistently followed was:  
For the major stream of potential admission or trauma patients; 
1. Patient triage or ambulance handover 
2. Nurse observations 
3. Junior doctor assessment / treatment 
4. Diagnostic Requests (imaging and blood tests) 
5. Registrar or Consultant doctor review / treatment 
6. Nurse observations 
7. Specialty referral (if necessary) 
8. Patient handover or discharge 
For the minor stream patients, an Emergency Nurse Practitioner or General Practitioner 
completed the assessments and treatments and nursing observations were not 
necessary. 
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The major stream is depicted in the summarised Value Stream Map in appendix 7 which 
includes points of observation discussed in this section where possible.  The whole Value 
Stream Map showed the relationship of all of the observations and their potential to 
cause variation in the performance seen in the Emergency Department against the four 
hour wait target. 
Between each step, the patient would usually wait for the next task to be completed.  
Twenty patients were randomly selected to have their time and movements in the 
Emergency Department and through the hospital, if necessary, observed.   From these 
observations, a mean of 75 minutes of clinician to patient contact time and a median of 
73 minutes was recorded.  Because the data in figure 6.2 were not normally distributed 
a mean calculation would not represent the central tendency of the distribution (the 
mean of 173 minutes was affected by the outlying long length of stay patients).  
However the median of the data was 152 minutes showing that non-clinical (or waiting) 
time accounted for around half of patients stay in the Emergency Department.    
The time taken to discharge a patient can be partly examined using calculation of 
productivity taken from Little’s Law from chapter 5.  Capacity and waiting time affect 
the rate at which patients are discharged (the denominator in Little’s Law) so the 
ethnographic study considered the causal factors of waiting and restrictions on physical 
and human capacity. 
Observations of the level and continuity of the Emergency Department’s productivity 
rate, brought forward from the quantitative analysis, revealed several causal factors.  
Several ‘people’ related factors were observed to affect the waiting element of the 
patients’ stay (discussed in in section 6.4.2). However, the factors associated with 
‘process’ and physical capacity in the hospital’s emergency care system and are 
discussed in this section. 
Clinical Space 
The effect of clinical space was not easy to evaluate as an influence of patient movement 
through the department. During the busy hours, when the number of patients in the 
department was high, the need for clinical space often exceeded that available.  
However, major stream patients were routinely moved out of the bays where they had 
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received clinical contact and waited on trolleys outside of designated bays until they 
were ready for the next clinical task.  This frequent movement of patients made 
observation difficult and it was not possible to accurately quantify any cause and effect 
relationship between clinical space and time that patients spent in the Emergency 
Department. Moving patients to release clinical space clearly does absorb staff time, and 
hence the capacity they can provide, and affects space capacity, thus influencing 
productivity in terms of the patient discharge rate.  The method of work where a patient 
is seen, left alone, moved (away from a bay and back) and then seen again opposes the 
more efficient PPP concept of continuous flow. In a continuous flow operation, one 
product (patient) is worked on continuously until completion (the patient is discharged) 
thus optimising clinical time and space (Womack and Jones, 1996, 22).  To achieve this, 
however, an experiment would be required to design the process to focus on continuous 
clinical care and the number of bays that would be required to achieve the Emergency 
Department’s attendance profile. 
A clearer effect of limited space was observed when ambulance crews were frequently 
delayed in handing their patients over to Emergency Department care because 
assessment areas were not available. On five occasions four ambulance crews were seen 
to be waiting with patients on trolleys in a corridor as space was not available for a 
Paramedic to Nurse handover.  This caused considerable tension as the ambulance 
crews were keen to be back in service (and had their own target for handover times) 
and the nurses were not able to safely accept the patient into their care.  Patients waited 
for up to 60 minutes for a handover. 
Indicators and Use of Data 
Other factors which affected the time patients spent in the department were observed 
through the use of data generated within the Emergency Department. Patients 
attending the Emergency Department were recorded on the Caydar system (the 
Emergency Department’s patient record database) which enabled staff to update the 
patient’s status throughout their stay (until discharge or admission to a hospital bed).  
Caydar could display the patient’s location (which clinical bay they occupied, for 
example), care status (for example awaiting triage or blood test results) and the duration 
of their stay.  It would not, however give an audit trail of all the clinical spaces the patient 
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had occupied.  Although the Urgent Care Standards (UCS) time targets could be recorded 
in within Caydar, the capture of the data was not consistent.  During the data extraction, 
the Caydar categories relating to UCS were disregarded because they contained 
insufficient data, and in the ethnography no evidence of consistent use was observed, 
particularly when nursing staff were under pressure.  This meant that no detailed 
planning for a patients’ progress in accordance with the UCS was made in Caydar.   As a 
consequence, no quantifiable evidence of common issues or analysis for problem 
resolution was possible.  In PPP, this is a key concept encapsulated by the Plan, Do, 
Check, Act (PDCA) cycle.  PDCA looks to improve productivity through the steps of 
(Maruta, 2012): 
1. Plan – study the process and plan small scale improvements. 
2. Do – carry out small scale improvements. 
3. Check – observe the effect of the improvements. 
4. Act – evaluate and repeat the cycle if necessary. 
Caydar was displayed in the Emergency Department on a large touch-screen whiteboard 
so that clinicians could update a patient’s status easily and details were visible to all 
staff. The same information was available in read only format to an Operations Centre: 
a facility used to optimise bed utilisation by tracking bed availability and admission 
requests. Only two commonly used features of the Caydar system were observed.  
Firstly, patient location was updated if they moved from one bay to another (although 
this was often delayed and occasionally not done at all).  Secondly, a summary of the 
time patients spent in the department was displayed in order of the longest length of 
stay patients. Those who had been in the department over three hours were coloured 
red, two to three hours yellow, and others green.   
The summary data were primarily observed to be used by managers as a means to 
control performance: to ensure that all patients were discharged in less than four hours.  
Two levels of management were seen to actively use and respond to these data: a co-
ordinating nurse in the Emergency Department and Operations Centre managers. 
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Although no formal process existed for managing patients’ care plans, and actual 
performance was not monitored against the UCS, the co-ordinating nurse was 
appointed to help ensure that patients flowed through the department and that issues 
causing delay to care were resolved.  The co-ordinating nurse was fully qualified but was 
supernumerary to the clinical staff to allow full attention on resolving patient flow 
issues.  This role was separate to the Matron, Nurse Consultant and Sister who had 
mixed clinical and administrative duties in the Emergency Department.   The co-
ordinator role should have been assigned to a Junior Sister on duty, however the 
restrictions of staff meant that this was observed to occasionally be undertaken by an 
experienced staff nurse.  Additionally, when pressure in the department due to large 
numbers of attending patients, acuteness of the cases or both was high, the co-
ordinating nurse left the position to undertake clinical nursing tasks.  The co-ordinating 
nurse had two key prompts for work allocation: requests from clinical staff to intervene 
with delays to patient treatment and the colour coded time status for patients 
approaching the four hour target (often emphasised by pressure from the Operations 
Centre managers). 
The requests for intervention from clinical staff were only observed during times of high 
patient attendances and because of the limited capacity of the co-ordinating nurse, the 
clinicians either tried to resolve the issue themselves or waited for the co-ordinator to 
become free.  Patients’ time status however, often took priority in the co-ordinators role 
and this was seen particularly as a patient approached a breach of the four hour wait 
target. At this point the managers from the Operations Centre, who accessed the same 
data as the co-ordinating nurse, were seen to request details from the co-ordinating 
nurse and would also be involved in ensuring that the patients were either discharged 
from the Emergency Department or admitted in the time limits.  Examples of 
intervention by Operations Centre Managers included delayed referral requests from 
the Emergency Department to the Clinical Director of the required specialty and locating 
Physicians or Surgeons to discharge patients to free bed space. The later intervention 
usually involved Physicians discharging a patient who was named under the care of one 
of their colleagues.  Considerable tension between the separate Physicians and between 
Physicians and the Operations Centre Managers was observed.  These tensions were a 
consequence of the rigid nature of ownership of patient care: when a patient is named 
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to a consultant’s care, the consultant is legally responsible for the patients care.  
Consultants observed were often reluctant to allow major decisions for care to be taken 
by other clinical staff.  
The Operations Centre was intended to ensure that patients were placed in the 
appropriate clinical environment for their diagnosis and that discharge or transfer to 
another care provider was conducted safely and in a timely manner.  Various indicators 
measured the success of these interventions, namely: 
 The number of medical specialty patients in a surgical specialty ward, or vice 
versa (known as outliers) 
 The number of patients cared for in the correct specialty, but the wrong sub-
specialty wards (i.e. a stroke patient in a respiratory ward, known as off-
template). 
 The number of patients medically fit for discharge from the hospital (those 
patients that the doctors were ready to discharge but could not because either 
no onward care, such as a nursing home bed, home appliances, therapy packages 
or medication was available.  Known as delayed transfer of care – DTOC). 
The hospital also targeted a bed occupancy level of 95% to ensure that adequate space 
was available for emergency situations (infection control or major accidents, for 
example). However, during observation, with one exception, the hospital never had a 
bed that was either not occupied or assigned to a patient awaiting admission. The 
exception was one Friday evening when the hospital made, in the words of the 
Operations Centre manager ‘a big push to make space for the weekend admissions’: 
although this effort only improved occupancy to 97% and the beds were fully occupied 
by 13:30 the following day. This pressure to provide beds in which to admit patients led 
to decisions which caused patients to outlie or become off-template.  In order to make 
such decisions, the manager identified DTOC patients and moved them to an 
inappropriate ward in order for the more acute admission patient to be cared for in the 
right place.  Two clear consequences were observed from this. Firstly, the DTOC patients 
could be moved up to six times in the hospital stay in order to make space for admitted 
patients; absorbing clinical time through patient movement and handover.  Secondly, 
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the DTOC patients observed were elderly and often frail, and nine patients were 
observed to become unfit for discharge after contracting a hospital acquired infection.  
This caused the patients to be moved again to the appropriate ward for their care. 
Patients Avoiding Breach 
The spike of patients leaving the Emergency Department just before a 240 minute stay 
(the point at which they would have breached the Enterprise Culture target, seen in the 
quantitative analysis was observed to be caused by intervention and not the natural 
process.  The continual build-up of waits in the process caused an accumulation of time 
which, in accordance with Little’s Law, would extend with the increase in patients in the 
department.  However, the Operations Centre reacted to time status data in order to 
avoid a breach.  Negative effects on the other indicators of care were accepted as an 
unfortunate consequence. No evidence was seen of planning towards a sustainable 
solution to outlier or off-template patients, although a nurse was employed to resolve 
the more complicated DTOC patient transfers.  During one Tuesday morning in the 
ethnographic study 71 DTOC and other medically fit patients occupied the hospital’s 
beds, the lowest was 24, a Friday evening. 
Furthermore, no evidence was seen of the hospital’s emergency care system having 
planned capacity to meet demand profiles of attending and admitted patients.  Figure 
6.4 shows the imbalance between percentage of patients admitted per hour and those 
discharged on ethnographic study days. This imbalance produced a build-up of patients 
waiting to be admitted (absorbing capacity resources through occupation of the 
Emergency Department clinical space and additional nurse observations), and 
admissions to inappropriate wards to meet the patients care and delays for newly 
attending patients.  Most Operations Centre interventions to avoid a breach were 
caused by a shortage of beds available to admitted patients. 
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Figure 6.4: Profile of medical admissions to discharges 
 
Many reasons were observed for the imbalance between admissions and discharges.  
Most prominent was the common practice for medical wards to hold ward rounds in the 
afternoon.  After a decision to discharge was made in the ward round, delays from 
writing the discharge document, ordering take home drugs from the pharmacy and 
arranging transport for patients contributed to bed occupancy late in the day.  No prior 
planning for patients who could potentially be discharged on the ward round was 
observed, and all of the above activities were reactive.  As a result, the pharmacy and 
transport providers were unable to schedule and optimise their resources and had to 
manage batched requests for many patients.  
Admissions from the Emergency Department 
As noted in the quantitative analysis, the attendance to admission conversion rate, was 
a cause for concern to be investigated in the ethnographic study.  Admission decisions 
were common in the fourth hour of a patients stay.  Delays and inconsistent practices 
from referrals by Emergency Department doctors to other specialties (due to specialists 
having their own capacity issues and separate targets) contributed to many breaches of 
the four-hour target or late admissions.  Although no evidence was available to show 
the association of the high conversion rate with decisions to admit a patient to avoid a 
breach of the four-hour wait target, no analysis of higher than expected levels of 
acuteness for the attending patients is available either. 
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Other Causes of Patient Waits 
Other reasons for patients’ long stays in the Emergency Department were observed.  
Some delays were caused by aspects of the emergency care system outside of the 
Emergency Department. Patients requiring imaging diagnostics were observed to be 
delayed particularly when the Radiology department outpatients’ service was closed. At 
these times only one radiographer was available to manage the emergency workload 
and demand was often seen to exceed the available capacity which resulted in patients 
waiting more than two hours for their procedure.  Another major impact came from 
referrals to mental health services.  The mental health assessors were employed by a 
separate health care Trust which provided service across a wide geographic region and 
a lapsed time of up to four hours in responding to a referral was observed on several 
occasions.  However, good practice which reduced patients’ time in department from 
services outside of the Emergency Department was observed.  The presence of a 
physician to assess potential medical admissions on attendance in the Emergency 
Department helped to overcome late referral problems and occupational therapists and 
physiotherapists also contributed to reduced waits for patients.  These services were 
not permanently available to the Emergency Department however. 
Further, less common, observations which were seen to affect the patients’ time spent 
in the department relating to process and physical capacity were: 
 The co-ordinator aimed for patients to be seen in chronological order unless they 
had a clinical priority, however junior doctors were seen to select patients notes 
based on their own preference. Files were usually prioritised, firstly in order of 
clinical acuteness and then chronologically from arrival.  When there were no 
priority patients, notes were seen to be taken out of chronological order. 
 Delays in obtaining pathology results which were caused by request forms and 
samples being placed in a box at the nurses’ station and sent to the laboratory 
in batches by a non-clinical administrator. The oldest requests in the batches 
were observed to have an additional twenty five minute wait as a result of this 
process. 
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 Clinical time was spent locating patient notes.  Boxes at the nurses’ station were 
used to hold the notes unless they were needed at a patient’s bedside and were 
occasionally not returned or placed back in the box after use.   
Summary 
Pressure to meet the target is apparent, however two clear findings emerge from the 
observations.   
Firstly, the process for moving emergency care patients through the hospital emergency 
system was not sufficiently defined, nor was capacity provided to meet the patient 
demand profiles.  This meant that training could not be given to new participants in the 
department in order to enact repeatable performance. 
Secondly, the data and controls were used to prevent breaches of the four-hour target, 
not to maintain the UCS which was designed to enable the Emergency Department to 
achieve the four-hour wait.  No data capture to monitor the patients’ progress against a 
plan was available and data could not be used retrospectively for problem solving 
purposes. 
6.4.2 People 
The analysis of capacity revealed that clinical staff were usually present in the 
department in accordance with the planned rota.  However, three principal concerns 
emerged from the observations of social interactions and physical resource capacity 
which affected the performance of the Emergency Department: a reliance on staff who 
had little or no knowledge of the department, clinical staff being absent from the 
department and relationships between the department and other areas of the hospital’s 
emergency care system. 
Staff on duty frequently contained a significant amount of bank or agency nurses (and 
on occasion Consultant and Registrar grade doctors) who did not know the department, 
its working practices and management systems. This caused variability in performance 
as no formal procedure was available and no mechanism was in place to induct the staff 
into the generally accepted working practices. 
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Nurses were also assigned to the Emergency Department from other wards and clinics 
within the hospital in order to achieve the required duty rota. Tensions were observed 
between the nurses assigned from other areas (who were often reluctant to work in 
front-line emergency care) and the department’s own staff. 
Qualified nursing time was frequently observed to be spent away from the department 
escorting patients or performing other non-clinical activities (checking bed availability 
and performing reception duties, for example) when more suitable, unqualified staff 
were not available. The staff absorbed in transporting patients was a significant 
contributor to fragmented care. During particularly busy periods, matrons and hospital 
managers were observed to aid porters in moving patients.  Although hospital policy 
expected the porters to be accompanied by a Health Care Assistant when moving in-
patients between clinical areas nursing staff routinely undertook the task.  The hospital’s 
policy was for patients whose condition was assessed as a clinical risk were to be 
escorted by a qualified nurse, however many patients who were deemed low risk were 
observed to be escorted by qualified staff.  To facilitate the admission of a patient, 
nurses would often call the receiving ward to check the status of bed availability and 
transfer time.  Nurses were observed to spend many minutes waiting for these calls to 
be answered and on occasion the nurses were seen to walk to the ward to make the 
enquiry in person after becoming frustrated by the lack of response.    
Many relationship and social tensions were observed during the ethnographic study.  
Clinicians within the Emergency Department were seen to advise each other, and 
particularly bank and agency staff, about who to contact and avoid in other parts of the 
hospital and how to by-pass usual practices if a key person was not on shift at a particular 
time.  Far from Toyota’s average people managing brilliant processes, the people within 
the system were often more influential than the process.  
Additionally, a culture which stimulated tensions and reactive behaviour was observed 
within the hospital.  At the management level this was seen in pressure to meet the 
four-hour wait target and the Operations Centre managers were visited many times by 
hospital Directors and Commissioning Trusts to explain performance results under tense 
conditions.  An interesting interaction between a Director and Operations Centre 
manager following a Commissioner’s visit concluded that performance against the four 
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hour wait target must not be in the lower quartile with its peers (other providers within 
the region). The prominence of the Enterprise Culture target to exceed locally defined 
care needs was clear as was the statement of motivation: not that they wanted to be 
the best performers, but that they did not want to be the worst. 
Within the Emergency Department, the fear created by performance against the target 
was also observed.  Relationships between departments and individuals made a greater 
impact on patient flow than process and protocol (an Emergency Department patient 
was often seen as an Emergency Department problem unless a good relationship 
between departments or individuals existed).  Emergency Department nurses 
contacting wards to receive admitted patients became very emotive when the patient 
transfer was delayed.  Some departments also had separate targets, such as surgical 
wards having targets to provide (and certainly not cancel) a patient’s elective surgery 
because the demand for emergency patient admission was high. 
6.5 Conclusion 
From the limited quantitative data available, a description of the planned capacity 
characteristics of staff and physical space was made.  However, no data describing the 
capacity actually provided was available by which to assess the impact of capacity 
against demand.  The profile of patients’ time spent in the department revealed a 
characteristic spike of activity just before the four-hour target. These limitations and 
further characteristics of the Enterprise Culture were identified in the ethnographic 
study and presented by Process and People themes. 
The Enterprise Culture was implemented in an Emergency Department which was 
managed and evaluated separately from the whole emergency care system.  The 
Enterprise Culture’s four hour wait target was prominent in both process and people 
aspects of the Emergency Department (and the wider operational management). 
Characteristics in both aspects were observed to affect performance. 
Processes were found not to be formalised and although a commonly accepted practice 
existed, it did not support the expected care standard targets which underpinned 
achievement of the Enterprise Culture four hour wait target.  The characteristics of the 
processes and people within the emergency system resulted in excessive waiting time 
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for Emergency Department patients.  Management interventions were commonly used 
to ensure patients did not breach the four hour target and these actions adversely 
impacted on other aspects of emergency care.  The process issues, staff unfamiliar with 
the hospital’s working practices, rigid organisational structures and fear of poor 
performance often caused difficult working relationships within the hospitals’ 
emergency care system. 
Insufficient planning to match systemic capacity and productivity to demand was 
apparent.  This resulted in fragmented intelligence about safe patient flow within the 
system and difficulty in understanding where patients should be at what time to receive 
the best possible care.  In summary, the findings of the analysis and ethnography reveal 
that: 
 Analysis of patient demand and calculation of planned processes and productive 
resources to meet it did not exist.  There was no mechanism to continuously 
monitor and resolve performance gaps. 
 The emergency care system was fragmented and often reactionary.  Disparate 
targets, ineffective relationships and a deviation from care standards produced 
a culture where management intervention was necessary to achieve the four 
hour wait target. 
The functional lines of control (management and clinical specialism) discussed in the 
Process section and the ineffectual People relationships that resulted from them 
represented a major difference between PPP and the Enterprise Culture.  The process 
and people characteristics of the Enterprise Culture present in the Emergency 
Department, and the wider hospital emergency care system, do not support 
achievement of the Enterprise Culture purpose: attaining the four hour wait target. 
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7 Results: Achieving the Aims of the Enterprise Culture 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter has two purposes.  The primary purpose is to examine the research 
hypothesis: that the private enterprise framework adopted by the Emergency 
Department is successful in achieving the aims of the Enterprise Culture.  Also, following 
limitations in applying practical research, an additional purpose is to discuss barriers to 
conducting a study in a small, rural District General Hospital (DGH). 
This chapter records the results from two stages in the research methodology.  Firstly, 
the validation of findings from chapters 5 and 6 is discussed, using the methods 
described in section 4.2.3. Secondly, a discussion of the efficacy of a subsequent 
intervention of the case study site within the context of the Purpose, Process, People 
(PPP) framework, using the methods described in section 4.4.1.  These stages led to the 
paper, Implementing Emergency Department Performance Improvement Through the 
Enterprise Culture which was accepted for publication in the British Journal of 
Healthcare Management in October 2015 and is included in appendix 8. 
7.2 Validation of the research findings 
Validation from participants within the system provides the research with a critique of 
the findings and was chosen because they “have access to additional knowledge of the 
context [of the system] … that is not available to the ethnographer” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995, 228).  However using Emergency Department staff to validate the 
findings presented structural barriers to the research. 
As noted in the Methods chapter, only a small number of permanent, experienced staff 
were available to be participants in the research.  However, even after planning changes 
to the original protocol, further barriers to the availability of those participants and to 
that of clinical management resources reduced the potential knowledge with which to 
validate the system.   These barriers to participants’ availability were associated with 
two unplanned events.  Firstly, the participants employed in clinical positions were not 
able to convene in planned groups due to staff time pressures and additional long-term 
illnesses of permanent employees.  The time that clinical staff were able to give to non-
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clinical activities was restricted and duty rotas did not coincide.  Secondly, during the 
validation process the Clinical Director resigned his position.    The Clinical Director had 
sponsored the study and was keen to implement the intervention.  Additionally, there 
was an increased risk to service continuity due to the department retaining potentially 
only one substantive Consultant after the Clinical Director left.  Therefore, the decision 
was taken to change the planned timings of the validation, the implementation of the 
intervention and evaluation of the success of the intervention.  As a result of the 
barriers, four of the six participants contributed to the validation of the research.  
In the open Delphi round, participants were asked the question: which controls and 
practices are, or have been since April 2011, in place to ensure that time-led (four-hour 
patient discharge or admission) targets are met?  Although all four respondents made 
comments about the controls and practices, all of their responses had been observed 
during the ethnographic study and no new knowledge was added to the findings.   
The nominal group members were sent the analysis and summary of the findings 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6 one week in advance of the group meeting. Additionally, 
a meeting was arranged with each participant separately to discuss the findings and 
address any questions or points of clarity.  During the group meeting, participants were 
firstly asked to comment on potential inaccuracies and raise any queries about the 
quantitative capacity and demand analysis they had been sent.  No comments or queries 
were recorded.  Secondly the participants were asked to rank their agreement of the 
findings using a nine point Likert scale.  They were asked how much they agreed with 
the following statements:  
1. The patient demand data (shown in the figures in chapter 5) are an accurate 
description of the Emergency Department’s demand. 
2. The planned staff (shown in the figures in chapter 6) and the physical space 
analysis (described in chapter 6) are accurate reflections of the Emergency 
Department’s capacity.   
3. The patient time in department data (described in chapter 6) is an accurate 
description of the Emergency Department’s performance. 
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4. The commonly accepted working practice for major patients (described from the 
ethnography in chapter 6) is an accurate description of the Emergency 
Department’s patient pathway (local term). 
5. The Urgent Care Standards exist to support the four hour wait target, but are not 
routinely recorded in Caydar (the Emergency Department patient recording 
computer system). 
6. The findings of the ethnographic study, discussed by the group, are a fair 
assessment of the capacity and performance issues of the Emergency 
Department. 
Consensus was achieved in each question by a median score for all participants in the 7-
9 range described in section 4.2.3.   
The validation through consensus represents another barrier to research in the small, 
rural DGH case site.  Changes to the original protocol and subsequent amendments to 
manage difficulties of engaging participants still only managed to achieve responses 
from four out of the six signed to the study.  Staff illness and relocation has a significant 
impact on a department and its ability not only to engage in clinical activities but also 
improvement and research work.   
7.3 Intervention 
To define the clinical process to achieve the intervention (to safely transfer observation 
patients to the appropriate place of care), the Emergency Department consultants 
considered several sources of information.  The findings from this research, their own 
tacit knowledge of local needs and limitations and from a recent clinical audit which 
highlighted failings in patient care were considered to identify a performance issue.  
The performance issue identified by the consultants for intervention was the treatment 
of a cohort of emergency care patients requiring clinical observation for at least twelve 
hours after attendance to the Emergency Department.  These observation patients were 
defined as those who had presented to, and been assessed and treated in, the 
Emergency Department.   Although they did not require admission to an acute bed, 
these patients were kept under observation for a limited time.   The treatment of 
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observation patients was chosen because it represented a critical local need which was 
caused by a gap in clinical control (namely a lack of agreed process) within the 
Emergency Department and the Clinical Decision Unit (CDU).  Observation and admitted 
medical patients were transferred to the CDU prior to their discharge or relocation to a 
specialty ward.  
The intervention to ensure that observation patients received quality care through a 
process was: 
1. Identification of patients requiring observational care but not admission to an in-
patient bed in a specialist ward. 
2. The creation of an adequate care plan and drug chart was created for the patient 
by Emergency Department staff (the term ‘adequate’ related to health care 
professional standards, but was not clearly defined). 
3. The securing of a bed for the patient in the CDU. 
4. Safely transporting the patient and ensured that a nurse to nurse handover 
accompanied the transfer of care from the Emergency Department consultant to 
the CDU consultant physician. 
The indicators assigned by the consultants to measure success in the intervention were: 
 Whether the observation patient had a care plan agreed and documented by an 
Emergency Department doctor or nurse. 
 Whether a drug chart was complete when the patient was transferred to CDU. 
As these indicators were essential elements of clinical care 100% compliance was 
expected. 
In defining criteria for the intervention process, the Emergency Department consultants 
and the consultant physician from the CDU considered evidence from the trust’s quality 
audit recommendation, the validated findings of my research and other best practice 
techniques (for example for ECIST: mentioned in chapter 2).  These criteria were 
accepted or rejected for use in the intervention process through consensus in the Delphi 
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group questions.  These questions gauged respondents’ agreement that the criteria 
were necessary and the analysis of the responses was used by the consultants to create 
the intervention guidelines detailed in appendix 4. 
Following the implementation of the intervention, the Clinical Director reviewed 
compliance to the defined process.  From the seventeen sets of notes reviewed, fifteen 
patients (88.2%) had a clinically appropriate plan and drug chart.  However, using the 
one proportion test in the Minitab statistical software, this infers with 95% confidence 
that performance fell between 63.5% - 98.5% of the population of patients using the 
pathway during that week (events = 15, trials =17; where events were successful patient 
transfers and trials were the total number of transfers made).    
7.4 Evaluating the intervention 
The second ethnographic study revealed that the intervention was not routinely 
followed, particularly in times of great pressure (from high patient volume or where the 
acuteness of some patients absorbed a lot of clinical time).  Of the fourteen patients 
followed, only nine had visible compliance of a care plan and drug chart being 
transferred between Emergency Department and CDU staff (64.3%).  Although I did not 
review the clinical quality and appropriateness of the care plan and drug chart (due to 
ethical considerations, no additional information was requested from the Emergency 
Department by CDU staff after the transfer.  Although all of the non-compliances 
happened at times when four-hour wait pressures were most intense, four compliances 
were also noted during this time.  The compliances were all observed to be carried out 
when a permanent nursing staff member was present from either the Emergency 
Department or the CDU during the patient handover.  However, some non-compliance 
were also attributed to permanent nursing staff.   During the non-compliant handovers, 
no challenge or discussion was observed about the failure to meet the intervention. 
Also, no mechanisms were observed to monitor the indicators and resolve issues when 
performance below standard was evident: although the intervention process and 
indicators were described, monitoring performance was not.  The lack of monitoring in 
real-time against performance levels was observed as common practice in the hospital 
as performance against policy was managed through a periodic audit by the Trust’s 
quality department.  
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The semi-structured interviews with four participants followed the format described in 
table 7.1.   
Table 7.1: Semi-structured interview format  
Opening Question Objective 
Please could you give your views on recent 
changes to the observation patient 
pathway? 
To link the perceptions to the post 
implementation evaluation (review of 
compliance and the subsequent 
ethnographic observation). 
Which barriers prevent compliance 
(implementing and sustaining) of this 
pathway? 
To examine the negative culture and 
behaviours affecting the compliance and 
relate these to the post implementation 
evaluation. 
How does this compare to other pathway 
changes? 
To identify these negative differences 
between this intervention and other 
Enterprise Culture changes. 
What enabled positive compliance to the 
pathway? 
To examine the positive culture and 
behaviours affecting the compliance and 
relate these to the post implementation 
evaluation. 
How does this compare to other pathway 
changes? 
To identify these positive differences 
between this intervention and other 
Enterprise Culture changes. 
What are your views on indicators and 
targets when complying with the pathway 
changes? 
To identify if there any types of indicator 
that affect decisions to provide care. 
Results from the interviews showed general beliefs common to all participants (one 
consultant, one registrar, one business manager and a senior nurse).  Table 7.2 
demonstrates how themes (denoted by bold type at the top of each box) were 
developed from a sample of quotes coded from the transcripts and in appendix 5 an 
example coded transcript is recorded. 
Table 7.2: Key themes from the interviews 
Intervention success: 
 ‘Everybody’s had their chance (to 
contribute to the intervention). If 
you listen hard to what people are 
saying and doing what they’re 
Influence of the Four hour wait target: 
 ‘There should be something, a target 
to achieve otherwise we’ll just go back 
to twelve hour waits’. 
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saying they feel that this is not 
being done to us’.   
 The intervention has ‘ensured that 
these patients are dealt with 
appropriately, they’re not hanging 
around’. 
 
 ‘So any patient sometimes, if they are 
close to four hours, they are plucked 
from A&E and dumped in CDU as an 
observation patient. Or sometimes if 
doctors are slow or they pick up a 
patient at the third hour - so they 
might not finish the full assessment by 
four hours’. 
 ‘The management trying to meet the 
four hour targets when it precedes the 
patients safety’. 
Staff availability: 
 ‘If we see 150 patients a day and 
50% are ambulance patients, junior 
doctors can see one ambulance 
patient an hour. It cannot work 
with our numbers’. 
 ‘There are training issues as well. If 
you see in these last two years the 
changeover of staff then a lot of 
staff left, a lot have been recruited. 
Most of them are undertrained and 
lack basic skills sometimes and 
these things impact on the work of 
A&E.’ 
Organisational relationships: 
 Emergency department patients 
‘weren’t given the same credence in 
CDU’. 
Firstly, the overall perception was that the intervention had led to greater patient 
management and care and as a result was successful.  This success was attributed to 
staff involvement in defining the issue and the process by which to resolve it which was 
deemed to be in contrast to a more common approach of ‘being told how bad we are 
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and where we need to change’.  Common resentment was evident of criticism the 
Emergency Department received in performance of meeting patient demand, rather 
than performing clinical tasks. 
Barriers preventing compliance with improvement interventions were seen to be caused 
by the predominance of the four hour wait target in setting patient management 
activities.  Although it should be noted that the influence of the four hour target was a 
key theme and seen as useful as an aim to prevent patients ‘waiting twelve hours’ in the 
Emergency Department which some staff remembered as routine performance from 
before the target was introduced.  However, this view was qualified with the need to 
balance time based targets with other measures.  
The provision of adequate, well trained staff to deliver quality care and participate in 
improvements was another key theme.  One participant recommended that staff levels 
were calculated as a percentage of patient demand with a weighting to consider 
additional staff time for by patients arriving by ambulance. The participant wanted to 
draw attention to his perception that ‘we have more ambulance patients (as a percent 
of the total attendances) than other hospitals I have worked at’.  Staff availability was 
seen as a barrier to participating in and following improvement interventions.  However, 
concerns were raised about the staff who were present because of perceived training 
and clinical competence issues and unfamiliarity with the hospital caused by high levels 
of staff turnover and a reliance on agency nurses and doctors.   
The final key theme concerned the relationships present in the hospital and how the 
Emergency Department was perceived in the local health care environment.  Emergency 
Department staff felt that patients attending the department were seen ‘as their 
problem’ by the rest of the hospital and the wider emergency care system.  
Acknowledgement was also made of a sometimes ‘fractious’ relationship with the 
Operations Centre managers and other parts of the hospital emergency care system.  
Other barriers to implementing improvement interventions were: 
 Policy decision makers not working in or understanding rural health care and 
rural patient needs to care for patients ‘spread thinly’ over a large geographic 
catchment area. 
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 A lack of consultant presence to make decisions, particularly around ‘whether 
to admit patients’. 
 A significant cultural tension from clinical staff who do not ‘believe in’ a target 
outcome. 
The intervention was viewed positively by the participants because it addressed a 
performance gap that clinical staff identified as a local need - rather than a response to 
central or managerial directives. This was considered important and the ‘right thing’ for 
patients.  Clinical staff had their views sought and included in the in the intervention.  
Although, this intervention was viewed as a clinically driven, patient focused resolution 
to a local issue, no comments were made by the participants about the proportion of 
non-compliances. 
Targets and indicators were not so enthusiastically received, however.  One participant, 
for example, did not believe that full compliance was possible or necessary, stating that 
decisions on patients’ care were ‘likely to be based on the patient in front of you and 
complying for all patients could be a waste of time’.  Another participant agreed and 
considered that targets and indicators were good, but needed to be triangulated against 
quality of care, patient experience and time.  The use of targets and indicators were 
accepted but the performance needed the ‘hows’ which were deemed appropriate 
staffing and training to perform well.  As noted, no assessment of the low compliance 
rate was mentioned, which may have been due to the lack of mechanisms to monitor 
the indicators and the desire to qualify performance against with quality factors.   
Other notable findings from the interviews were an open acknowledgement of 
relationship issues between the A&E and CDU departments and an effect on patient 
waits which corroborates the findings from the ethnographic study.  Emergency 
Department patients were seen as an Emergency Department problem and not as 
patients in a multi-disciplinary process unaffected by organisational boundaries.  
Additionally, managers had faith in a move towards a national ambulatory care model 
in the future and believed the intervention was a step towards this.  
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7.5 Discussion 
In evaluating the hypothesis that the Enterprise Culture framework in the Emergency 
Department is successful in achieving quality and efficiency improvements, the 
following key aspects of the PPP framework were identified. Firstly, the intervention and 
its success criteria addressed local needs which are identified as desirable factors in the 
effective use of performance indicators and improvements to efficiency and quality 
(Turner et al., 2013b).  Additionally, the process was well defined and captured the 
expertise of a wide group of stakeholders who had a clear view of the purpose in their 
approach to problem solving that Womack et al. consider important (2007), although 
involvement from participants within the Emergency Department was limited for the 
reasons already noted.  Finally, the effect of clinical managers guiding participants’ 
knowledge to improve performance of a clearly defined purpose demonstrated 
fundamental principles of PPP framework problem solving methods (Turner et al., 
2013b). 
However, sustained and complete compliance was not achieved and other key aspects 
of PPP were absent. All performance ‘is the result of a process’ (Womack, 2005, 3), but 
to achieve success, people must enact the process unless a need to resolve an 
immediate problem occurs (Womack et al., 2007).  Some evidence of the departmental 
relationship concerns from the ethnographic study described in chapter 7 remained 
when studying the efficacy of the intervention and may have also contributed to non-
compliance.   In particular, because of reliance on agency staff, people may not have 
been or felt fully competent in enacting the process.  Training new staff to be competent 
in local procedures is especially difficult where permanent, experienced staff were 
engaged in clinical activities to the extent that they were not available for development 
and training. 
Because the intervention’s indicators were not monitored, or evidenced by the receiving 
CDU, resolution of performance issues was not possible and failure to comply was only 
evidenced anecdotally and without closure of the issue.  A dichotomous phenomenon 
was revealed through the evaluation of the intervention.  Although the expectation was 
originally for the intervention target to be for 100% of observation patients to have a 
care plan and drug chart however in the interviews this was seen as excessive and a 
153 
 
potential reason for non-compliance (clinical discretion rather than the predominance 
of process).  Additionally, there was a common theme for the process to be monitored 
through periodic audit (which would sample a small number of patients using the 
process and add delay to improvements) rather than a continuous review of all patients.  
Continuous review of patients would ensure that any problems could be addressed and 
either immediately resolved or put in abeyance (if appropriate) using a PPP monitoring 
system.  The possibilities to make improvements to efficiency and quality enabled 
through this Enterprise Culture intervention are limited because of the measurement 
system. 
Although the intervention represented a localised issue for emergency care patients, it 
did not address the key purpose of the Enterprise Culture: achievement of the four-hour 
wait targets.  Observation patients account for an average of twelve out of the daily of 
133 daily attendances, but the consultants’ choice of intervention was not based on 
quantified information, rather on what felt right clinically and what would make an 
improved service. An intervention to provide capacity to meet demand and relieve four 
hour wait pressures would have relied on resources throughout the emergency care 
system, not just internally to the Emergency Department or even the hospital, but 
involving ambulance providers (acute and patients transport), NHS primary care and 
commissioning Trusts and care homes for example.  The limitations of organisational 
restraints and internal departmental rigidity may have affected the selection. 
The intervention could not proceed as it was originally intended: to address the research 
hypothesis using an adequate sample of participants and an unrestricted methodology. 
The limitations from structural barriers to research both in terms of planning the 
method (potential participants and sample restrictions to evaluate the intervention 
efficacy) and in the live setting (the lack of availability of participants and the effect of 
losing a consultant from the study) presented a limitation to the study.  However, the 
limitations provided useful outcomes, firstly as an introduction to the difficulties of such 
enquiries to an aspiring researcher but also as a key finding to the limitations of a small 
Emergency Department to actually enact the underpinning principles of improvement 
from the Enterprise Culture policy. Reflecting on the difficulties of planning such an 
enquiry in a small, rural Emergency Department, I considered alternative preparation 
and methods that would have mitigated against the problems I encountered at the 
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planning stage.  Although initial investigations into the restrictions of staff and 
alternative methods could have been employed, I remain confident that the justification 
to proceed was reasonable.  Importantly, I also question whether using an alternative 
should have been considered:  PPP demands that the best people are used as leaders, 
mentors and problem solvers and showing that they are not available through the 
Enterprise Culture is a significant finding. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Through this intervention the research has: 
 Identified structural barriers to research in a rural DGH. 
 Introduced an intervention in this live setting. 
 Conducted research to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention given the 
structural barriers. 
These findings are useful to clinicians looking to introduce similar interventions and 
future researchers in comparable live settings.  
Although a process capable of resolving a locally identified performance issue was 
implemented, problems with availability of competent staff to enact it affected its 
efficacy. The availability of sufficient experienced staff was also evident in the limitations 
of applying the protocol and validating the research.   Pressure to achieve the four-hour 
target and inadequate volume of staff who were competent in enacting the process 
were responsible for the below expected compliance.   
The intervention did not widely test the Enterprise Culture’s ability to achieve quality 
and efficiency aims, however the effects from the failure to follow the PPP framework 
in such a study presents a concern.  Insufficient evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that the Enterprise Culture in the case study Emergency Department was 
successful in achieving quality and efficiency improvements. 
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8 Discussion: Meeting the Needs of the Local Emergency Care System 
8.1 Introduction 
The development and aspirations of the Enterprise Culture are now reconsidered in light 
of the findings from the study.  Tensions between policy and local emergency care needs 
and other effects of the Enterprise Culture in a rural District General Hospital (DGH) are 
summarised and the limitations of the research are discussed.  Conclusions about the 
efficacy of the Enterprise Culture are also considered. The gaps between the Enterprise 
Culture and the Purpose, Process, People (PPP) framework and potential ways to 
address the critical gaps within an emergency care system are discussed along with 
recommendations for policy. 
The purpose of the chapter is to address the fourth research question: How can the 
private enterprise best practice framework or other best practice methods be 
introduced to meet the needs of the local emergency care system?  
8.2 Review of the Enterprise Culture Purpose 
The Enterprise Culture emerged from the convergence of health policy as the major 
British political parties started to address financial pressures through the adoption of 
commercial best practice to create efficiency and quality (Wall and Owen, 2003, 34-39).  
A reduction of state monopoly in health care provision and acceptance of commercial 
practices was argued to be a policy move to tackle poor performance in cost control, 
equity in health care provision and inefficiencies (Turner et al., 2013a).  Short electoral 
cycles and a focus on health care provision rather than health improvement have 
impacted on the efficacy of this policy, however. The cost to benefit return of the 
increased spend in health care provision under the policy also remains a point of debate 
(Pollock, 2005, 260).  
The Enterprise Culture has several defining elements.  Firstly, many targets and 
indicators are used to measure performance – within Emergency Departments this is 
predominantly the four hour wait target. This target was introduced following 
consultation to form the National Health Service (NHS) plan (Department of Health 
2000, 2001). Despite wider, health outcome based indicators being introduced following 
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clinical pressure (Department of Health, 2011a), the four hour target remains key to 
Emergency Department performance at the case site.  Although some success is 
recorded in meeting central performance target expectations, failure to meet the 
Enterprise Culture targets incurs punitive sanctions, and in order to publish acceptable 
performance figures, gaming, confounded data and a culture of suspicion and fear have 
developed (Turner et al. 2013b).  Targets are centrally defined and administered through 
a command and control framework, backed-up with government agencies which 
regulate and assure performance (Turner et al., 2013a).  Further criticisms of the use of 
summative targets within the Enterprise Culture emphasise their potential to draw focus 
away from local innovation and improvement. 
Centralised performance targets were to be achieved through decentralised elements 
of the Enterprise Culture.  Front-line managers in the NHS are employed to improve 
efficiency as they would in commercial organisations but are not empowered or in 
control of the performance outcome as commercial managers would be (Turner et al., 
2013a, 2013b).   The NHS uses complex systems which contain fragmented processes 
which run across rigid organisational structures which can comprise difficult social 
relationships (Turner et al., 2013b). Central government control and a lack of local 
ownership place managers in a position of potentially being victims of political blame 
for local performance issues (Baggott, 2007, 153).  To support the management 
function, some of the power formerly taken by consultants was transferred to certain 
management levels as the Enterprise culture developed.  This shift of power engendered 
clinical opposition and led to some difficult working relationships (Wall and Owen, 2003, 
55-71; Hunter, 2003, 70). 
The decentralised market system was also introduced and developed through the 
Enterprise Culture in order to exploit the efficiencies that should have been generated 
through performance indicators and managers. The market system is intended to 
achieve this exploitation through commissioning health care provision from providers 
whose competitive performance makes their service more attractive.  This applies to 
providers who are both internal and external to the NHS.  Internal markets aim to 
generate competition through rivalries between NHS providers and thereby inform and 
influence patient choice and commissioning decisions).  External markets aim to 
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generate costs savings and efficiencies through commissioning possibilities with 
commercial health care providers. 
The PPP framework, which underpins the reasoning behind the Enterprise Culture, 
differs from health policy in some significant ways. Centralised command and control 
practices, managers lacking competence in PPP techniques and rigid organisational 
structures are prevalent in the Enterprise Culture.  In contrast, the private sector best 
practice delivers more localised, value-based solutions through the empowered 
managers and people within the PPP framework.   
The PPP framework requires a clearly defined purpose which enables progress towards 
the organisation’s priorities.  Processes are the means by which performance towards 
the purpose is generated and should be designed without organisational or structural 
barriers. This study has shown that processes and the productivity rates required to 
meet performance and purpose measures can be analysed so that adequate levels of 
capacity can be provided to meet demand, but that relevant and detailed data is 
required to perform the analysis.  This analysis should consider variation in demand 
patterns and match capacity to demand to avoid queues forming in the process.  
Performance indicators can be developed to allow immediate issue resolution when 
necessary. When these process elements are designed, competent people can enter the 
process in order to fulfil the purpose that the process is there to achieve. An empowered 
process owner resolves issues through coaching and mentoring people rather than 
motivation for performance being issued through a central command and control 
regime. 
The literature describes that the primary purpose of the Enterprise Culture in Emergency 
Departments (although acknowledged as a target originally intended to promote 
hospital wide emergency care performance) is measured through the central four hour 
wait target.  This does not correlate with the PPP use of indicators as a means of 
identifying opportunities for improvement through value-driven local outcomes. 
158 
 
8.3 Research Discussion 
8.3.1 Introduction to the Discussion 
The research examined the Enterprise Culture prevalent in the Emergency Department 
of a rural District General Hospital (DGH) and its ability to achieve the underlying policy 
aim to improve efficiency from two aspects.  Firstly the Emergency Department’s ability 
to meet the central, four hour wait target was studied and secondly the department’s 
ability to resolve a locally defined issue through intervention was examined. These 
aspects are discussed within the context of the purpose of the Enterprise Culture and 
the PPP framework that policy aims to adopt in order to create efficiencies. 
As discussed in chapter 2, studies in the literature similar to my own follow three 
themes. 
1. The efficiency and quality aspects of health policy  
2. The systemic nature of Emergency Care 
3. Holistic studies which combine efficiency and complex systems 
From these themes, gaps were identified where my research has the potential to add 
new knowledge.   
My research had similarities with other studies in evaluating interventions to improve 
efficiency and quality aims arising from health policy, such as examinations of patient 
waiting time and the four hour target.  Other similar studies have examined the 
application of PPP based improvements to increase efficiencies. However, whilst other 
research acknowledges targets as a policy driven aim, my study has examined the 
intervention and potential application of PPP techniques through a critique of the way 
that the hospital’s emergency care system was shaped through the Enterprise Culture. 
This study considered the Emergency Department’s place within wider emergency care 
system, although at a much more detailed level than Brailsford et al. (2004).  This 
allowed a qualitative assessment of the hospital entity within the system – and to some 
extent the nature of the market relationship with commissioners. Although this is an 
incomplete account of the dynamics of the system when compared to Braislford et al.’s 
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work (2004), it does provide a greater understanding of agency as a causal mechanism 
and recommendations about how that may be modelled in the whole system to add a 
full systemic assessment that expands on Brailsford’s work.  
Importantly, in my study of the application of the Enterprise Culture in a rural DGH, a 
gap in the literature, an evaluation is made of the effects of how far health policy goes 
in realising the real benefits of the PPP framework.  The effects of agency from the 
people in the system is a key difference from the focus that other studies have on the 
best processes to create improvements within Emergency Departments. 
8.3.2 Centralised Target 
8.3.2.1 Purpose Considerations 
The PPP framework emphasises the importance of a clear purpose and the Enterprise 
Culture specifies this for hospital emergency care principally through the four hour wait 
target. However this target contains limitations that do not meet private sector best 
practice.   
Two key limitations are evident from this research. Firstly, that the target is centrally 
defined and does not address local needs such as patient case mix, the geographic or 
other location factors or other demand or systemic factors within the hospital 
emergency care system. A key function of targets and indicators identified from the 
literature is to address the needs of local service users (Turner et al. 2013a).  However, 
the command and control influence of the centralised, summative target has led to the 
operational consequences discussed below. 
Secondly, the target is not a representative measure of the policy expectation to 
generate efficiency and quality, nor is it able to address its specific purpose: to facilitate 
improvement to the efficacy of emergency care provision within the hospital.  The 
imbalance of hospital capacity provided to meet demand within the Emergency 
Department does not allow consistent performance or target achievement.  Some of the 
capacity restrictions are seen to be caused by the isolated nature of the Emergency 
Department, attributable to organisational barriers which prevent systemic efficiency at 
a hospital level.   
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Importantly, another aspect to systemic efficiency improvement is missing in the target. 
No consideration was observed in this study for the hospital’s function within the local 
emergency care system (other than from pressure from the commissioner 
representatives) neither was any focus given to how systemic factors from other 
organisations within the system would affect performance. The target does not consider 
the hospital’s role within the local emergency care system or how wider relationships 
and capacity and demand factors affect holistic emergency care provision.  This tension 
is discussed in greater depth in the recommendations section.  
8.3.2.2 Process Considerations 
The effects of the Enterprise Culture four hour wait target extend into the operational 
activities of the case site. The importance of a well-planned process to meet the defined 
purpose is frequently documented in this thesis. Key elements include analysis of 
capacity and demand profiles which are required to calculate productivity rates using 
techniques such as Little’s Law and takt-time rates to avoid phenomena such as the spike 
in discharges at 240 minutes and, as discussed in chapter 6, the need to care for patients 
in wards not suited to their clinical needs.  Although data are available to calculate this 
at a departmental level, a more detailed view of patient cohorts is necessary to plan 
productivity to consistently meet the target.   
Despite the argued need for a clearly defined process and competent people to enact it, 
the research found that the process for moving patients through the hospital’s 
emergency care system was not sufficiently well defined. No monitoring activities were 
in place to measure performance and address issues as they happened.  Instead of a 
mechanism to immediately resolve performance issues, the Emergency Department 
relied on audits that were not contemporaneous (and which were performed by staff 
outside the emergency care system) which added delay to improvement opportunities 
and patient care.  
The PPP framework places great importance on processes, however the case site did not 
use robust processes to achieve its care purposes.  The Enterprise Culture present in the 
case site did not lead to the adoption of practices that health policy is created to achieve. 
This lack of planning would be under the accountability of managers – both in the 
Enterprise Culture and the PPP framework.  However in the Enterprise Culture, 
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managers were not supported to produce this level of planning.  The fearful and 
reactionary nature of managers’ actions and the pressure placed on managers through 
the command and control nature of the Enterprise Culture (discussed in the next 
section) prevented this. However, it is uncertain that managers would have been given 
the opportunity to develop competence in, or knowledge of PPP planning.  No evidence 
of developing managers in PPP techniques was found in the review of the policy 
documents, observations from the research or the interview process. 
8.3.2.3 People considerations 
A key role of a manager in the Enterprise Culture is to enable efficiency improvements, 
although as discussed this appears to be an impractical expectation considering the 
research findings.  Similarly, the PPP framework relies on managers to facilitate 
improvement although it realises this through coaching and mentoring methods which 
empower a competent workforce.  The Enterprise Culture reality of managers reacting 
to performance issues to achieve a centralised target represents a key gap from PPP and 
the adverse consequences of the command and control system seen in the literature. 
The role of a manager within the Enterprise Culture has been shown by this research to 
have an unclear function.  Pressure from political entities (commissioners and central 
government for example) creates a need to intervene with operational activities in order 
to achieve a target largely out of their control. Pressure from clinicians and inter-
departmental barriers has also been seen to exacerbate this problem and, as noted in 
the literature, managers remain unpopular with the public (Learmonth, 1997, 216-220).  
Given the consequences of this pressure and the failure to prepare managers to lead 
towards PPP framework improvements, as noted above, poor performance decisions 
and outcomes are unsurprising.  This also leads to a question about the real function of 
Enterprise Culture managers: given the unrealistic expectations, managers absorb the 
consequences of performance, whether this is an inadvertent effect of policy or a 
political move by design is an area for further research.  The effect of reactive decision 
making on health outcomes poses potential risks and presents another area for future 
research. 
The premise of achieving excellence through a robust process is that only staff who are 
competent of enacting the process requirements can enter it.  This research found that 
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this was not possible within the case site’s Enterprise culture largely because of the lack 
of defined and documented process, but also because of the reliance on agency staff 
who did not have a tacit knowledge of the hospital.  The Enterprise Culture was unable 
to provide a means to identify or resolve such serious issues as matching discharges to 
admission in a manner which would allow beds to be free for patients that required 
them.  The hospital made similar discharges to admissions each day (otherwise the 
hospital would constantly expand), however the imbalance between admission and 
discharge times caused queueing and reactive decisions throughout the hospital’s 
emergency care system. 
The organisational structure of independent departments with their own performance 
expectations encouraged process fragmentation and the culture of tension observed.  
The relationships that were observed as a result of the barriers to harmonious 
relationships between departments (and agency staff unfamiliarity with working 
practices) did not correspond with the PPP framework of unimpeded, horizontal flow 
for the patient.  
8.3.2.4 Conclusion of Centralised Target Discussion 
Although the purpose defined through the Enterprise Culture is clear through the four 
hour wait target (and timely care was stated to be an important aspect of emergency 
care by some interviewees in the research) it is not representative of the emergency 
care system or locally generated to meet that system’s needs. In fact, this isolated target 
seems to focus distinction within the system by defining Emergency Department 
patients seen as ‘their problem’. 
The target could be attained if capacity and productivity were calculated using PPP 
techniques, but this would require a wider, systemic perspective and more complete, 
relevant data.  Furthermore, a more structured process, trained and competent staff, 
and empowered managers would be necessary. As the process of providing emergency 
care crosses existing departmental barriers, two options are presented:  
1. A local owner of the emergency care process is introduced whose authority 
crosses all boundaries and is an empowered decision maker, or  
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2. A new organisational entity is introduced that contains the whole emergency 
care system within the hospital. 
The PPP framework achieves its success through a clearly defined purpose target.  The 
four hour wait target for Emergency Care, although important, represents a patient’s 
entitlement within the system.  Non-achievement of this target is the effect of 
imbalances of capacity and demand in the system.  To manage this entitlement and 
other unnecessary queues in the system (for example the Delayed Transfers of Care 
(DTOC) patients seen in the research), I argue that a systemic review should be 
undertaken.  This review should address the key problems and questions which face 
those planning the emergency care system and a discussion of this review is given in the 
Recommendations section.     
Given the Enterprise Culture’s clear purpose, the PPP framework then requires a defined 
process. Toyota’s maxim of average people managing brilliant processes demands that 
the process is more influential than the people.  That does not mean the people should 
be automatons, but simply that the coaching and other structures are there to empower 
them when needed.  The research clearly shows that in the case site the people are 
more influential than the process.   For the health policy responsible for the Enterprise 
Culture to truly achieve its central target, a further recommendation for improvement 
would be to follow the PPP framework and define the process, then ensure that staff 
are competent to enact them and managers are competent to support the staff to 
resolve problems and make improvement.   At the case site level, given the 
organisational barriers and reliance on agency staff training staff to be competent in the 
process, this would be a difficult task: although the intervention showed that it is 
possible.  
8.3.3 Locally Defined Issue 
8.3.3.1 Process Considerations 
The concerns associated with using a central target and insufficiently defined process 
were partly addressed when staff designed and implemented a process to address a 
local health care need.  Innovation was achieved and the process extended between two 
organisational departments which addressed a wider aspect of the hospital’s emergency 
care system. 
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However further evidence of the failure to prepare staff to understand or implement 
PPP methods through the Enterprise Culture was seen.  The process was given an 
associated measure and target but no monitoring was available to generate 
improvement.  The same reliance on the audit culture to inform quality improvement 
was implemented.  The targeted performance was not met and despite the process and 
target being locally developed, evidence was found in the interviews that some staff did 
not believe the process should be applied in all cases.  
The influence of the central target four hour wait target remained evident. The pressure 
to achieve the central target was clearly greater than the need to follow the process in 
some observations. 
8.3.3.2 People Considerations 
Although the process was developed by staff within the system and addressed local 
needs, barriers between departments remained.  Following the intervention there was 
still evidence of relationship issues and the concern that an Emergency Department 
patient was an Emergency Department problem. This could be because the barriers 
remain deeply rooted problems and significantly because of the reliance on agency staff. 
However relationship issues between clinical staff could also be attributed to the 
minimal instruction (staff briefing, an explanatory email and an amendment to the 
departmental handbook) given to the people who enacted the process.  All of these 
reasons represent a departure from the PPP framework expectation that only 
competent people enter the process. 
Consultants leading an intervention did however, lead to a quick design and 
implementation.  Clinical staff involvement in leading the intervention was a key 
observation from the interviews and, despite the limitations of measurement of 
performance and relationships discussed above, this approach did lead to inter-
departmental agreement for patient care.  Management involvement was restricted to 
supporting the ratification of the change at governance committees which shows a more 
proactive role for clinicians.  In this study consultant’s power, although challenged in the 
literature, did not appear diminished at the expense of managers’ authority.   
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However, the choice of intervention may have reflected structural barriers resulting 
from individual nature of consultants’ work or other organisational barriers.  The 
intervention did not look to address the central target which clearly remained a highly 
influential factor on the Emergency Department, and hospital emergency care system 
operational activities.  It did however address a local need which is aligned to PPP 
framework expectations. An area for further research could be an examination of the 
influence and limitations consultants have on change activities. 
8.3.3.3 Conclusion of Local Issues Discussion 
An examination of the intervention undertaken within the Enterprise Culture confirms 
the conclusion from the discussion of the central target. The central target remained a 
highly influential aspect of the Enterprise Culture activities within the case site. People 
had more influence in performance outcome than the process did, whether driven by 
pressure from the four hour target or not being fully competent in enacting the process. 
8.3.4 Conclusions to the Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the final research question: How can the 
private enterprise best practice framework or other best practice methods be 
introduced to meet the needs of the local emergency care system? Several themes 
emerge from the discussions which conclude that neither the four hour wait target, nor 
the local needs were met through the Enterprise Culture in place at the case study site. 
However, clear recommendations can be drawn to use the PPP framework to support 
local needs.  
Firstly, the central target does not necessarily represent the needs or local issues of the 
emergency care system examined, but does have a great influence on operational 
activities. As discussed above, timely care is an important entitlement of emergency care 
but one which can be facilitated through balancing capacity with demand. Although this 
target may well remain a policy directive and local commissioning target, better 
understanding of the target’s influence within the local emergency care system – in 
particular to commissioners – could generate a review of wider systemic needs and how 
to measure them. 
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Secondly, a review of the demand for local emergency care, both within the hospital and 
within the context of the whole system’s care providers, is necessary in order to 
understand the capacity needed to meet it.  In section 8.4, I will develop the 
recommendations and suggest a method to undertake this review as an opportunity for 
further research.   
Thirdly, the adherence to the process would require greater attention by those enacting 
it. This study has demonstrated that the people component of the system studied has a 
demonstrably greater influence than the process component.  A robust process can be 
amended through continuous monitoring and adjustment through well trained 
managers and competent staff.  A further requirement of the process would be the 
removal of organisational barriers. 
Finally, a review of the culture is necessary to provide competent people to enter the 
process and empowered and skilled managers to generate efficiency improvements.  
Existing, deeply rooted organisational barriers and practical problems of providing 
sufficient levels of permanent staff are difficult areas to address.  These could be taken 
as individual topics for further research. 
The Enterprise Culture has not replicated the framework that underpinned private 
sector success. However, many opportunities exist in emergency care to adopt the 
private sector’s best practices to improve service delivery.   
8.4 Developing the Recommendations 
8.4.1 Introduction 
As noted above, a major concern from the findings of the research was the inability of 
the policy present under the Enterprise Culture to match capacity and productivity rates 
to the demands of patients attending the Emergency Department in order to meet a 
defined purpose.  This concern was identified within the process of Emergency 
Department and the hospital within their function of the emergency care system.  
However a wider system issue remains, both within the hospital and the emergency care 
system of which it is a part. 
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Complexity theory considers “emergence”, where “interactions among components 
both with each other and with the whole of which they are part are constitutive 
properties of systems” (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014, 22).  Within an emergency care 
system defining these component parts, possibly an Emergency Department, hospital, 
care home, (or at a lower level clinical tasks and spaces) and their interactions is 
necessary as a “metaphor” to develop an account of causal powers structures within the 
system (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014, 39-56). 
8.4.2 Methodology 
In chapter 5, I argued that complexity theory addressed the complex interactions found 
within the structures of Enterprise Culture.  The deductive theory selected for this 
research used dominant quantitative, less dominant qualitative elements.  The 
dominant quantitative element aimed to examine the organisational and procedural 
nature of the PPP framework which the Enterprise culture seeks to adopt, and the 
qualitative techniques to develop a framework to explore the expected causal 
relationships. 
The findings of the research, however, reveal that the Enterprise Culture present in the 
case site is often more influenced by behavioural complexities: people are more 
influential than processes.  The workforce relationships observed were not the same as 
those seen in private sector best practice. 
Although the Enterprise Culture looks to adopt the PPP framework, including the 
importance of following process, its efficacy is compromised because of the causal 
influence arising from relationships and social complexities.  This raises an ontological 
concern about the social reality studying the Enterprise Culture and the role of process 
and organisational laws in understanding complex social world issues. Byrne and 
Callaghan argue that within their ontology “emergence underpins the whole social 
world” and that in “epistemological terms there is no transcendental reality to be 
described only in terms of mathematical formalisms” (2014, 209).  Although I agree with 
this statement, I remain committed to the potential for improvement that strong 
mathematical formalism such as Little’s Law and takt time can provide within an 
individual system component. These formalisms have shown empirically the potential 
for optimisation and effectiveness such as Ng et al.’s work which led to improvements 
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to patient flow within an Emergency Department: reducing waiting times and improving 
patient satisfaction (2010). 
In complexity theory, computer simulation models are used to provide a metaphor of 
the system (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014, 41-56). Computer simulation metaphors are 
used dynamically (to show changes through time and interaction of components) which 
can demonstrate change (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014, 162) and test scenarios 
(Maidstone, 2012). This allows decision makers using the simulations to “reach correct 
conclusions about the net impacts of interventions in systems with many interacting 
actors, multiple goals, and conflicting interests” (Milstein et al., 2010, 811).  Brailsford 
and Hilton note the benefits of simulation in health care decision making analysis 
praising its “flexibility, ability to deal with variability and uncertainty” and its 
understandable usability with health care professionals (2001, 1). 
8.4.3 Simulation in Emergency Care 
Two simulation methods are discussed and compared by Brailsford and Hilton in their 
2001 paper considering the most appropriate simulation method with which to form 
health care models; Discrete Events and System Dynamics.  Discrete Events simulations 
model systems in the form of networks comprising queues and activities (Brailsford and 
Hilton, 2001, 1; Maidstone, 2012).  System components are modelled as discrete units 
of activity (patient triage for example) and entities (patients for example) progress 
through the system as a “series of discrete events” (Maidstone, 2012, 1).  An entity’s 
progress is based on the characteristics of the activity durations at discrete points in 
time before the move to the next queue.  For example, an aspect of the Emergency 
Department could be viewed in figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1: An example extract of an Emergency Department Discrete Events model. 
 
The number of patients within each activity or queue is shown below each box. Patients 
progress through the system based on the characteristics, for example severity of illness 
or age and a logical sequence of activities.  If, for example, a patient requires a doctor 
assessment but both doctors are occupied, the patient must queue until a doctor 
becomes available. The time that a doctor would need to assess a patient is based on 
samples for “probability distributions” of the patient’s characteristics (Brailsford and 
Hilton, 2001, 1). 
System Dynamics simulations model networks continuously through a series of stocks, 
flows and delays (Brailsford and Hilton, 2001, 1, Maidstone, 2012). The stocks represent 
a quantitative build-up of units and the flows represent a means of the unit moving into 
or out of a stock based on a rate of flow from the delay.  Maidstone asserts a key 
difference between System and Dynamic Discrete Event simulations: System Dynamics 
“focuses more on flows around networks than on the [Discrete Events focus of the] 
individual behaviour of entities” (2012, 2). System Dynamics simulations can be also 
used qualitatively and tend to be used at a strategic level whereas Discrete Events are 
more often used to address operational level issues, for example to “solve resource 
allocation problems” (Brailsford and Hilton, 2001, 2). The qualitative aspect of System 
Dynamic simulations addresses identifying and representing the elements of the system 
which could “generate an influence in the problem situation” (Brailsford and Hilton, 
2001, 2) such as delays from specialty referrals to a patient waiting for admission in an 
Emergency Department. 
This combination of quantitative and qualitative aspects allows the modeller to 
represent and understand an identified problem by comprehending the problem’s 
Junior Doctors 2
Triage Nurses 5
Queue for 
triage Triage
Queue for 
Junior Dr 
Assessment
Junior Dr 
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4 1 3 2
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structure and the “relationship present between relevant variables” (Brailsford and 
Hilton, 2001, 2). 
An example System Dynamic representation of the Emergency Department extract is 
shown in figure 8.2. 
Figure 8.2: An example extract of an Emergency Department System Dynamic model. 
 
In figure 8.2, patients’ progress through the system based on the rate defined in the 
delay – in this simplistic model these are the ‘Triages per hour’ and ‘Dr assessments per 
hour’ which will pull patients out of the ‘Patients awaiting triage’ and ‘Patients awaiting 
Dr assessment’ stocks. Although characteristics are not defined to individuals as in a 
Discrete Events simulation, the patients can be grouped to show how they progress.  
Patients entering the system can be categorised, for example, as ill or severely ill if the 
rate of assessment is likely to be fewer for the latter group.  
Considering the most appropriate method to use when simulating health care systems, 
Brailsford and Hilton compare Discrete Events and System Dynamic methods (2001). 
They conclude that the answer may lie in the purpose of the model and give guidelines 
for value judgement when selecting the method.  Discrete Events are appropriate for 
operational and tactical decision making for optimisation or prediction for a small 
number of individuals who need to be tracked over a short period of time (Brailsford 
and Hilton, 2001, 13). System Dynamics are recommended for strategic and policy 
making decisions to gain an understanding of larger groups over longer periods of time 
(Brailsford and Hilton, 2001, 13).   
However in his 2012 paper, Maidstone adds a third, more recent, method to Brailsford 
and Hilton’s comparison. Agent Based simulation is “a relatively new method” 
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comprising autonomous agents which “follow a series of predefined rules to achieve 
their objectives whilst interacting with each other and their environment” (2012, 3).  The 
agents within the system “encapsulate the behaviours of the various individuals that 
make up the system” in order to understand how behavioural change affects the system 
performance (Parunak et al., 1998, 1). Byrne and Callaghan assert the usefulness of 
Agent Based simulation in understanding social complexity. Agent based simulations can 
provide a means to understand “what will happen if the rules describing agent 
behaviour are correct representations of the causal power of interactions among 
agents” (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014, 172). Agent Based simulation “is a very extreme 
example of a bottom up approach” to understanding complexity (Maidstone, 2012, 5) 
Although Discrete Events is the most widely used simulation method (Brailsford and 
Hilton, 2001, 1; Maidstone 2012, 1), System Dynamic simulation offers a simulation 
platform to focus on wider systems at a strategic level which consider the qualitative 
aspects of the system’s characteristics. Maidstone argues that Macal’s (2010) Agency 
Theorem for System Dynamics (that all System Dynamic simulations have an equivalent 
Agent Based simulation) leads to the potential for Agent Based simulations to meet or 
even outperform System Dynamics (2012, 5).  However, as Agent Based simulations are 
more time consuming to produce and operate (Maidstone, 2012, 5), System Dynamic 
simulations may be more practicable.  
However, both Maidstone (2012) and Brailsford and Hilton’s (2001) papers lead to the 
conclusion that the problem should determine the simulation method selected.  The 
two papers also agree about the potential problems that System Dynamics and Discrete 
Events simulation methods generally best address. Parunak et al., assert that Agent 
Based simulations are “most appropriate for domains characterized [sic] by a high 
degree of localization [sic] and distribution and dominated by discrete decisions” (1998, 
15). 
Research of simulations methods in emergency care has produced positive results.  For 
example, Brailsford et al., took a strategic approach using System Dynamic methods to 
model and simulate a whole emergency care system in order to address the issue of high 
emergency care demand in Nottingham (2004). Connelly and Bair use Discrete Events 
simulation to compare two triage methods (2004) and Wang provides an Agent Based 
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simulation to investigate Emergency Department performance under various settings 
(2009). 
However a full and up to date study of the most appropriate method to study rural 
English emergency care system represents a gap in the literature. A full comparison of 
all methods or combination of methods to address both lower level relationship and 
social complexities whilst balancing strategic level demand and care provision is also a 
gap. Further research should look to investigate this by defining a whole emergency care 
system, formulating the questions and problems to be addressed, selecting the most 
appropriate simulation method(s) and creating a model and simulation environment for 
decision makers to address the questions. 
From this research potential starting question is: 
 What care provision is necessary to meet the emergency care system’s demand 
and what alternative functions could be made to care for patients in a more 
appropriate place with minimal waiting? 
Additionally, with the current focus on integrated care to manage co-morbidities in the 
aging population (Department of Health, 2013), and the need for health care functions 
and staff to provide alternatives to traditional care methods, an additional question 
could be: 
 What aspect of the demand requires integrated care and what workforce is 
necessary to provide this care? 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 Contributions to the Researcher 
As stated in chapter 1, my initial aim from this research was to use the academic process 
to test whether the methods that I had successfully used in the private sector could 
achieve the same results in a rural NHS hospital.  As an engineer specifically recruited to 
the NHS management for my experience in designing and implementing efficiency and 
improvement projects, I was keen to make a positive impact on health care provision.   
Additionally, I saw this as an opportunity to add best practice to the growing body of 
evidence through an academic study.  As an aspiring researcher, I was drawn to the 
robust academic process, and the need for evidence-based best practice for efficiency 
improvements was high within Emergency Care provision.  Throughout the study, 
tensions and harmonies between the three personal aspects of engineer, NHS manager 
and researcher would frequently arise. 
My work as an engineer had taught me to follow a robust research methodology that I 
could largely relate to in the academic research process.  Clear research questions and 
aims, testable hypotheses and structured analysis, for example, were critical 
components of research in both sectors.  However, some differences were also obvious. 
Engineering research is commercially driven and is performed at a much faster pace than 
I could progress my academic research: for example if I was researching an vibration 
issue for a oil platform in the Persian Gulf, I would have a limited time to work as millions 
of barrels of oil would be waiting to be pumped, but access to considerable resources to 
aid me.  Although time pressured research might compromise quality, it was also a cause 
of great focus.   
For many good reasons, study at PhD level would not allow rapid application of research.  
Developing my research skills in literature review and methodology and an introduction 
to philosophical principles such as ontology and epistemology was often troublesome 
for a quantitatively focused statistical engineer, but was a great experience of learning 
and has added greatly to my ability as a researcher.  Other delays caused by the 
academic process were more frustrating and questionable in developing my ability as a 
researcher and producing timely and high quality outputs.  Although I strongly support 
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the need for ethical integrity, for example, the time needed for university, NHS trust and 
national research approval added considerable time demands and some inconsistent 
results. 
Timely research, however, has a very practical aspect in health care research above any 
concerns regarding my development as a researcher or the application of rapid 
engineering research.  The critical point that I observed through my study is that changes 
in the NHS (and in particular changes to policy and the operation of my case site) move 
at much faster pace than my PhD study and this exacerbated some of the barriers to 
research discussed in the limitations section.  The barriers to research in a rural DGH 
exposed me to a wider view of social science research and allowed a pragmatic 
application of methods and changes to protocol. This fitted very well into my experience 
of iterative design of experiments as an engineer but had the advantage of developing 
my qualitative and interpretative skill set.  However research must be carefully planned 
to ensure that the outcome is meaningful and applicable to contemporary issues. 
Timeliness of the research presented some other tensions on my dual role as NHS 
manager and researcher.  Senior clinical staff considered outputs from the academic 
process as highly credible and were enthusiastic to engage in research and improvement 
on that basis.  Conversely, some Directors within the NHS saw academic study as 
protracted and theoretical and were less tolerant of the time required for a PhD study 
as a means of achieving their improvement project as their need for delivery was 
immediate – a consistent reflection with the findings of Propper et al. (2008).  A view 
that I often considered was that, because of the abundance of data in the NHS, managers 
wanted answers (evidence and analysis) first and questions to be formed later.  The 
quality and relevance of the data were rarely questioned.  
Although I remain sympathetic to managers’ desire for timely, practical research (as I 
believe that service improvements should not be unnecessarily delayed), I feel that NHS 
management culture is often misguided.  During the project an often quoted phrase 
from Directors and Managers within the NHS was “doing nothing is not an option”.  As 
an engineer, doing nothing is always an option and in the absence of good testing it is 
sometimes the only option that doesn’t make things worse.  A further reflection of this 
study on my role as a Manager is the rhetoric of policy that presented to NHS staff: that 
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the patient is at the heart of the service. This may be a true intention, however 
examination of the Enterprise Culture would suggest that organsations and certain 
people, but not patients, are at the heart of policy. 
Some frustrations remain as a consequence of my study.  As an engineer, assessment of 
outputs is a largely objective process.  One might have to defend the use of 
mathematical approaches used in a solution or argue the interpretation of a statistic, 
but the formulae stand on their own merits.  At times, I found the evaluation of process 
of this study subjective, inconsistent and in some ways abstract when focusing on an 
evaluating individual’s own interests.  For example, what as an engineer I might regard 
as a testable hypothesis derived from evidence and pertinent to the outcome could be 
evaluated as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
In summary, developing as an academic researcher has been very rewarding and has 
added an important dimension to my quantitative focused skill set. The academic 
research process required wider consideration of philosophy and methodology, and the 
direction and support I received was far more challenging and holistic than I had 
experienced in engineering. Being supported by other engineers had not led me to 
widely develop skills and techniques that could have been pertinent to problem solving.  
As a consequence, I consider myself a better researcher and would now undertake many 
engineering projects with the same approaches that I would employ in health and social 
care research.  I will continue to develop the application of mixed methodologies as a 
critical way of evaluating and improving systems. 
9.2 Contributions to the Community of Practice 
Contributions to the community of practice draw together findings from the study in a 
logical pattern.  Firstly, the application of thinking at a systemic level; secondly, 
improving efficiencies at a process level within that system; thirdly, the effective use of 
managers, targets (and people) within that process. Although my research identifies 
theoretical improvement opportunities, the practical differences between the 
Enterprise Culture and PPP are discussed in this section. 
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9.2.1 Systemic Thinking 
My research discusses separate organisations found within the emergency care system, 
the departmental structures within those organisations, and the effects on patient care 
which arise from that fragmentation.  This is consistent with the literature review and 
the need to think systemically that Brailsford et al argue for (2004).  Considering the 
benefits of modelling, described in chapter 8, to better understand the system and plan 
for efficiency gains prompts an important question for application in the community of 
practice: how can organisations collaborate within a system to produce efficient 
emergency health care?  However, my research also focuses on the tensions between 
organisations and other influencing entities (government bodies, regulators, etc.) and 
drives another important question: can the organisations within the system collaborate 
effectively in the health economy?  
I intend to address both questions in the post-doctoral research outlined in chapter 8 
and both elements are used to develop the initial research question: 
What care provision is necessary to meet the emergency care system’s demand 
and what alternative functions could be made to care for patients in a more 
appropriate place with minimal waiting? 
Although these questions require further research, practical implications for managers 
involve identifying and removing organisational barriers which impede the flow of 
patient care.  This theory may not be practical however: an intervention in one 
Emergency Department was not sustained partly because of central targets and other 
elements of the prevailing Enterprise Culture.  Therefore, expecting this to be 
implemented across a whole health economy may not be realistic and the further 
research will need to be designed to explore this.  The question of rurality is also 
unresolved from the research but is of immense importance to the community of 
practice.  The presence of the Enterprise Culture and the effects from central target is 
clearly seen in this research and the reviewed literature. The theory of targets informing 
patient choice in an urban environment with multiple acute, mental health, community 
and primary carers may be practical.  However, in a remote and rural region where 
provider locations are spaced by up to 30 miles and public transport links are do not 
support such travel, the many patients do not get the choice that policy is designed to 
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achieve.  Managers of health commissioners and providers would need to consider the 
system within the policy framework in order to provide high quality care. Although 
further research is required to understand the possibilities for collaborative working and 
the agency of the actors within the system, an opportunity for consideration of providing 
a collaborative environment is possible. 
9.2.2 Process Implications 
Managers might be able to address systemic and organisation issues to gain holistic 
improvements to patient care, however processes within the system can be partly 
improved immediately (although the boundaries and function of these process may 
change as a result of a system review and removal of organisational boundaries). 
In chapters 5 and 6, I argued the need for analysis of the demand placed on the 
Emergency Department (or any provider in the system) and the capacity provided to 
meet it.  These data can be used to calculate takt-time and other indicators useful within 
the process, however as noted in the next section, implementation of this may be an 
unmanageable theory that managers cannot practice.   
The theories of capacity and demand analysis and calculation of takt-time were not 
directly testable in this study, but remain a key opportunity for managers in practice: 
along with subsequent defined processes and implementation of competent people.  
However, some of the limitations need to be addressed before this is possible: namely 
complete, relevant and accurate data and adaptable organisational structures.  The 
likelihood of the full application and potential benefits in the contemporary NHS seem 
remote.  
Further research is required to observe the effects of process improvement through 
capacity and demand analysis, however managers do have opportunity in the short-
term to test takt-time based scenarios and develop good data gathering techniques. 
9.2.3 Manager Implications 
I have noted that managers have the potential for considerable responsibilities in my 
reflections.  The expectations of managers through the Enterprise Culture may be 
misplaced, although there may be some ways that managers could use the findings of 
the research.  However, the continuation of the challenge to the Enterprise Culture 
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remains: are managers empowered enough to use the findings and, if they are, are they 
competent to implement them?   
I understand that this is a somewhat naïve assumption: that the Enterprise Culture is 
wholly responsible for the efficacy of managers.   Medical consultant power and the 
strength of the Royal Colleges, for example are often not controllable through 
managerial decisions.  However, these are not new arguments and the policies behind 
the Enterprise Culture have not addressed these influences but have still been 
developed to make efficiencies.  Therefore my reflections are based on the strength of 
policy to achieve the improvements for which it was written. 
Managers and senior clinicians have shown through this study an ability to intervene to 
address local improvement needs. However they were not able to meet the full 
potential of those needs or sustain and continuously respond to them.  In order to 
effectively manage local processes, for example, managers would need to factor central 
targets, such as the four hour wait, into the takt-time formula.  Although managers can 
use takt-time and other process indicators to monitor and control process performance, 
the influence of central targets is beyond their power. Even at a system level, Clinical 
Commissioning Groups are able to set local performance targets, however the central 
four hour remains how the Emergency Department and the trust are judged nationally. 
As health policy continues to develop targets and entities designed to support health 
care provision, an ironic rhetoric is also delivered to achieve a focus on care services and 
not organisations (Department of Health, 2016).  It is key for managers to focus on the 
quality and efficiency measurables for processes that they can control. Managers should 
also be aware of the processes defined above within the system.  And finally they should 
be able to consider how central targets affect the process and the system. 
When demand figures are available it is possible to plan the process, test it and make 
sure competent people enter it. When system knowledge is available a more integrated 
emergency care system can be planned. 
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9.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
Through this research, an understanding of the efficacy of the aims of health policy on 
a rural DGH, as implemented through the Enterprise Culture, has been explored.  The 
effects of how the Enterprise Culture has been developed and implemented in this 
environment were shown in the limitations of the hospital’s emergency care system to 
achieve the policy goals: 
 Firstly, to achieve the policy’s four hour target for patients’ time spent in the 
Emergency Department. 
 Secondly, to make localised efficiency improvements in line with private sector 
best practice. 
The Enterprise Culture has not prepared managers or clinicians to work in the PPP 
framework.  Knowledge of improvement techniques and access to credible data were 
not observed. Furthermore, the pressure from the centralised four hour target 
distracted focused from the improvements implemented.  Although managers could 
achieve the required level of competence through the Enterprise Culture if sufficient 
policy changes were made, whether they were fully effective in meeting the goals of 
policy noted above is still debated.  Policy makers should also consider the target setting 
and organisational structures within emergency care systems to enable managers to be 
more effective.  
The complex nature of health care systems is much wider, in terms of component 
organisations and causal mechanisms, than the policy behind the Enterprise Culture 
considers.  Decisions regarding patient care, the use of emergency care capacity and 
operational activities within the system must understand and consider the whole system 
when planning and measuring effective emergency care. 
This study has proposed potential methods which could be used to address and achieve 
the Enterprise Culture’s four hour wait target using private sector methods. Although a 
patient waiting for over four hours was not considered satisfactory by interviewees in 
the research, private sector best practice would deem any unnecessary waits or queues 
to be undesirable in any system.  An approach of understanding the relationships within 
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the wider emergency care system and balancing capacity and demand to remove such 
issues systemically is argued.    
Although Byrne and Callaghan state that simulation is “not uniquely the best mode 
through which a complex world can be investigated” (2014, 153), it does offer an 
important component of effective decision making.  At a strategic level simulation 
provides a method with which to consider capacity and demand dynamics with causal 
mechanisms for complexities arising from social and structural components.   
9.4 Limitations of the Research 
Some limitations to this study were caused by barriers to research arising from 
participant issues at the case site in a rural District General Hospital.  Firstly, as discussed 
in chapter 4, the availability of participants eligible to enrol in the study was limited 
which caused me to reflect on the protocol originally selected for the study. The original 
protocol was developed from theory as the most appropriate way of conducting the 
study to answer the research questions.  At the stage of enrolling participants to the 
protocol (which had been granted ethical approval) however, my reflections led to a 
pragmatic change in protocol to ensure that the most robust validation available was 
applied. Although this change to protocol limited the intended validation of the 
research, I considered that it still identified a significant representation of staff issues in 
a case site which was directly relevant to the application of the PPP framework and the 
prevalent Enterprise Culture at the case site. 
When participants were recruited, a second structural barrier arose when some became 
unable to contribute to the research as discussed in chapter 7.  Work pressure 
challenges and sickness absences prevented staff from attending planned protocol 
activities which added to the limitations of validating the research. However identifying 
these challenges and tensions generated further evidence to the issues related to the 
‘people’ aspect of policy implementation in the case site.   The effects of sickness and 
staff availability on the study led me to consider further the possibilities of validating my 
research findings.  Balancing a pragmatic combination of validation techniques with a 
method that was far removed from theory was challenging.  However, I chose to 
continue with a Delphi technique as the participants were on the border of the 
recommended lower limit (Bloor et al. (2015, 66).  
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A further significant limitation caused by barriers to research from participant issues 
arose when the Clinical Director, who had sponsored the study, announced his intention 
to leave the case site before the intervention had been confirmed (as discussed in 
chapter 7).  This caused the original, theoretical protocol to be changed through an 
improvised method of devising, implementing and evaluating the intervention.  
Although these changes again limited the research from its theoretical intents, they did 
provide further evidence of the reliance on people and not process within the case site 
and identified a departure of Enterprise Culture from the PPP framework.  Reflections 
from the Clinical Director were that the intervention must happen under his tenure 
because no substantive successor was available and there was a very high risk of the 
study not being able to continue after his departure. 
The limitations to the research from staff participation issues, which moved the study 
away from the original theoretical protocol, add context to a causal mechanism of the 
Emergency Department’s performance.  Not only were staff unable to participate in the 
study as planned, the effect of permanent staff availability was also seen in the high use 
of agency staff unfamiliar with the hospital. The stress on permanent staff was a true 
limitation to research, but a key expression of the pressures on the case site. 
More limitations to the study came from data gathering, analysis and interpretation. As 
a further consequence of pressures on the Clinical Director, the sample size for the 
review of patient notes compliant to the intervention was restricted to the time he was 
able to commit.  As discussed in chapter 4, the size of the sample and my concerns over 
the long-term interpretation of the resulting analysis led to strengthening of the 
evaluation protocol. Using further ethnographic observation and semi-structured 
interviews proved a valuable deviation from the planned protocol.  These methods, in 
particular the semi-structured interviews, allowed me more understanding of the 
agency of the emergency care system within the hospital and formed a major 
recommendation for future research and would form the original data gathering 
protocol should I conduct similar research again.    
Limitations were also identified from data source issues.  Poorly recorded patient 
attendance, and capacity resource data limited quantitative analysis and the possibility 
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of fully describing the Emergency Department characteristics, detailed in chapters 4, 5 
and 6.  Although access to quality data would have allowed me to test the PPP theory to 
the case site, through use of Little’s Law and takt time, this represents another 
departure of the effects of the Enterprise Culture from the PPP framework.  An 
understanding of these aspects would have led to improved analysis and would greatly 
aid Emergency care planning and decisions making. From this limitation and the 
emphasis on capacity and demand analysis identified from this research, I was able to 
introduce further improvements in my role as a manager in the trust. 
Ethnographic observation was justified as an appropriate data collection method in a 
critical realist study in chapter 4. However, during the periods of observation I was often 
taken from the Emergency Department when following patient movements in order to 
examine events.  Although following patients contributed greatly to explanatory data to 
understand causal mechanisms, I was taken away from the Emergency Department for 
long periods of my observation time.   Despite being a limitation for all individual 
researchers, the limitation may have caused me to miss some important phenomena as 
I was often following patients during particularly busy periods in the Emergency 
Department. 
Replication of this research across other rural DGH emergency care systems is not 
feasible given the specific nature of the relationships, processes and individuals making 
up the case site study. However, as noted in chapter 5, any researcher wishing to follow 
this study’s theoretic proposition, has a generalisable template for comparison (Yin, 
2014, 21). 
9.5 Concluding Synopsis  
Through this study, I aimed to test the theory that the Enterprise Culture has provided 
a framework for performance improvement in a rural District General Hospital. A single 
site case study was selected to apply mixed methods in order to understand the rigid 
organisational structures and complex social and relational phenomena described in the 
literature review.  The study found that the PPP framework, which the Enterprise 
Culture was developed to replicate, is not present in the case site in several key areas.  
In particular, managers’ understanding of the framework and the complexity of the 
systemic nature of providing emergency care was insufficient.  Additionally, the 
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influence of individual decision makers over a robust process can be seen to draw 
performance outcomes away from expected targets.   
9.6 Final Recommendations 
In addition to the recommendations to develop a simulation model to understand the 
emergency health system, additional, tangible recommendations can be drawn from the 
study. 
1. Changes to data collection methods in the Emergency Department are necessary 
to allow both deeper analysis of patient demand characteristics and the capacity 
planned and actually delivered to meet them.  Little’s Law and takt-time can then 
be calculated to plan activities to avoid queuing. 
2. Managers should be trained in PPP techniques and enabled to apply them to 
develop or improve both robust processes and empowered people to meet the 
defined purpose (four hour wait, or local need). 
3. Indicators should be developed and used to assure compliance to expected 
outcomes from the process.  A culture shift away from the decisions of influential 
people towards excellence through processes should be encouraged. 
4. Staff should be made aware of the holistic and systemic nature of emergency 
care, not just their departmental responsibilities. They should also have an 
understanding of reactions to and consequences resulting from their actions in 
a complex system. 
5. Wherever possible, departmental or administrative barriers should be removed 
to allow a process manager to assure a patient’s unrestricted flow through the 
emergency care system.  
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Appendix 1: Database Searches for the Development of Health Care 
Indicators 
1. Academic and Business Source Complete  
1. DE "ECONOMICS -- Sociological aspects"  
2. DE "PERFORMANCE evaluation"  
3. DE "KEY performance indicators"  
4. DE "POLITICAL accountability"  
5. DE "QUALITY of service"  
6. indicator*  
7. OR/1-6 
8. DE "HEALTH care reform" 
9. DE "HEALTH care industry" 
10. DE “HEALTH services administration” 
11. DE “HEALTH services administrators” 
12. OR/8-11 
13. 7 AND 12 
14. LIMIT to January 1980 to none; Scholarly (peer reviewed) journals; English language 
 
This search returned 161 results on 9th March 2011, 17 met the search criteria. 
2. COPAC 
Subject: “National Health Service” 
Keyword  “indicator”   
The search is limited to the date range 2000-2011 in English.  132 results were returned on 16th 
March 2011, 25 met the search criteria. 
3. Health Business Elite 
1. Indicator* 
2. “Health care” 
3. “Healthcare” 
4. 2 OR 3 
5. 1 AND 4 
6. LIMIT to January 1980 to 2011 
Thesaurus mapping is not available for this database.  The search returned 202 results on 11th 
March 2011, 26 met the search criteria.   
4. Health Management Information Consortium 
1. Indicator* 
2. HEALTH SERVICE INDICATORS/ 
3. HIGH LEVEL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
4. INDICATORS/ 
5. KEY INDICATORS/ 
6. NHS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
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7. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
8. SOCIAL INDICATORS/ 
9. OR/1-8 
10. HEALTH CARE/ 
11. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH ORGANISATIONS/  
12. BUSINESS HEALTH ORGANISATIONS/ 
13. COMMUNITY HEALTH CARE/ 
14. COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES/ 
15. HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE/ 
16. HEALTH AUTHORITIES/ 
17. HEALTH ECONOMICS/ 
18. HEALTH IMPROVEMENT MODERNISATION PLANS/  
19. HEALTH IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMMES/ 
20. HEALTH POLICY/ 
21. HEALTH SERVICE ADMINISTRATION/ 
22. HEALTH STATUS/ 
23. OR/10-22 
24. 9 AND 23 
25. LIMIT to January 1980 to 2011 
The search returned 99 results on 11th March 2011, 31 results met the search criteria. 
5. NHS Evidence Based Reviews 
“Health Care” and Indicator 
The search is not date limited.  52 results were returned on 22nd March 2011, non met the 
criteria. 
6. Web of Science 
1. Indicator* 
2. “Health care” 
3. “Healthcare” 
4. 2 OR 3 
5. 1 AND 4 
6. LIMIT to January 1980 to 2011 
Thesaurus mapping is not available for this database.  The search returned 358 results on 3rd 
May 2011, 14 met the search criteria.   
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Appendix 2: Database Searches for Emergency Department Indicators 
1. Academic and Business Source Complete Databases 
1. DE "KEY performance indicators"  
2. indicator* 
3. 1 OR 2 
4. “accident and emergency” 
5. “emergency department” 
6. “emergency departments” 
7. OR/4-6 
8. 3 AND 7 
9. LIMIT to January 1980 to none; Scholarly (peer reviewed) journals; English language 
This search returned 9 results on 16th June 2011.  One result met the search criteria following 
abstract review. 
2. COPAC 
“Emergency” AND “Indicator” 
The search is limited to the date range 2000-2011 in English. 104 results were returned on 10th 
March 2011.  Two results met the search criteria. 
3. CINAHL 
1. MM “Clinical Indicators” 
2. Indicator* 
3. MM "Emergency Care"  
4. MM "Emergency Medical Services" 
5. MM "Emergency Medicine" 
6. MM "Emergency Nurse Practitioners" 
7. MM "Emergency Nursing" 
8. MM "Emergency Patients" 
9. MM "Emergency Service" 
10. MM "Emergency Treatment (Non-Cinahl)" 
11. MM "Physicians, Emergency" 
12. “emergency department” 
13. “emergency departments” 
14. “accident and emergency” 
15. 1 OR 2 
16. OR/3-14 
17. 15 AND 16 
18. LIMIT to 2000 to 2011, Abstract Available, English Language, Major Thesaurus 
Headings 
This search returned 358 results on 11th March 2011.  Twenty three met the search criteria 
following abstract review. 
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6. Health Business Elite 
1. Indicator* 
2. “emergency department” 
3. “emergency departments” 
4. “accident and emergency” 
5. OR/2-4 
6. 1 AND 5 
7. LIMIT to January 2000 to 2011 
Thesaurus mapping is not available for this database.  The search returned 67 results on 11th 
March 2011. 
7. Health Management Information Consortium 
1. CLINICAL INDICATORS/  
2. ECONOMIC INDICATORS/ 
3. FUNCTIONAL STATUS INDICATORS/ 
4. HEALTH INDICATORS/ 
5. HEALTH SERVICE INDICATORS/ 
6. HIGH LEVEL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
7. INDICATORS/ OR KEY INDICATORS/ 
8. NHS PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
9. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS/ 
10. Indicators* 
11. OR/1-10 
12. EMERGENCY SERVICES/ 
13. EMERGENCY ORGANISATIONS/ 
14. EMERGENCY ADMISSION OF PATIENTS/ 
15. EMERGENCY BED SERVICE/ 
16. “emergency department” 
17. “emergency departments” 
18. “accident and emergency” 
19. OR/12-18 
20. 11 AND 19 
21. LIMIT to January 2000 to 2011 
The search returned 44 results on 11th March 2011. 
8. PubMed 
1. "Quality Indicators, Health Care"[Majr]  
2. "Health Status Indicators"[Majr] 
3. 1 OR 2 
4. "Emergency Service, Hospital"[Mesh]   
5. "Emergency Medical Services"[Mesh]  
6. "Evidence-Based Emergency Medicine"[Mesh]  
7. "Emergency Treatment"[Mesh] 
8. "Emergency Nursing"[Mesh] 
9. "Emergency Medicine"[Mesh] 
10. OR/ 4-9 
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11. 3 AND 10  
The search returned 381 results on 11th March 2011. 
9. Web of Science 
7. Indicator* 
8. “Health care” 
9. “Healthcare” 
10. 2 OR 3 
11. 1 AND 4 
12. LIMIT to January 1980 to 2011 
Thesaurus mapping is not available for this database.  The search returned 358 results on 3rd 
May 2011, 14 met the search criteria.   
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Appendix 4: Guideline Instructions for the Intervention 
Admitting patients to CDU for observation 
All patients admitted for observation should have a plan agreed with a senior A&E 
doctor and the A&E nurse co-ordinator. All patients admitted for observation should 
have a drug chart completed to ensure they get pain relief and any essential 
medications. All medical staff now have access to SystmOne, the computer system 
that most of the local GPs use, to minimise medication errors. The drug chart should 
also include regular medications, particularly for patient with Parkinson ’s disease.  The 
patient’s consent should be sought before using SystemOne. The original blue A&E 
notes should not go around to CDU with the patient, as they are likely to get lost.  Most 
observation patients should be admitted to CDU for less than 12 hours, and after 24 
hours they should be all be referred to the appropriate inpatient teams.  The nursing 
staff on CDU will provide the nursing care for these patients. The observation patients 
should have consultant ward rounds twice a day during the week and at least once a 
day at weekends. 
Patients should not be discharged from A&E or CDU until it is safe for them to go 
home.  This is important for elderly patients with precarious social circumstances 
should not be discharged overnight.  In principle, “hospital at home” services might 
present a safe alternative to admission but these are not available overnight at the 
present time.  There should be written communication from A&E team to the 
community teams, and the care home if that is where they are going, including the 
reason for admission, what was done, onward plan, medications with doses and times 
due, and whether follow up appointment need to be organised.  There must be 
mechanisms in place to ensure that patients who are being discharged can have 
prescriptions dispensed prior to discharge.  The options for this include sending a drug 
chart to pharmacy for patients who have been admitted, sending a white prescription to 
pharmacy for patients who have not been admitted, dispensing the medication from the 
A&E supply, and giving the patient or carers an outside prescription.  If the patient 
requires dressing changes they should be given at least 7 day’s supply on discharge.  
Patient being transferred to the community hospitals need a green & white community 
drug chart completing.  If the patient is issued with a frame/ crutches/walking stick etc. 
then this must go with patient. We should ensure cannulas are removed and patients 
clothes put on as increasing number of patients have been discharged with gowns on.  
If a terminally ill patient is on a Liverpool Care Pathway then the “Do Not Attempt 
Resuscitation” form and the pathway must be completed accurately and must go with 
patient.  Finally, all patients who are in pain should be offered appropriate analgesia 
prior to transfer. 
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Appendix 5:  Example Coded Interview Transcript 
Organisational relationships 
Intervention success 
Staff availability 
Influence of four hour target 
PT: Please could you give your views on recent changes to the observation patient pathway? 
AS: The pathway was changed to ensure that patients moving between A&E and CDU were 
given the same ... what shall I say… well previously it was thought that these patients weren’t 
given the same credence within CDU and they were add-ons as opposed to being part of the 
multi-disciplinary team.  The changes to the pathway have ensured that these patients are 
dealt with appropriately.  They’re not hanging around, they are not waiting for consultant 
review because all of these stipulations are in place.  So it’s improved patient care. 
PT: Do you think it has been effective? 
AS: I think so.  My observation is that there aren’t as many patients waiting to be seen as I walk 
past which is good for patient care. 
PT:  So you feel there is a demonstrable improvement. Do you feel that ties back to the needs 
of the department and the needs of the patient? 
AS:  I think it ties back to the needs of the patient.  It will put pressure on the department 
because the department lacks consultant presence and of course it needs to be a senior 
decision maker albeit a consultant or somebody on the CCG register who can make decisions 
to discharge.  So getting that level of body around CDU will prove difficult but in terms of 
patient care it’s the right thing to do. 
PT: And its very much driven by the needs of the .. 
AS: patients.. 
PT: department and patients who turn up at the department and the way the hospital works 
rather than…. 
AS: the people who run these departments 
PT: Which barriers prevent compliance (implementing and sustaining) of this pathway? 
AS: Lack of consultant presence and that’s because of difficulties in recruitment.  
Departmental… needs isn’t the right word, but in my view CDU believed that these patients 
were thrust upon them rather than embracing them into that ambulatory type care.  But now 
of course that’s all changed now because we’re moving more towards ambulatory type 
pathways so that’s helped the department move on rather than just say these are more A&E 
patients to look after. 
PT:  So the barriers to compliance as to whether the clinical staff follow the pathway, or are 
able to follow the pathway – from a management perspective do you see any… 
AS: Well, there’s an accountability.  You know if, in retrospect a patient has waited or their 
care has failed, there’s an auditable trail of what’s happened.  So the barrier is that we have to 
break down that issue between A&E and CDU don’t we? So we have to… this is ensuring the 
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compliance to the correct patient pathway. But as I say, that will be moved on much more 
quickly because of the ambulatory care pathway they are about to implement. 
PT: How does this compare to other pathway changes? 
AS: Well I think in the study that was done, everybody had a chance to have their say.  In the 
past people believe, as I have eluded to, patients being thrust upon CDU for them to look after. 
And they believe that was without their input.  Whereas the study clearly let everyone have 
their say and give the why this is the right thing for the patient.  
And care has moved on. The national guidance is that we move towards ambulatory care 
model and this just helping them get into that ward mindset, into that quick turnaround, fast 
turnaround, diagnostic type [last word not understandable]. 
PT: Why do you think there is a need to get so much input and persuade people so much when 
it comes to change?  What’s the difference between that and a direct command? 
AS: In top down command you’ll always get non-compliers. 
PT: I’m just trying to tease out why you feel that’s so prevalent?  
AS: Everybody’s had their chance. If you listen hard to what people are saying and doing what 
they’re saying is that this is being done to us.  The Trust board is at XXXX. The fact that it sits 
outside the hospital means nothing to the Pilgrim staff so they believe that XXXX are 
disempowering them and making them do this.  The way we went about getting this policy in 
place was by involving all the key stakeholders, which I think was the right thing to do.  It was 
time consuming, and if you think about why we did it – we really need that policy now – one of 
things we could improve on was to shorten the time it took for people to give back their 
answers. 
PT: I think you have already answered this question as the opposite of the barriers, but What 
enabled positive compliance to the pathway? 
AS: Getting people involved.  Getting people to talk to each other.  So actually, eventually, 
despite them being two discrete departments, and they believe they are, it’s that joining 
together of teams to ensure the patient pathway is seamless. 
PT: How does this compare to other pathway changes? 
AS: Like? What are you thinking? 
PT: Well, obviously these were changes that were identified by clinicians from various studies 
that we did.  The solutions were generated by clinicians and backed by managers. But in all 
honesty there wasn’t a great deal of management involvement. 
AS: There didn’t need to be until the end result into the physical getting the policy through the 
recognised bodies or whatever. 
PT: And was that lack of interference an enabler do you think? 
AS: Yes. I still believe that people need to be steered in the right direction though. So if the 
agreement had been we are not taking A&E patients, what would we [managers] have done? 
We would have steered them. 
PT: What are your views on indicators and targets when complying with the pathway 
changes? 
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AS: Well I think in the way that the NHS is structured, if there was nothing to aim for what do I 
think would happen to patient care. There should be something, a target to achieve otherwise 
we’ll just go back to 12 hour waits.   
PT: And should the targets be local? Should they be government driven? Should they be a 
combination? 
AS: Well to get consistency of care I think they should be government driven as far as 
everybody… so it doesn’t matter where you go, we guarantee you will be seen in the same 
time.  But there will be some local requirements, some local need that the CCG will impact so a 
combination of both.  
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Appendix 6: Wording from the Participant Information Sheet  
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide we 
would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve 
for you. One of our team will go through the information sheet with you and answer any 
questions you have.  
 
From an on-line Delphi group, we aim to identify: 
1. Which controls and practices are, or have been, in place to ensure that time-
led (four-hour patient discharge or admission) targets are met. 
2. What needs-led indicators you believe are necessary to ensure effective 
needs-led emergency care in your department? 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
We would like to establish what systems of work will deliver the best emergency care 
for local needs within your department – independent of national targets.  This study is 
funded by the researcher and is undertaken through the University of Lincoln. 
  
Why have I been invited?  
You have been invited because of your position and knowledge of the hospital’s 
emergency care system. 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is entirely voluntary.  If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to read 
and complete the consent form.  
You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.  It should be noted, 
however, that once anonymised data has been merged into the data set and analysis 
begun, it will not be possible to withdraw individual data. 
  
What will I have to do?  
You will be invited to complete an online Delphi questionnaire which will take 
approximately one hour to complete.  The questionnaire will be structured to 
address a specific topic, and the aim will be to achieve consensus amongst a group of 
your clinical colleagues with respect to the topics listed above.  The questionnaire will 
be recorded without your personal details.  
 
You will also be asked to attend a semi-structured interview to help us to 
understand your opinions about the efficacy of changes resulting from a 
clinically agreed pathway and the enablers and barriers to successful 
implementation and sustainability.  The interview will be recorded for 
transcription without your personal details and will last approximately 45 
minutes. 
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Will my contribution to the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you, or that you 
contribute, will be anonymised and handled in confidence.  
Your name will not be recorded in the study.  An identifier will be coded to represent 
your role in the emergency care system for any information we collect from you.  
These groups involve only a limited number of staff from the Accident and 
Emergency department, and any comments recorded may be attributed to your 
position.  However efforts will be made to make all quotes anonymous. 
All recordings will be made using digital media files and transcriptions will also be held 
on electronic files.  All files will be held on an encrypted computer for seven years and 
then be destroyed. 
What if I have a complaint or concern? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
principal researcher who will do his best to answer your questions [Paul Turner; 
CONTACT DETAILS WITHHELD].   
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, please contact the XXXX Trust 
customer care team on: XXXXX XXXXXX 
 
 
Additionally complaints of academic nature can be addressed by Dr R Kane at the 
University of Lincoln: 
 
Dr Ros Kane  
Senior Lecturer  
Faculty of Health Life and Social Sciences  
Room 3114  
Bridge House  
University of Lincoln  
Brayford Pool  
Lincoln  
LN6 7TS  
01522 837326 
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Appendix 7: Value Stream Map 
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Appendix 8: Papers Published in the British Journal of Health Care 
Management 
Following an agreement with the Editor, papers were published in series in the journal 
in order to keep a consistent record of the progress of this research in a relevant journal.  
They are presented below in chronological order of publication which is consistent with 
the research process. 
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